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Summary 
 
Beyond Immaturity and Victimisation: The European Periphery and the 
Eurozone Crisis 
 
Neil Dooley 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Sussex 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the eurozone crisis is its asymmetric impact. Detrimental 
economic and political consequences have resonated across Europe, but peripheral countries 
have been most severely affected. Individual peripheral countries have followed dramatically 
different paths to crisis, making it difficult to speak of the crisis as a single phenomenon. 
Bringing literature from Comparative Political Economy (CPE) on capitalist diversity into 
dialogue with scholarship on Europeanisation, this thesis develops the concept of modernisation 
via Europeanisation in order to explore the much overlooked ways in which the negotiation of 
European integration has been generative of divergence of the European periphery. 
To capture this asymmetry, I investigate the origins of the eurozone crisis across three 
cases – Greece, Portugal and Ireland. I study the active attempt by these countries to negotiate 
and adapt to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of European integration. This approach sheds light on 
how adaptation to Europe inadvertently resulted in the generation of fragile, hybrid, models of 
growth in each of the three countries. These findings have significant implications for how we 
understand the origins of the crisis. They suggest that it has been the European periphery’s 
attempt to ‘follow the rules’ of European Integration, rather than their failure or inability to do 
so, that explains their current difficulties.  
This novel reading of the origins of the eurozone crisis directly challenges settled 
common-senses in existing literature. The eurozone crisis cannot be explained by narratives 
which stress the ‘immaturity’ of the countries of the European Periphery. Neither can it be 
explained by more critical narratives which understand the periphery as a victim of German 
‘economic domination’. Instead, the relative severity of the crisis in the periphery can be 
explained by the EU’s obstinate promotion of a single model of convergence which has 
generated a variety of different European economic trajectories. 
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Introduction 
 
All happy countries are alike; but each unhappy country is unhappy in its own 
way. 
 
Albert Jaeger, Senior Resident IMF Representative in Lisbon, 2015. 
 
 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the eurozone crisis is its asymmetric impact. 
Detrimental economic and political consequences have resonated across Europe, but 
peripheral member states have been affected more severely than others (Hardiman and 
Dellepiane 2010, 473). Not only this, but individual peripheral countries have followed 
dramatically different paths to crisis. While the Greek state may have dangerously over-
borrowed and widened its budget deficit, Ireland was among the most fiscally 
responsible economies in Europe. While banks fuelled a property bubble in Ireland, 
Portugal was in the midst of a decade long recession. As an IMF economist playfully 
put it, each unhappy peripheral country is ‘unhappy in its own way’ (2012).  
This thesis has two main purposes. First, I aim to develop an understanding of 
the origins of the eurozone crisis in the European periphery by conducting case studies 
of Greece, Portugal and Ireland.1 The embattled Greek economy makes up just two per 
cent of the eurozone. And yet, the shockwaves from its crisis have appeared to threaten 
the disintegration of the entire European project. As such, whether the eurozone crisis is 
understood as mostly domestic or systemic in nature, it is vital that existing literature 
reflects on the assumptions it makes about the crucial role of the periphery. Second, in 
                                                          
1 The island of Ireland technically comprises of two states: The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
For the sake of convenience, throughout this thesis, I refer to the Republic of Ireland as ‘Ireland’. 
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order for this explanation to be persuasive, this thesis aims to account for the 
dramatically different paths to crisis the periphery has followed.  The crisis has been 
and is playing out in very different ways across Europe (Bruff and Ebenau 2014, 4). 
This suggests an intellectual puzzle: why has the eurozone crisis appeared to manifest as 
a fiscal crisis in Greece, a recession in Portugal and as a banking crisis in Ireland? To 
examine these questions, this thesis traces the evolution of economic trajectories across 
these three case studies in the decades before their respective crises.  
In order to examine these cases, I propose a framework based on a combination 
of scholarship on Europeanisation and the Comparative Political Economy (CPE) 
literature on ‘capitalist diversity’. This proposed framework makes it possible to draw 
attention to the much overlooked ways in which domestic adaptation to European 
integration has been generative of precarious patterns of divergence across the European 
periphery.  I develop the concept of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ to argue that 
over the past number of decades, Greece, Portugal and Ireland have viewed their own 
modernisation in the mirror of a ‘one size fits all’ model of European development. As 
such, national and supranational efforts at promoting the convergence of member states 
have – paradoxically – propelled these countries towards crisis. 
The issue of asymmetry is becoming increasingly acknowledged as absolutely 
central to research into the origins of the eurozone crisis (Bruff and Ebenau 2014, 4; 
Jäger and Springler 2015, 1). Yet, I argue that existing literature has yet to adequately 
take up the challenge of explaining it. Instead, there has been a tendency, even in 
otherwise sophisticated analysis, to fall back upon, and reproduce, one of two 
problematic narratives of why the periphery was ‘hit hardest’ by the eurozone crisis.  
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The first is a story about the ‘lazy Greeks’ and their fellow European ‘PIIGS’.2 
Much like their namesakes in the fairy tale, the PIIGS built their houses out of straw, 
risking the survival of the eurozone in the process (Dooley 2015a). As the story goes, 
Portugal, Ireland, and particularly Greece were unwilling to introduce ‘painful but 
necessary’ reforms in the decades before the crisis hit; content to irresponsibly 
reproduce patterns of fiscal profligacy, low efficiency and political immaturity (Bastasin 
2012,8; Lavdas, Litsas, and Skiadas 2013, 175).  
 The second story offers a more critical take - casting Germany as the ‘big bad 
wolf’ of the tale.3 While the above notions of peripheral ‘immaturity’ remain 
widespread and influential, somewhat surprisingly, scholars have noted that narratives 
expressed in Western media have increasingly focused on the problems with 
Germany’s, rather than the so-called ‘PIIGS’, behaviour (Cross and Ma 2015, 1066; 
Adler-Nissen 2015). Germany has been portrayed as iron-fisted and intransigent (Cross 
and Ma 2015), as irrationally committing to its ordoliberal values even when this 
commitment threatens the very existence of the European project (Matthijs 2015). 
Germany is accused of ‘beggaring its neighbour’ in the European periphery in order to 
reproduce its export-led model of growth, and of uniquely and perhaps deliberately 
benefitting from the euro at the inevitable expense of its fellow member states 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012). The centrality of Germany in the origins, escalation, and 
intractability of the crisis has become more and more commonplace in ongoing debates. 
By replacing one scapegoat with another, this narrative of peripheral ‘victimisation’ 
aims to challenge existing assumptions by blaming the German ‘big bad wolf’ instead 
of the ‘PIIGS’. 
                                                          
2 A regrettable acronym for the so-called ‘deficit’ countries of Southern Europe and Ireland: Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
3 While Germany remains central to most research in this vein, some approaches emphasise the role of 
‘core Europe’ and/or of transnational capital classes. 
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These two narratives of the origins of the crisis in the periphery – labelled here 
as the ‘immaturity thesis’ and the ‘victimisation thesis’ – have remained largely 
undisturbed by alternative conceptions, and have strongly influenced much existing 
research on the eurozone crisis.4 I argue that this has contributed to two major gaps in 
the literature. Firstly, existing accounts downplay the very different kinds of crisis the 
European periphery has experienced. Pointing out, as scholarship relying on 
assumptions of immaturity does, that every peripheral country ‘failed to converge’ tells 
us little about how and why these three specific kinds of ‘divergence’ emerged. 
Exposing the periphery’s collective victimisation by Germany or Western Europe 
explains less still about these multiple paths.  
The second major gap relates to the agency of the periphery. While the 
immaturity thesis reifies and pathologises peripheral agency (rendering it immature, 
incomplete), the victimisation thesis neglects it entirely – peripheral agency has been 
stunted by the core. This problem tends to produce scholarly and political debates that 
are pre-occupied with assigning blame (as Hänska 2015; Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 
2014; and Ntampoudi 2014 all note). On the one hand, narratives of blame are clearly 
evident in the conditionality of the European Union-European Central Bank-
International Monetary Fund (EU-ECB-IMF) arrangements, as well as in the emerging 
European institutional response to the crisis; all of which are marked by measures 
designed to correct the immaturities of the peripheral states. This response has been 
widely admonished with even the IMF issuing an extraordinary apology for not 
recognising the damage austerity would do to Greece (see Elliott, Inman, and Smith 
                                                          
4 This literature on the eurozone crisis is usually split into two levels (national and systemic level causes – 
see Matthijs 2015, 3), or sometimes sub-divided into different configurations of three or more (e.g. see 
Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 144 and Jones 2015). I argue that, regardless of whether a systemic or 
domestic level approach is adopted, literature on the eurozone crisis tends to rely on either assumptions of 
immaturity or victimisation when it deals with the causes of the crisis in the periphery. Because any 
account of the eurozone crisis will need to diagnose the crisis in the periphery, implicitly or otherwise, 
narratives of immaturity and victimisation are widespread. I will further develop this argument in chapter 
one. 
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2013). Related to this, some have noted how public, media and political perceptions of 
the periphery, particularly Greece, as immature contributed to the notorious 
procrastination on the part of European elites in responding to the crisis, a serious error 
that raised the stakes of the crisis (Bastasin 2012, 7–11). Brazys and Hardiman (2013) 
have even noted how the very use of ‘heuristic labels’ such as the ‘PIIGS’ acronym 
have actually contributed to negative market responses towards those states.  
On the other hand, transposed from academic to political discourses, narratives 
of victimisation have contributed to the problematic rise of anti-German sentiment 
within Europe. Labels such as ‘Nazi oppressor and colonizer’ and ‘strict teacher’ vie for 
prominence against ‘immature pupil’ and ‘moral sinner’ (see Adler-Nissen 2015, 3; 
Dooley 2015). Roberto Orsi notes that the taboo of large scale weaponisations of war 
memories against Germany has been broken (Orsi 2015), and populist rhetoric from all 
corners has emerged that others claim form an emerging ‘intra-European neo-racism’ 
(Kouvélakis 2012, xix; see also Andreou 2012) – potentially feeding into disintegrative 
momentums for the European project.  
Framed in this way, existing debates beg the question: is it possible to have 
understanding of the periphery as having a role in their own history without resorting to 
the dead end of choosing between a German and a Greek scapegoat? What would it 
mean to investigate the origins of the eurozone crisis without lenses of blame? 
Based on in-depth case study analysis of the crises in Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland, I propose a different interpretation of the origins of their respective crises. 
These countries were ‘hit hardest’ not because of their ‘immature’ patterns of political 
and economic governance, nor due to their ‘victimisation’ by their more powerful 
European neighbours. Instead, I argue that the crisis in the European periphery is the 
product of supranational and national attempts to promote the convergence of the 
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European periphery with Western Europe. Greece, Portugal, and Ireland have been at 
the centre of the crisis because their aspirations to converge with Western Europe 
catalysed brand new and unexpected patterns of divergence. In other words, the 
countries of the European periphery got into trouble by ‘following the rules’ of 
European integration, not by failing to. 
In developing this argument, this thesis makes important contributions to 
debates on the eurozone crisis. Theoretically, I develop the concept of ‘modernisation 
via Europeanisation’ to demonstrate how insights from the Comparative Political 
Economy (CPE) literature on ‘capitalist diversity’ can be fruitfully brought into 
dialogue with studies of ‘Europeanisation’. While the latter directs attention to the 
effects of ‘domestic adaptation to European regional integration’ (Vink and Graziano 
2007, 7), CPE makes an important distinction between divergence (transformation) and 
non-convergence (persistence of national variation in the face of pressures to transform) 
(Hancké 2009, 9). Their combination leads to a new understanding of how domestic 
adaptation to European regional integration can be generative of brand new, 
unpredictable patterns of transformation.5 
This argument implies an important distinction between convergence as a 
process and convergence as a project. National and EU elites alike have tended to 
subscribe to a common sense belief that European integration would lead to processes 
of convergence among member states. The implication of joining the Single Market and 
the euro is that all member states could and should use a ‘one size fits all’ formula to 
secure economic growth, and it was believed that competitive pressures together with 
                                                          
5 As I argue in chapter one, the literature on Europeanisation tends to conflate ‘divergence’ with ‘non-
convergence’. Drawing on the insights of capitalist diversity, I propose that the evolving economic 
trajectories of the European periphery cannot simply be explained with reference to the resilience of 
national varieties of capitalism in the face of EU driven pressures to converge. Europeanisation led 
neither to convergence, nor non-convergence for the European periphery. Instead, it led to the generation 
of new, unanticipated, patterns of transformation, or in other words, divergence. 
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the stringent conditions imposed by the EU on member states would force structural 
reform and lead to institutional convergence (Hall 2012, 357).  As Hall (2014) notes, an 
‘element of prophecy was built into this mythology’ which remained, of course, 
unfulfilled.  Greece, Ireland, and Portugal all participated in projects of convergence 
during their membership of the EU. I argue that these projects aimed at promoting 
convergence were actually significant contributors to processes of divergence in these 
countries. Convergence as a process is a myth, but the emergence of projects to 
restructure economies in the name of convergence has had real and significant effects.6  
Empirically, I contribute new interpretations of the origins of the eurozone crisis 
in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Existing domestic accounts have been dominated by 
historical narratives that are pre-occupied with identifying the various obstacles to the 
development of mature trajectories of development in these countries. Systemic 
accounts have tended to eschew a domestic focus. When they do trace national crises, 
they privilege the structural role of ‘external’ over domestic pressures for change. As 
such, parallel national histories of the origins of specific patterns of divergence –
something altogether different - have tended to be neglected. In contributing to the 
filling of these gaps, the case studies presented here invite new thinking on the histories 
of economic development and crisis in these three countries.  
Taken together, these contributions suggest a way for debates on the crisis in the 
European periphery to move beyond problematic narratives of immaturity and 
victimisation. Although it is vital that the domestic sources of the eurozone crisis be 
accounted for, a deeper understanding of these sources can be arrived at by recognising 
                                                          
6 For the sake of clarity, please note that throughout the thesis, the term ‘convergence’ will refer to 
projects of convergence, and does not indicate any subscription to theories that assume the likelihood of 
‘convergence’ as a process (e.g., see Hancké 2009, 5-6 for an account of liberal convergence theorists). 
For this reason, it is possible to speak about a ‘project of convergence’ (e.g. adherence to EU budget rules 
or transposition of EU directives on banking and finance) and to note how these projects actually are 
generative of divergence. 
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both their immature and non-immature components. Similarly, debates surrounding the 
potentially ‘hegemonic’ role of Germany, hierarchy and inequality within Europe, and 
the architectural flaws of the European project matter. I suggest that we can enrich our 
understandings of these issues by leaving assumptions of ‘victimisation’ behind, and 
viewing them instead through the lens of peripheral agency.  
 
Structure of thesis 
The argument of this thesis is developed across five chapters. Chapter one reviews 
existing literature on the origins of the eurozone crisis in the European periphery. I shed 
light on the ways in which literature ranging from domestic level to systemic level 
analysis has tended to fall back upon narratives of immaturity or victimisation to 
account for the relative severity of the crisis in the periphery. These narratives draw 
necessary attention to the domestic and systemic character of the eurozone crisis 
respectively. Yet, they are unable to adequately account for the asymmetry of the crisis 
or the agency of the periphery. After exposing these limitations, I propose an analytical 
framework that combines the study of Europeanisation with the Comparative Political 
Economy insights of capitalist diversity. This framework makes it possible to trace the 
evolving trajectories of economic development in Greece, Portugal and Ireland, while 
being sensitive to the possibility that Europeanisation has acted as a catalyst for the 
emergence of radically new hybrid structures and patterns of growth. 
 Chapter two analyses the case of Greece, beginning the first of three case 
studies. Greece has been presented in segments of the international press as ‘the new 
rogue element of our times’ (Lavdas, Litsas and Skiadas 2013, 175). Scholarship on the 
Greek crisis has similarly emphasised its ‘exceptional’ origins, typically tracing how the 
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emergence of ‘debt-fuelled clientelism’ in the 1980s has resisted the attempts of 
modernisers and reformers to supplant it in the decades before crisis struck. In contrast, 
I make an analytical distinction between the fiscal and competitiveness components of 
Greece’s crisis, and argue that although the former can be partially (but not 
exhaustively) explained with reference to the ‘poor reform capacity’ of the Greek state, 
the latter emerged as a result of implementing EU reforms relating to liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation. The Europeanisation of Greece facilitated the emergence 
of a ‘debt-led’ trajectory of economic growth, suggesting that Greece’s problems were 
caused just as much by the EU driven reforms it succeeded in introducing, as by those it 
failed to. 
 Chapter three turns to Portugal, and investigates the origins of a crisis that was 
characterised by the experience of ‘all of the signs of overheating… without any 
acceleration of GDP’ (Deutsche Bank 2010). I trace how the introduction of EC/EU 
facilitated ‘structural reforms’ throughout the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the 
development of ‘domestic demand debt-led growth’ (Lagoa et al. 2014). In the 1990s, a 
rejuvenated private banking sector drove the expansion of economic growth in 
Portugal’s non-tradable sector, damaging the country’s competitiveness and creating 
some of the highest levels of private debt in the EU. This trajectory of economic growth 
contributed to a decade of recession in the 2000s, ensuring that Portugal was 
particularly vulnerable to contagion from the Greek and Irish crises from 2010 onwards.  
 Chapter four focuses on the origins of the Irish banking crisis. I make an 
analytical distinction between the decline of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ export boom and the 
emergence of a detrimental housing bubble in the early 2000s. Challenging dominant 
explanations regarding the negligence of Irish governments from the late 1990s 
onwards, I argue that Ireland’s implementation of reforms driven by its preparations for 
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joining the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) facilitated the 
emergence of a highly liberalised and aggressive banking sector from as early as the late 
1980s. While European integration may have been vital to Ireland’s development of 
export-oriented growth in 1990s, it also created the conditions for a severe banking 
crisis a decade later. 
 Chapter five draws the historical narratives of the three case studies together and 
explains the thesis’ contribution to new theories of the origins and asymmetry of the 
eurozone crisis. More specifically it develops the concept of modernisation via 
Europeanisation as an alternative to narratives of immaturity and victimisation. This 
concept comprises of two analytical steps. Firstly, it argues that the countries of the 
European periphery have been ‘hit hardest’ by the eurozone crisis because their attempts 
to ‘catch up’ with Western Europe by aspiring to converge their levels and forms of 
development with them were – paradoxically – generative of brand new patterns of 
unstable divergence. The crises in Greece, Portugal and Ireland were not caused solely 
by exceptional or immature national traits. Rather, they were an unintended outcome of 
putatively ‘mature’ patterns of Europeanisation.   
Secondly, the damaging effects of Europeanisation are not best captured by 
narratives of victimisation. Germany and other ‘core’ member states had little to gain 
from this process. Rather, the European periphery actively and enthusiastically ‘tailored 
themselves’ to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of development as part of national strategies 
of modernisation. In addition, paying attention to agency makes it possible to identify 
how a common external pressure such as a ‘one size fits all’ model of European 
integration was mediated domestically, resulting in very different patterns of 
institutional change. Greece, Portugal and Ireland all negotiated their own 
Europeanisation in different forms and at different levels. Focusing only on how these 
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countries were ‘passively reshaped’ by Europe or Germany overlooks how the agency 
of each country shaped their very different respective paths to crisis. The concept of 
modernisation via Europeanisation implies that the eurozone crisis is a crisis of the 
project of convergence itself, and the integration process has not been sensitive or 
flexible enough to the unpredictable and divergent outcomes of the attempt to promote 
the economic convergence of its member states. Finally, the concluding chapter 
summarises the development of the overall argument, and reflects on its broader 
significance for academic and political debates on the eurozone crisis. I propose that the 
concept of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ can deepen understandings of the crises 
in the European periphery, of hierarchies and inequalities within the EU, and of the 
eurozone crisis more generally. 
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1 
Beyond the ‘Lazy PIIGS’ and the ‘Big Bad Wolf’: 
Rethinking the Asymmetry of the Eurozone Crisis 
 
 
Let's be clear about the responsibility, because sometimes not only in the Irish 
case, I hear it’s suggested the problems have been by created by the European 
Union or by the euro. It is exactly the opposite. The problems have been created 
in some countries because they did not observe the minimum prudence in terms 
of managing their banking or financial sector, in other countries, because they 
were not able to control the excessive debt. This is the case. 
José Manuel Barosso, former President of the European Commission, 2013. 
 
 
[The eurozone crisis] has nothing whatsoever to do with [peripheral immaturity], 
and even if God’s angels were running the Athens government, Greece would be 
suffering the same destructive dynamic that we are experiencing currently  
Yanis Varoufakis, former Minister for Finance of Greece, 2013. 
 
 
Modernization theory can see only a failed state to be explained by 'tradition', its 
explanatory framework allowing only a vacuous teleology or a facile exoticism. 
Dependency theory is no better, seeing … realities only as externally determined 
by global class forces. 
Tom Young, 1999. 
 
 
 
The aim of this first chapter is twofold. First, I scrutinise how existing literature has 
dealt with explaining the origins of the crisis in the European periphery. Second, in 
doing so, I clear the ground for an alternative framework for studying the origins of the 
crisis in Greece, Portugal and Ireland.  
As the foregoing introductory chapter has suggested, approaches ranging from 
domestic to systemic-level accounts have tended to fall back upon and reproduce two 
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problematic narratives in order to account for the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis. In 
this chapter, I begin by introducing these narratives, which I label the ‘immaturity’ and 
‘victimisation’ theses; and I demonstrate how they have generated problematic 
empirical and theoretical gaps in existing literature.  
 Perhaps the most influential narrative of the origins of the crisis in the periphery 
is the ‘immaturity thesis’. The European ‘PIIGS’ are widely understood to have built 
their houses out of straw. As the story goes, the causes of the eurozone crisis originate 
from the supposed hubris, profligacy, corruption, and general lack mature political 
culture in countries of the European periphery.  In spite of plausible counter-narratives, 
the immaturity thesis continues to drive the debate on the crisis in the periphery, and to 
underpin policy prescriptions (Adler-Nissen 2015, 6). 
Nevertheless, this narrative has been strongly challenged by approaches which 
view Germany as the ‘big bad wolf’ of the story; focusing on how its economic 
dominance of the eurozone contributed directly to the European periphery’s 
vulnerabilities. Such frameworks typically understand the eurozone as a region 
characterised by a core-periphery hierarchy between the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ style 
economic growth of the core, especially Germany, which has lead to precarious, 
‘financialised’ growth in the periphery.  ‘Core-periphery’ analysis has been rapidly 
gaining momentum in academic debates on the eurozone crisis (see especially 
Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Becker et al. 2010; Bellofiore, Garibaldo, and Halevi 2010; 
Bibow 2012; Stockhammer 2011; Beck 2013), and has also become very much in vogue 
in media circles (see Hugh 2014; Krugman 2013; 2014;  Barnett 2011;  Wolf 2010a; 
2010b) allowing many to argue that it doesn’t matter what material the PIIGS built their 
houses from, the real problem is that a big bad wolf resides in the eurozone and is 
blowing them down. 
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In reviewing existing literature, I argue that scholarship which relies on notions 
of either peripheral immaturity or German dominance cannot adequately explain the 
difficulties of the European periphery or the origins of the eurozone crisis. Certainly, it 
is vital that scholarship takes the domestic sources of the eurozone crisis seriously, and 
in doing so, does not explain away the clear role played by ‘immature’ factors. 
Similarly, we cannot fully understand the eurozone crisis without engaging in debates 
surrounding German hegemony, current account imbalances, international capital flows, 
and issues around hegemony and inequality in Europe. However, while the immaturity 
thesis has staged a problematic ‘morality play’ between Northern ‘saints’ and Southern 
‘sinners’, narratives of victimisation will be shown to lack empirical support for their 
positing of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ relationship between core and periphery. While 
their challenges to notions of ‘immaturity’ are welcome, I propose that critical literature 
on the eurozone crisis needs to move beyond assumptions of Germany as the ‘big bad 
wolf’ in order to open up the space for the development a genuinely critical rethinking 
of the origins of the eurozone crisis. In doing so, I suggest that such perspectives can 
offer a more compelling explanation of the ‘systemic’ issues they are concerned with 
examining. 
After concluding the review of existing literature, I propose an alternative 
framework for studying the crises in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Combining 
Europeanisation studies with the Comparative Political Economy (CPE) literature on 
capitalist diversity, this framework proposes studying the crises in the European 
periphery in the following ways. First of all, by drawing upon the CPE literature on 
‘capitalist diversity’ I discuss the approaches strengths (namely, the historicist study of 
institutional change) and limitations (namely, the problems of path dependency and 
methodological nationalism), and in doing so develop a key distinction between 
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‘divergence’ and ‘non-convergence’. Secondly, I propose drawing on this distinction to 
study the modernisation of the three case studies, but in a way that overcomes the linear, 
stadial conceptualisations of development adopted by approaches underpinned by 
‘modernisation theory’ claims. Finally, by drawing on the literature on Europeanisation, 
I suggest a framework that can avoid the internalism of the immaturity thesis and the 
externalism of the victimisation thesis by studying domestic adaptation to European 
integration (Vink and Graziano 2007, 7). This framework provides a conceptual 
foundation to conduct the case studies in the following three chapters that is sensitive to 
asymmetry, peripheral agency, the impact of European integration, and that is also 
capable of providing a new kind of critical alternative to the immaturity thesis. 
 The chapter comprises of three main parts. Section one discusses the 
‘immaturity thesis’ and its limitations through exploring two bodies of literature on the 
origins of the eurozone crisis – domestic level analysis and the ‘design flaws’ 
perspective. Section two explores the ‘victimisation thesis’, focusing mainly on ‘core-
periphery’ analysis. In the third and final section, a framework for moving beyond these 
two narratives and rethinking the ‘asymmetry’ of the eurozone crisis is proposed.  
 
Section One: The ‘lazy PIIGS’: unpacking the ‘immaturity thesis’ 
In late December 2013, responding disapprovingly to a question regarding relief on 
Ireland’s bank debt, former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso 
rearticulated a familiar narrative of the crisis in the European periphery. The euro was 
the ‘victim’ of irresponsible economic and political governance in the periphery, rather 
than the other way around (Independent.ie 2013). Barroso’s answer is underpinned by 
the ‘immaturity thesis’; perhaps the most ubiquitous explanation of the causes of the 
eurozone crisis. Found across political (European Commission 2010; 2011; 2012; for an 
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overview see Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis 2014), media (for overviews see 
Antoniades 2013; Tzogopoulos 2013) as well as scholarly discourses (mostly in the 
form of case studies, see below) the immaturity thesis is an explanation of the causes of 
the eurozone crisis which places the supposed profligacy, corruption, and general lack 
mature political culture in the European periphery at the heart of its analysis.  
In this first section, the various ways in which the literature on the eurozone 
crisis draws upon and reproduces the ‘immaturity thesis’ are outlined. I begin by 
reviewing the widely influential country-specific ‘domestic level analyses’ of the crises 
in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. I then introduce the ‘design flaws’ literature which 
highlights the institutional and policy faults at the level of the EU and the eurozone. 
Finally I draw together some of the major empirical and theoretical limitations that stem 
from reliance on assumptions of peripheral ‘immaturity’. 
 
Domestic level analysis: ‘immaturity’ in Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
In her analysis of Ireland, Niamh Hardiman argues that although the global economic 
crisis has induced recession and created major shocks for all the economies of the 
‘developed world’, if we wish to understand why the crisis has not had a uniformly 
severe effect on every country, we need to bring domestic institutions ‘back in’ to the 
analysis (Hardiman 2010: 71). In other words, if we wish to explain variation in 
experience of the global credit crunch or the eurozone crisis, the appropriate unit of 
analysis is the variation of practices and policies within states. Hardiman’s approach is 
consistent with the highly prominent ‘domestic level’ approach to the origins of the 
eurozone crisis. At face value, such a perspective is well positioned to account for the 
asymmetric impact of the eurozone crisis. Each eurozone member-country experienced 
the crisis as a challenge to its domestic capacity to manage its own particular ‘problem 
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load’ (Hardiman and Dellepiane 2010, 474). As such, this perspective explains the 
asymmetry of the eurozone crisis through a detailed analysis of the national-specific 
problems of domestic governance, economic practices and policy, arguing that these 
national problems have culminated to ensure the particular member state is less 
insulated than it should be against exogenous shock (Honohan and Leddin 2005).   
Nevertheless, as I discuss in detail later, domestic-level analysis fails to deliver 
on this potential, because the historical specificity it purports to provide is over-
determined by assumptions of ‘immaturity’. Specifically, in spite of the above strengths, 
it suffers from assumptions relating to unilinear modernisation theory, methodological 
nationalism, and has a tendency to fall back upon reified and pathologised notions of 
national and political cultures to explain divergence. Before these limitations are 
elaborated on, the different, and still dominant, domestic level accounts of Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland are outlined. 
 
‘Debt fuelled clientelism’: Greece and the immaturity thesis  
The immaturity thesis first emerged within domestic level analysis of the Greek crisis. 
Jason Manolopoulos writes that:  
modern Greek society and economy… is a monster... This is a systemic, cultural 
dimension of the Greek saga; it is not just a case of a few unconnected scandals. 
It is institutionalised (2011). 
 
More than a few agree (see, for example, Katsimi and Moutos 2010; Mētsopoulos and 
Pelagidēs 2012). Greece has been represented as a ‘scape-goat for a systemic failure of 
huge proportions’, labelled by some European tabloids as a nation ‘of non-productive, 
lazy and unmistakably corrupt people’ (Lavdas, Litsas, and Skiadas 2013, 175). Such 
narratives tend to represent Greece as ‘exceptional’; as the antithesis of ‘advanced’ 
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Northern European economies (Manolopoulos 2011, 11) and it is in these terms that the 
sources of the ongoing crisis can be delineated.7 Notions of Greek exceptionalism 
underpin the argument that a country such as Greece should never have been allowed to 
join the euro in the first place. Greece is not only accused of being responsible for its 
own mess; its immaturity has risked the very survival of the European project.  
How is this narrative analytically constructed? The first step is to recognise, at 
the most basic level, that the Greek sovereign debt crisis of 2009 was ‘mostly fiscal’: it 
was a crisis of Greek public finances, and of its consistently exorbitant levels of public 
debt and budget deficits. Greek public debt has been close to 100 per cent of GDP or 
more since the late 1980s, and its budget deficit, while fluctuating over the same period, 
has remained well over the Euro area average (Alogoskoufis 2012, 2; Featherstone 
2010, 298; Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Marzinotto 2010, 4).  Secondly, this excessive debt 
has its origins in the socioeconomic polices of the mid to late 1970s, but particularly of 
the 1980s which were aimed at expanding the public sector, social spending and raising 
wages through borrowing. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his party the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) are accused of pursuing political power via a 
highly-charged populist agenda and then consolidating this support once in power 
through expansionary fiscal policies and the construction of systems of clientelism.8   
The third analytical step is to recognise that PASOK’s strategy of political 
power consolidation catalysed a particular and toxic relationship between state and 
society. PASOK and later New Democracy (ND) transformed the Greek state into a 
complex system of clientelism/patronage. Electoral support was traded for favours, 
                                                          
7 See also the large body of literature on Greek 'underdog culture', summarised in Triandafyllidou and 
Gropas 2013, 4–6; but see in particular Tsoukalas 1995; Diamandouros 1993; Diamandouros 2011; and 
for indispensible critical interventions see Tziovas 2001, 2014; Xenakis 2013. 
8 See various chapters in Clogg 1993; Clogg 2002, 173–209, and see the discussion on ‘Hellenic 
Peronism’ in Manolopoulos 2011, 1-13. 
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employment, and particular lifestyles.  Major sections of society accordingly became 
bound up in a systems of clientelism, and bribery and corruption in the everyday 
provision of public services became a ‘national pastime’ (Manolopoulos 2011, 103–4; 
CNN 2011). Put very simply, the form of state developed by PASOK in the 1980s 
helped engender a broad ‘culture of entitlement’ across Greek society (see 
Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013 for a summary of this argument). 
The final analytical step posits the ‘end of Greek history’; the next thirty years 
of Greek history are, in any meaningful sense, static; the clientelistic state that had 
become consolidated during the 1980s proved impossible to supplant throughout 1990s 
and 2000s (see Diamandouros 2011).9 Although exceptions are well noted, it is widely 
considered that no meaningful reforms succeeded during the 1990s and 2000s (see 
Diamandouros 2011) because the debt-fuelled clientelism had become endemic and 
impossible to supplant. The state’s growth, and the interests of society at large, not to 
mention powerful interest groups, were all too dependent on the ‘Greek’ model (see, for 
example, the discussion in Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2013, 1-21; Diamandouros 2011, 
1994; Tsoukalas 1995).  
 
‘Chronic fiscal misbehaviour’: Portugal and the immaturity thesis 
With all of the (much unwanted) attention Greece receives, the Portuguese story is 
perhaps less familiar to many. The crisis there is understood as a story of three main 
factors: ‘chronic fiscal misbehaviour’ (Royo 2012), weak competitiveness (Mamede and 
Rodrigues 2012; Sebastián Royo 2012; Sebastián Royo 2013) and crucially, the 
political unwillingness to deal with either (Pereira and Wemans 2012; Magone 2004; 
                                                          
9 There is a large body of literature on this. For examples, see various essays in Mitsos and Mossialos 
2000; and various essays in Kalyvas, Pagoulatos, and Tsoukas 2013; and for more critical contributions 
see Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002; Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009. 
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Baer and Leite 2003). Had Portuguese governments managed their public finances more 
prudently, and had they taken advantage of EU membership by introducing and 
reforming institutions and policies to improve productivity and competitiveness, it is 
argued to be likely that Portugal would not have found itself in the position of the 
country in the eurozone most vulnerable to contagion (Kalbaska and Gątkowski 2012). 
It has been claimed that ‘the adoption of financially unsustainable public and 
private decisions over the years, together with the repeated postponement of “structural 
reforms”,’ lie at the roots of Portugal’s present crisis (Mamede 2012). This is nothing 
new for Portugal. In fact, the 2011 troika rescue package is the third time Portugal has 
been bailed out since its democratic revolution in 1974. Successive Portuguese 
governments (especially during the 2000s) are accused of failing to get a handle on their 
public finances, even (somewhat implausibly) temporarily introducing a government 
fiscal stimulus package in 2009, at the height of the eurozone crisis (Pedroso 2014). 
Electoral considerations and other motives, ‘often unrelated to the promotion of 
economic, social and environmental development… have been at the basis of fiscal 
practices which eventually proved to be unsustainable’ (Mamede 2012, 33). 
 Similar to Greece, analysis of Portugal’s misgovernment recognises the very 
real attempts at reform made by the country over the years. Yet, these reforms are 
almost always understood as insufficient or illusory (Royo 2012, 190). As Abreu notes, 
in the second half of the 1990s fiscal policy was expansionary. Deficit reductions 
necessary to join the euro owed much to high economic growth and the substantial fall 
in interest rates and consequently in debt servicing costs, and were not achieved through 
necessary structural reforms as they should have been (Abreu 2006, 2). Much like 
Greece, Portugal allegedly managed to participate in the euro under false pretences.  
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The Portuguese crisis is more widely recognised as not just a fiscal crisis, but 
also a crisis of competitiveness and productivity. Portugal entered recession in 2003 as 
GDP contracted by 0.9 percent and growth rates were lower than 2 percent from 2004 
until 2006 (Pereira and Wemans 2012, 10; see also Banco de Portugal 2009, 118). It is 
argued that Portuguese policy makers did not do enough to improve their international 
competitiveness and productivity by taking advantage of the opportunities of European 
integration (Abreu 2006, 3). Reis (2013) notes that most literature on Portugal’s crisis 
tends to mention various obstacles to Portugal’s productivity during the 2000s; a list 
that typically includes low average educational attainment, low total factor productivity, 
an oversized government, labour market rigidities, inefficient legal system and low 
export competitiveness (2013; see also Mamede 2012, 33; Pereira and Wemans 2012, 4-
5; see also Baer and Leite 2003, 745).  
 ‘Chronic fiscal mismanagement’ together with a failure to reform and upgrade 
the ‘cultural patterns of behaviour in Portuguese society’ and politics (Magone 2004, 
236) are argued to be the central causes of the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis. 
Together they formed a reinforcing pattern of anaemic growth and spiralling public 
finances. In the context of broader volatility in the eurozone from 2010 onwards, this 
pattern ensured that a Portuguese bailout, as Pereira and Wemans claim, was inevitable 
(2012). 
 
‘We all partied’: Ireland and the immaturity thesis 
If Portugal and Greece’s difficulties were caused by immature political and economic 
governance, Ireland’s crisis initially emerges as something of a puzzle. Kirby notes that 
Ireland was forced to apply for an €85 billion bailout after two decades of being viewed 
as the ‘poster child of the EU, proudly mentioned as proof of the Union’s policy 
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package’ and as a ‘showpiece of globalisation’ (Kirby 2010, 3). During the 1990s, 
Ireland’s high tech export sector drove economic growth at an annual average rate of 
over three times that of most other European countries; with some of the lowest levels 
of government spending and borrowing in Europe (Kirby 2010; Ó Riain 2007; 2014).  
It is typically argued that over time, different decisions by Irish governments 
contributed to the emergence of a banking crisis. The Celtic Tiger model was ‘hijacked’ 
by governments in the late 1990s and 2000s, who facilitated freedoms to the banking 
sector, spurring a housing boom, and put in place a timid and ineffective (Honohan 
2010) ‘light-touch regulatory system seeking to encourage the market rather than 
restrain it’ (Kirby 2010, 9; Honohan 2010; see also Hardiman 2012; Hogan, Donnelly, 
and O’Rourke 2010, 38; Klaus Regling, 2010). There existed close personal as well as 
financial links between bankers, property developers, builders and politicians, especially 
in the Fianna Fáil party (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012, 92). Elaine Byrne argues that 
Fianna Fáil, who were in government for most of the 2000s, developed a financial 
reliance on the construction sector- ‘[a] list of rich political donors once read like a 
Who’s Who of Irish property developers’ (Byrne 2012, 205; see also McMenamin 
2013, 2). Such immature governance left Ireland dangerously exposed to external 
shocks (Hardiman 2010, 72). As such, it doesn’t matter that Ireland temporarily ‘got it 
right’. When it came down to it, Ireland’s governance became just as problematic as that 
of its fellow PIIGS. Indeed, as early as 2001, the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (Ecofin) criticised Ireland’s fiscal over-stimulation, and Hogan, Donnelly, and 
O’Rourke (2010)  view the failure to heed the warnings as representing a tragically 
missed opportunity to exploit external fiscal commitments as political cover to help 
overcome the political pressures to act this way (38). Ireland is understood to have 
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squandered its ‘mature’ economic development during the 2000s when, as the late 
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan infamously put it, ‘we all partied’ (Lenihan 2010). 
 
The design flaws of the eurozone 
While the above literature has focused on different aspects of national ‘irresponsibility’, 
another influential body of scholarship has focused on the ways in which Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) has been set up to fail from the very start (de Grauwe 2006a; 
2006b Papadimitriou and Wray 2012; Lane 2012;  de Grauwe 2010; Uhlig 2002; 
Scharpf 2011).10 It argues that amongst other factors, because EMU was a monetary 
union without any provision for fiscal or banking management, because it removed 
sovereignty of monetary policy from national governments, some form of existential 
crisis was only ever a matter of time. 
 A well-known criticism of EMU is that it removed sovereignty of monetary 
policy from peripheral states, so that when they did get into trouble, they found that 
vital tools for crisis management were no longer at their disposal (Papadimitriou and 
Wray 2012,2-3; de Grauwe 2013, 7; Panico and Purificato 2013; Scharpf 2011). For one 
thing, the replacement of national central banks with the European Central Bank (ECB) 
meant that member states lost the lender of last resort function of their central banks (de 
Grauwe 2013, 8; Panico and Purificato 2013, 586-7). This meant that Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland could no longer issue debt in their own currencies to guarantee bank 
deposits. Once the crisis hit, this design flaw had a tendency to generate self-fulfilling 
liquidity crises and drive sovereign borrowers into default (Panico and Purificato 2013, 
                                                          
10 In this subsection I deal with one particular version of the ‘design flaws’ approach – namely, one which 
often focuses on the lack of efficacy and discipline built into the original design of the eurozone. Section 
two focuses on a different version of the same narrative – one that highlights how the eurozone was 
tailored to ‘core Europe’ at the expense of the periphery, and one that (sometimes) calls for a more 
meaningful fiscal union rather than more meaningful fiscal discipline (e.g. Patomäki 2013). 
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587). Furthermore the countries of the periphery were unable to make use of currency 
devaluations in the years before the crisis, which may have contributed to falling 
competitiveness and rising current account deficits. Worse still, EMU created perverse 
incentives for growth in the European periphery (Dellepiane, Hardiman, and Heras 
2013). Monetary union provided a ‘one size fits all’ monetary policy across a variety of 
highly diverse economies. The single interest rate that the ECB imposes across all 
member states is too low for countries that are booming and too high for those in 
recession (de Grauwe 2013, 6-7). Greece, Ireland and Spain’s membership of the euro 
thus coincided with an interest rate shock, causing inflation and indebtedness to soar.  
EMU has also been widely criticised for the sovereignty it left behind at the 
national level. A monetary union was designed with no parallel provision for fiscal or 
macroeconomic management. Peripheral countries essentially adopted a foreign 
currency, but retained responsibility for their own national fiscal policies (Papadimitriou 
and Wray 2012; de Grauwe 2013, 10).  In this way, a destructive contradiction was built 
into the architecture of EMU. There was far too much scope available to the countries of 
the European periphery to sweep difficult reforms ‘under the rug’ (Bastasin 2012). This 
was especially true after accession to EMU. In the pre-EMU accession stage, the threat 
of exclusion at least acted as a hard budget constraint for countries like Greece to 
address fiscal imbalances. Yet from 2001 until 2008, countries such as Greece were able 
to violate the 3 per cent limit of budget deficits every year (Katsimi and Moutos 2010, 
569).11 Similarly, member states were responsible for their own banks and their 
regulation, contributing to, for example, Ireland’s disastrous state guarantee of its 
beleaguered banking sector. As Papadimitriou and Wray (2012) put it, the European 
                                                          
11 But of course, Greece was far from the only offender. France and Germany infamously violated SGP 
criteria, leading to pressure from these countries to relax the rules and to reform in 2005. 
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periphery became ‘the equivalent of a Louisiana, but without the benefit of an uncle 
Sam’ (1).   
 The design flaws literature points to real and important institutional defects in 
the architecture of EMU in a way that purely domestic level analysis may overlook. It is 
especially useful in identifying how the lack of adequate provisions for fiscal and 
macroeconomic management snowballed into a calamitous lack of mechanisms for 
crisis management after 2009 (Lane 2012; Papadimitriou and Wray 2012; Shambaugh, 
Reis, and Rey 2012). EMU had never been designed with fiscal management in mind, 
so when confronted with a fiscal crisis – European leaders muddled through and 
procrastinated in a way that almost certainly made a bad situation worse (see Bastasin 
2012).12 The literature also draws our attention to the ways in which the institutions and 
the policies of EMU exacerbated the crisis, and how a better designed monetary union 
could have prevented or at least mitigated the severity of the crisis. It is capable of 
recognising that even though the origins of the crisis may be located at the domestic or 
global level, EMU has greatly increased the vulnerability of certain member states to its 
consequences (Scharpf 2011). This is especially true for versions of the narrative that 
emphasise the lack of fiscal discipline at the EU level.  
This leads to an important point. The above research into the ‘systemic’ design 
flaws of EMU can be understood as complementary to those ‘domestic level’ 
approaches that highlight the irresponsibility of national governments.13  The argument 
is that the euro made it far too easy for governments and households to behave 
irresponsibly (Jones 2015, 3), and in this respect, the approach retains assumptions of 
                                                          
12 Although some authors such as Bulmer (2014) attribute such hesitation to the domestic politics of 
Germany and Merkel’s tendency to weigh up options in advance. 
13 Jones (2015, 1) points out how many competing narratives of the origins of the eurozone are 
reinforcing. 
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‘immaturity’, while adding a ‘bad parent’ to its analysis.14 In this respect, design flaws 
matter to the extent that they failed to protect the eurozone project from the divergent 
economic trajectories of its member states.  
None of this implies design-flaws approaches are straightforward re-
articulations of the ‘immaturity thesis’. Rather, the point is that ‘systemic level’ analysis 
requires an implicit theory of asymmetry to be ‘cashed in’. Because even although the 
systemic, and indeed, global aspects of the crisis require explanation, we still need some 
sort of basic theory as to why some states were affected most severely and not others. A 
systemic level analysis cannot simply take for granted that Southern Europe and Ireland 
were likely to be ‘hit harder’. Accordingly, if systemic level analysis buys into the 
‘immaturity thesis’, as the prevalent European policy response to the crisis has done, 
then fixing the design flaws of EMU is likely to require stronger discipline and other 
measures aimed at correcting the immaturity of peripheral states. As I argue in section 
two, an alternative critique of the European project highlighting the ‘victimisation’ of 
the periphery is likely to reach a radically different diagnosis and policy prescription. 
Put simply, their added value notwithstanding, once systemic level approaches attempt 
to deal with asymmetry, or the causes of the crisis in the periphery, they tend to fall 
back upon narratives of immaturity or victimisation. 
 
The pitfalls of the immaturity thesis 
Perspectives that rely on assumptions of peripheral immaturity ultimately fail to 
capture, and indeed, seriously misrepresent, the origins of the crisis in these countries. 
Worse still, as suggested in the introductory chapter, these erasures have contributed to 
                                                          
14 Although, as I have already mentioned, many authors conceptualise the ‘design flaws’ of the eurozone 
in a way that jettisons assumptions of ‘immaturity’ more clearly. 
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what has been widely considered to be a seriously damaging policy response to the 
crisis.  
Three problematic assumptions can be identified at the heart of the immaturity 
thesis. First, such approaches tend to neglect the international dimensions of the crisis. 
Second, they have a theoretical inability to account for multiple models of development. 
Finally, they have a tendency towards reductive use of notions of political/social 
irresponsibility to explain peripheral agency. This literature never really explains 
divergence – instead it shows us the reasons why convergence failed to happen. The 
limits of the perspective highlight some quite serious tensions in any policy response 
that is underpinned by a motivation to ‘correct’ peripheral immaturity. These will now 
be discussed. 
 
Neglect of international dimensions 
The perspective is typically presented as a highly internalist framework that cannot take 
account of the international dimensions of the crisis and is unable to recognise some 
deeper contradictions of the eurozone itself (Dooley 2014; Becker and Jäger 2012; 
Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 147). By placing primacy of focus on domestic 
governance, factors such as trade imbalances, international competitiveness, the design 
flaws of the European Union and the power of internationally mobile capital are all 
relegated to being of secondary importance, if they are theorised at all (Dooley 2014). 
As Skaperdas puts it:  
 
If Greece were the sole country to have run into trouble, one could argue that it 
was solely Greece’s problem and not the euro’s. But one country after another 
has shown signs of trouble. There were problems lurking in the background that 
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surfaced with the financial crisis and the recession that followed (Skaperdas 
2011, 9).15 
By focusing only on national sources of social and institutional change, such 
approaches suffer from the well-known problems of methodological 
nationalism/internalism. It is clearly both theoretically and empirically untenable to 
overlook the ways in which so-called ‘external factors’ contribute to social and 
institutional change in a given country, as I discuss below. But concretely, this 
internalism creates a number of blind spots for the immaturity thesis. Notably absent 
from the literature on the immaturity thesis are discussions of international capital 
flows, structural inequalities in the eurozone, ‘Neoliberalism’, the role of Germany and 
external threats to international competitiveness. These erasures are discussed in depth 
in section two, but suffice to say, downplaying these clearly important aspects of the 
crisis creates a very partial account of what went wrong in the European periphery (see 
Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 147).  
 
Modernisation theory and the problem of ‘non-convergence’ 
The immaturity thesis shares its meta-theoretical assumptions with modernisation 
theory, a framework that is well known for its insensitivity to how development is 
pursued and achieved in different ways across societies (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, 
93, 95; Young 1999). As I have argued in the first part of this section, there has been an 
implicit assumption in much of the domestic level analysis on Southern Europe and 
Ireland that if the correct sets of policies are followed, and the right institutions are built 
and effectively governed; each country could have converged along the lines of their 
                                                          
15 Naturally, this is a criticism that applies most clearly to domestic level accounts and not to the ‘design 
flaws’ literature. Yet, adding ‘design flaws’ arguments to domestic level analysis does not fully overcome 
this problem either. This is because both perspectives can retain assumptions of peripheral immaturity at 
the centre of their analysis. Had the periphery not been so irresponsible, there would be little need for 
more discipline. Only if analysis of design flaws leaves assumptions of peripheral immaturity behind can 
it fully overcome this problem of internalism. 
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western European neighbours. Divergence in Greece, Ireland and Portugal is quite 
clearly explained as the result of a failure to achieve this convergence, typically due to 
an ineffective and immature political and/or national culture. As a result, any variation 
across societies is assumed to be a ‘perversion’ of the ‘normal’ developmental 
trajectory. In this way, the developmental paths of particular societies are ‘othered’, and 
this is at the heart of the immaturity thesis’ moralisations.  
The problem is not that immature patterns of peripheral agency have nothing to 
do with the crisis in the periphery, as many, among them Yanis Varoufakis in this 
chapter’s epigraph, suggest. Very few domestic level analyses of Greece would feel 
comfortable denying the reality of clientelism and its role in the crisis. The real problem 
is that this perspective problematically assumes that the origins of divergence are the 
same as the reasons for ‘non-convergence’. The logic is simple - the periphery diverged 
because it didn’t converge. Yet, the three very distinctive forms of crisis encountered by 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland suggest that something is missing from this formulation.  
Non-convergence may account for divergence at a very basic level, but we need 
something else to account for what caused there to be (at least) three different kinds of 
divergence. In other words, why did non-convergence lead to a banking crisis in one 
country but not the others? Why did convergence along fiscal lines still leave Ireland 
vulnerable? Why did falling competitiveness lead to GDP growth in Greece during the 
2000s, but recession in Portugal during the same time? The immaturity thesis needs to 
do much more work to explain the origins of divergence. It hasn’t done this work 
because it has been preoccupied with explaining the origins of non-convergence (more 
on this in section three).  
How does this problem lead to empirical gaps? For one thing, the perspective 
discounts the possibility that something other than an obstacle, say for example, the 
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transposition of EU directives on banking, could also be potential sources of divergence 
(see Honohan 1999). It also discounts the possibility that ‘non-liberal’ practices of 
governance could potentially contribute to ‘convergence’ even if they are identified as 
obstacles (Ó Riain 2014, 39) and vice versa. Additionally, it overlooks the fact that 
while there may only be one single way, in theory, to achieve ‘convergence’, there is 
any number of different ways to diverge, and moreover, not all of these trajectories 
would have necessarily led to precarious, vulnerable patterns of growth.  
Furthermore, the immaturity overlooks the fact that simply because a country 
has ‘failed to converge’ it does not mean that ‘things have stayed the same’. Failing to 
modernise does not mean a simple persistence of tradition as is often assumed in the 
above accounts. It does not mean that these countries go ‘back to the drawing board’, 
almost as if a reset button has been pressed. When Greece and Portugal attempted to 
reform and modernise during the 1990s, their failure to do so resulted in significant and 
dramatic changes to their political economies, because transformation was an outcome 
of the attempt to reform and modernise. Narratives of immaturity overlook how failure 
can also be generative of political, economic and social change. Had Greece and 
Portugal not attempted reform, they would not have transformed in quite the same way. 
In addition, Ireland did appear to ‘converge’ during the same period, but this did not 
stop its model, made up of institutions, actors and policies, behaving in different ways 
in different contexts. Ultimately, a theory of ‘non-convergence’ shuts down a myriad of 
interesting and important questions about divergence in these countries. 
 
Representing peripheral agency: Distinguishing between ‘obstacles to convergence’ 
and ‘paths to divergence’ 
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Finally, in focusing on ‘obstacles to convergence’ as outlined above, a limited 
representation of peripheral agency is propagated. Agency is posited to peripheral state 
organisations and societies only to the extent that they have ‘dug in their heals’ instead 
of pursuing structural reforms; or to the extent that they have derailed their own 
development through irresponsibility, short-sightedness, corruption and low 
productivity. Peripheral agency is always defined in terms of what it is lacking, which 
leads to a number of erasures in the historical narratives that are told. Positive 
understandings of peripheral agency, as actively promoting political economic 
transformation in ways that are not reducible to reinforcing ‘non-convergence’, are 
absent. 
In other words, when political and economic irresponsibility are the processes of 
agency that are taken most seriously, other kinds of agency are downplayed, explained 
away, or overlooked entirely. The periphery is only understood as having agency that is 
‘immature’ – there is no available conception of a ‘mature’ agency for the periphery. 
This is a problem because it precludes analysis from considering that anything other 
than immature agency could be generative of divergence. Such analysis does not 
consider that putatively ‘mature’ patterns of agency could be just as important in 
explaining the origins of the crisis in a particular peripheral state. The problem can be 
pinpointed as one of focusing on the history of ‘obstacles to convergence’, and thereby 
neglecting possible counter-narratives. 
The immaturity thesis is inadequate for accounting for the origins of the crisis in 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece due to the problematic assumptions outlined above. It 
accounts for the history and the agency of these countries in only a partial way, 
emphasising the supposed mistakes, errors, and failures which have led each country to 
squander its opportunity to converge with its western European neighbours. This means 
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that it omits any consideration of the parallel positive and creative ways in which 
peripheral countries have shaped their own economic destinies. We can only account for 
the emergence of multiple forms of economic trajectories by casting ‘obstacles to 
convergence’ aside, and studying the origins of ‘paths to divergence’ instead.  In section 
three I propose that domestic-level analysis is valuable, and indeed, necessary to 
account for the origins of the crisis in the periphery. But it is important that such a 
perspective is able to rise above the more readily apparent narratives of immaturity, in 
order to more adequately capture the multiple paths of divergence charted by the so-
called PIIGS. 
 
Section Two: ‘Huffing and puffing’: unpacking the ‘victimisation 
thesis’  
In part as a response to the above limitations, a number of important alternatives to the 
immaturity thesis have emerged in recent years. In this section I focus on two literatures 
– ‘core-periphery analysis’ and neo-Gramsican/neo-Marxian approaches.16 These 
approaches directly challenge assumptions of immaturity in their analyses. Both 
emphasise the various ways in which the eurozone has benefitted the core, or fractions 
of European capital, at the direct expense of the periphery. They posit a very different 
‘design flaws’ narrative which makes the claim that Germany, in particular, has been 
acting as a hegemon (see also Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Bulmer 2014)17 in a 
hierarchical Europe. The eurozone is not only argued to have been ‘tailored to core 
                                                          
16 This study cannot consider every body of literature on the origins of the eurozone crisis. For instance, 
numerous debates on the potential of varieties of capitalism (VoC) to contribute to an understanding of 
the eurozone crisis have emerged in recent years (see Hall 2012; Bruff and Horn 2012). Some of these 
debates are drawn on to develop the theoretical framework that I outline in section three of this chapter. 
17 The focus of this study is on the periphery, and not on Germany, and so the study does not fully engage 
in (less relevant but nonetheless important and vibrant) debates on whether or not Germany is emerging 
as a hegemon. Rather, this section is concerned with whether or not the periphery plays a role in 
Germany’s economic model (which may or not contribute to its hegemony). 
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Europe’ – reflecting German ordoliberal values at the expense of alternative 
configurations. Core-periphery analysis goes so far as to argue that the success of the 
German model is actually premised on the undermining of the periphery. In this section 
I outline the key analytical steps of this perspective. I argue that although they draw 
necessary attention to ‘systemic’ issues underpinning the eurozone crisis, scholarship 
which relies on notions of victimisation cannot adequately explain the difficulties of the 
European periphery or the origins of the eurozone crisis.  
 
Core-periphery analysis: three analytical steps 
Including Keynesian (Wolf 2010a) and post-Keynesian variants (Bellofiore 2013; 
Bellofiore, Garibaldo, and Halevi 2010; Cesaratto and Stirati 2010) as well as Marxian 
(Becker et al. 2010; Becker and Jäger 2012; Becker and Jäger 2011; Stockhammer 
2011; 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2010) perspectives, ‘core-periphery 
analysis’ reinterprets the crisis as driven by a core-periphery hierarchy driven by the 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ style economic growth of the core, especially Germany, which 
has lead to precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery.   
Broadly speaking, core-periphery analysis involves three analytical steps. 
Firstly, EMU has been characterised by an institutional arrangement that has benefitted 
the German model of ‘export led’ growth, and in turn, has helped generate 
unsustainable ‘debt led’ growth (Stockhammer 2012) in the periphery. Secondly, these 
two models became linked by a structural ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ pattern of growth 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 30). Finally, large capital inflows from the core have funded 
current account deficits in the periphery, exacerbating their balance of payments 
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problems, and increasing their financialisation and indebtedness. These three steps are 
explored in turn. 
 
Step-1: Tailoring Europe to the core: export-led and debt-led growth 
The first step tends to argue that the institutions and policies of EMU have ‘taken 
cognisance of conditions primarily in core countries rather than assigning equal weight 
to all’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 3, 5). The literature has focused on the ways in which 
German ideas, interests and ordoliberal values have contributed to the escalation of the 
crisis through they way in which it has been responded to (Dullien and Guérot 2012; 
Moravcsik 2012; Matthijs and Blyth 2011; Thompson 2013; Bulmer 2014; Jacoby 
2015; Newman 2015; Jones 2010; Matthijs 2015, 6). But there is also an argument to be 
made that the ‘uploading’ of German or western European values to the European level 
contributed to the emergence of the eurozone crisis in the first place (Matthijs 2015, 4; 
see also Beck 2013; Goetz and Dyson 2003). Such approaches emphasise the 
institutional and policy transformations that associated the 1986 ‘re-launch’ of the 
European project – setting in motion plans for the Single Market and later the euro. As 
Matthijs (2015, 14) notes, Germany was only willing to participate in the Single Market 
and EMU if the rest of Europe agreed to create the euro after the Deutsche Mark’s 
image (see also Marsh 2011; Heipertz and Verdun 2004; de Grauwe 1996a, 1094). As 
Milios and Sotiropoulos note: 
‘[T]he whole apparatus of the European Union in Brussels pushed the member 
countries to strive for a high-tech investment strategy linked to high profits and 
to cost-cutting financialisation under free intra-European capital mobility’ 
(Bellofiore et al. 2010,131; see also (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010).  
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 As a result, a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration was designed with core 
interests in mind.  
It has been argued that this ‘tailoring to core Europe’ has contributed to the 
generation of current account surpluses in the core, and deficits in the periphery. Thus, 
European integration has contributed to the emergence of two economic models of 
growth in Europe, ‘export-led’ growth in the core, and ‘debt-led’ growth in the 
periphery (Stockhammer 2012; Becker & Jäger 2012,172; Hall 2012). For the core 
(Germany in particular)18, the main source of growth has been its current account 
surplus ‘inside the eurozone, which has resulted from downward pressure on pay and 
conditions rather than on superior productivity growth’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 3). 
Different European economies have attempted to adjust to the emerging institutions and 
arrangements of German neomercantalism, but not all have not been successful 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4; Bellofiore et al. 2010, 136). The periphery was unable to 
emulate the core model because, ‘the scope for gains in competitiveness through 
pressure on workers is correspondingly less’ given that real wages were lowed and 
welfare states are generally less developed in the periphery to begin with (Lapavitsas et 
al. 2012, 4). Additional factors include the specificities of their histories and social 
models (Lapavitsas et al. 2012), as well as the weaknesses of their capital goods sectors 
(Bellofiore et al. 2010, 136). Unable to adopt a neomercantalist model itself, the 
periphery was forced to find other ways to develop, and typically, it lost 
competitiveness and generated current account deficits. Thus, the eurozone crisis is re-
                                                          
18 Although I outline more serious problems, it should be noted that the categories of ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ in core-periphery analysis can lead to analytical problems, with the ‘core’ being frequently 
reduced to Germany alone (although see Bellofiore et al. for a more nuanced typology of European 
economies within the core-periphery framework (2010,136-143). ‘Debt-led’ and ‘export-led’ 
categorisations can be similarly blunt.  
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interpreted as originating from the contradictions of a project of European 
neomercantalism19, driven largely by Germany (Bellofiore et al. 2010, 2013).  
This first step acts as a challenge to the immaturity thesis, because instead of 
placing the economic and political governance of the periphery at the centre of its 
analysis, it identifies a contradiction in the European economic project; a 
‘neomercantalist fracture’ that is dividing the ‘core’ of Northern Europe and the 
‘periphery’ of mostly Southern Europe (Bellofiore 2013, 498). The key theoretical 
point, as Lapavitsas et al. have argued, is that it was not possible for such a model to be 
adopted universally (2012, 5). A particular theoretical implication is important to note at 
this step of the argument. Firstly, although EMU and the project of European integration 
may have been ‘tailored to core Europe’ (Cesaratto 2013, 114), it is not analytically 
necessary at this stage to theorise the underdevelopment of the periphery as either 
necessary to, or caused by the success of the neomercantalist model of the core; what is 
important is that the single model of development fostered by EMU has been 
responsible for the emergence of (at least) two divergent economic models. Focus here 
is placed on how the project of EMU, and indeed, European integration more generally 
contributed to divergent patterns of development, but it is not analytically necessary to 
establish any kind of co-constitutive interaction between these divergent models.20 
Rather, it is enough to recognise that they are two responses to the common pressure of 
European integration (Stockhammer 2012). Although most writers take the ‘core-
periphery’ thesis beyond this first step, I later argue that there is no imperative to do so, 
and as will be seen, there are alternative departures from this starting point. 
                                                          
19 Neomercantalism is understood as ‘the pursuit of economic policies and institutional arrangements 
which see net external surpluses as a crucial source of profits (Bellofiore et al. 2010, 120). 
20 This is important, because as steps 2 and 3 demonstrate, this co-constitutive interaction is central to 
most core-periphery analysis. 
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Step 2: Current account imbalances 
The second step begins to theorise the interaction between the neomercantalist ‘export-
led’ core and the ‘debt-led’ periphery, by more explicitly outlining how EMU has 
‘facilitated the domination of the eurozone by Germany at the expense of the peripheral 
economies’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). This has largely to do with analyses of current 
account imbalances within the eurozone. This is crucial to the supplanting of the 
immaturity thesis, because it recasts the crisis as a balance of payments crisis, rather 
than a fiscal crisis (Cesaratto 2013).  
The economic success of Germany, it is argued, has been made possible due to 
EMU being characterised by a structural balance of payments asymmetry between the 
core and periphery. ‘In other words’, as Young and Semmler write in their own account 
of this position: 
[C]ountries with current account surpluses need countries with current account 
deficits. This is particularly true in the Eurozone where there is no mechanism 
for tax and transfer policies to provide for regional equalization and stability as 
is the case in federal countries like the U.S… [t]hus the Eurozone could not 
function at all if all members tried to emulate Germany ([emphasis added] 2011, 
9).  
 
Thus, current account deficits in the periphery are understood to be the ‘mirror’ of 
Germany’s current account surpluses (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). The eurozone is 
understood to be a hugely important trading partner for Germany - accounting for two 
thirds of its trade (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 30) - leading Bellofiore to posit that ‘trade 
deficits in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were crucial to Germany’s 
competitiveness’ (2013, 505). The Single Market, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and 
later, EMU, created the conditions whereby Europe as a whole became ‘the primary 
market supporting Germany’s positive net exports and profits for its big 
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business…[and] these economic policies and industrial behaviours were the pillars of 
the resurrection of Germany’s export-led capitalism during the 2000s’ (Bellofiore 2013, 
504). Within such an arrangement, the eurozone periphery fulfils a crucial role for 
Germany’s model of growth, as Bellofiore notes that Germany has a ‘historical need to 
export to Southern Europe, where it realised the largest part of its profits’ (2013,505). 
This is the crux of core-periphery analysis, ‘[t]he worsening of the current account 
balance of the peripheral countries emerges pari passu with the improving surplus of the 
central countries’ (Cesaratto and Stirati 2010, 59). 
Thus, the first analytical two steps link together as follows. EMU has fostered a 
neomercantalist model of growth that Germany was, perhaps uniquely, placed to adopt, 
although this model of growth was conceivably a model for all to emulate (Milios and 
Sortiropoulos 2010). The contradiction (or obstacle for the universal adoption of this 
model) is that the current account surpluses of Germany are made possible by current 
account deficits in the periphery, exacerbating, and entrenching the division between a 
core and periphery in the eurozone. Thus, the success of the German model results in 
the underdevelopment of the peripheral model. EMU is understood to be an area for 
exploitation of the countries of the ‘periphery’ by the economic ‘steam-engine’ of the 
‘centre’ (Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2010, 227). It is on this basis that Lapavitsas et al. 
claim that, ‘[t]he euro is a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy for Germany’ (2012, 30). 
 
Step 3: Capital account imbalances 
The final analytical step theorises the way in which EMU has led to enormous financial 
imbalances stemming from capital flows from the core to the periphery. These in turn, 
have been used to fund the current account deficits of the periphery. The crisis 
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originated in easier access for a number of peripheral states to European financial 
markets, due to the adoption of the euro, and the new financial and monetary 
institutions and innovations that accompanied such access (Cesaratto 2013, 114). 
Massive capital flows went from the core to the periphery, which funded credit-financed 
autonomous consumption growth in Spain and Ireland, and contributed to the growth of 
public spending in Greece (Cesaratto 2013, 114).  
Germany is argued to have ‘recycled’ its current account surpluses into capital 
exports, ‘primarily bank lending and foreign direct investment …the main recipient of 
which has been the eurozone, including the periphery’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 4). This 
has had two important effects. Firstly, large capital inflows have resulted in capital 
account surpluses in the periphery, directly contributing to public and private 
indebtedness, precipitating the sovereign debt crisis (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 5). 
Secondly, capital outflows from the core into the periphery have led to the promotion of 
financialised growth via investment bubbles and consumer booms. As such, the ‘export 
led model’ of growth in the core has directly led to the ‘debt led’ model of growth in the 
periphery (Stockhammer 2012). As Cesaratto notes, ‘credit that finances net imports in 
the [eurozone] periphery is created by local banks. This spending eventually becomes 
foreign saving (net exports) in core countries and normally, financial lending by core 
[eurozone] banks to periphery banks’ (2013, 113). Accordingly, peripheral import 
dependency, and persistent external imbalances becomes financed, and thereby 
constantly reproduced by capital inflows from the core (Bellofiore, Garibaldo, and 
Halevi 2010, 136-7; Becker and Jäger 2012, 183). In other words, the current account 
surpluses that are necessary to the success of German neomercantalism, become 
financed by German lending to the periphery. This not only creates new vulnerabilities 
and fault lines for the periphery via the worsening of their balance of payments, but it 
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also leads to the ‘destruction of their productive base[s]’ (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 
227). 
 
Neo-Marxian and neo-Gramscian approaches 
Neo-Marxian and neo-Gramscian accounts (see for example, van Apeldoorn 2002; 
2009; van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn 2009; Bieler and Morton 2001; Cafruny 
and Ryner 2003; 2007; Holman 1996; Overbeek, van Apeldoorn, and Ryner 2003; van 
der Pijl, Holman, and Raviv 2011; Bieling 2003; Gill 1998; Gill 2002) also offer an 
explanation of the peripheral crisis by emphasising its ‘victimisation’. This literature 
can, in general, be understood as operating within the neo-Gramscian framework of the 
Amsterdam School of International Relations (but there are also non neo-Gramscian 
versions, see especially Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013). Much like ‘step-1’ of core-
periphery analysis, this literature notes that the European project, at least since the 
Maastricht Treaty and the completion of the Single Market Programme and the Single 
European Act (SEA) has been actively devised and promoted by the interests of a 
‘neoliberal transnational capitalist class’. The European project is understood to reflect 
and act in the interests of this class (Bieling 2003, 206). Over the years, the socio-
economic structure of Europe and its member states is understood to have been in a 
complex process of transformation, along the lines of the interests of transnational 
European capital (see the concept of embedded Neoliberalism, van Alperdoorn 2009; 
2000; Rodrigues and Reis 2012; and the concept ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ or ‘new 
constitutionalism’ in Gill 1998; 2002). This has resulted in a move away from the 
Keynesian policies of the 1950s and 1960s, which have been ‘replaced step by step by a 
new, more aggressive configuration, which basically is neoliberal, i.e. in favour of 
broadened and intensified market competition and monetarist anti-inflation and austerity 
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measures’ (Bieling 2003, 206). These approaches study the ways in which 
Neoliberalism, a hegemonic project promoted by, and in the interests of, a transnational 
neoliberal class (aided by comprador elites domestically, see Rodrigues and Reis 2012), 
has transformed the European project, and its member states, along neoliberal lines, and 
the ways in which the inherent contradictions of this project are ultimately responsible 
for the current crisis (van Alperdoorn 2009, 27). In other words, European states in 
general have increasingly come to be shaped by ‘neoliberal’ strategies of development. 
Analysis should accordingly focus on the ways in which European states and the 
structure of the EU have become ‘more Neoliberal’. (van Alperdoorn 2009, 27). Neo-
Marxian strands such as Fouskas and Dimoulas (2013) and Rodrigues and Reis (2012) 
take a domestic level class analysis approach which emphasises how countries such as 
Greece and Portugal were ‘inserted’, through national ‘comprador’ elites, into a weak 
position of semi-dependency with European and Global capital through European 
integration. This ‘insertion’ is argued to have ‘destroyed the productive base’ of 
peripheral economies – in favour of financialised, neoliberal, debt-led growth. However, 
often, when such approaches wish to explain the reasons why the periphery was ‘hit 
hardest’ by the eurozone crisis, they explicitly reproduce the ‘core-periphery’ narrative 
outlined by Lapavitsas et al (Overbeek 2012; Rodrigues and Reis 2012; van Apeldoorn 
2012). As such, critical approaches ranging from neo-Gramscian to post-Keynesian 
have adopted assumptions of victimisation in order to allow their frameworks to 
account for asymmetry (Bellofiore 2013; Bellofiore, Garibaldo, and Halevi 2010; 
Cesaratto and Stirati 2010). 
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The limits of ‘victimisation’ 
Core-periphery analysis is a highly influential critique of the immaturity thesis (Fouskas 
and Dimoulas 2014, 144), that allows us to recognise, as Yanis Varoufakis does, that 
the eurozone crisis has ‘nothing whatsoever to do with’ peripheral immaturity 
(Varoufakis 2013, 45). In other words, German dominance of the eurozone didn’t leave 
the PIIGS with any option but to ‘build their economies out of straw’. In a way that 
domestic-level accounts tend not to, the literature reviewed above brings issues of 
German hegemony, current account imbalances, capital flows, and the 
unequal/hierarchical nature of EMU to the fore. Nevertheless, as important as these 
issues are, core-periphery and neo-Gramscian/Marxian analyses do suffer from some 
serious empirical limitations, as I now outline. 
 
Empirical limits I: Current account imbalances 
As we have seen, claims that current account surpluses in the core are the ‘mirror’ of 
those in the periphery tend to rest on the assumption that most of German trade takes 
place within the eurozone, and moreover, that the core ‘needs’ the periphery (Young 
and Semmler 2011, 9) to generate its current account surpluses. This seems intuitive, as 
figure 1.1 shows, because the eurozone is indeed clearly characterised by current 
account surpluses in the core, and deficits in the periphery.  
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Figure 1.1: Current account balances for Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (as a percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
 
However, it is one thing to be able to recognise that the eurozone is characterised by 
deficit countries and surplus countries, and quite another to argue that one is responsible 
for the other (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 227; Young and Semmler 2011; Dooley 
2014). In fact, it is becoming increasingly recognised that differences in 
competitiveness may actually emerge because of Germany’s superior links to trading 
partners in the core and outside of Europe (such as with the USA and China), and that 
German exports to the eurozone periphery are in fact marginal, and are unlikely to 
account for the imbalances posited by Lapavitsas et al.  (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 
234-5; Dooley 2014, 945; Bastasin 2012, 156, 157).  
Indeed, the core-periphery literature tends to overlook country specific balances 
of trade. For example, if the periphery were structurally necessary to the core as a 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Germany Greece Ireland Portugal
44 
 
 
market for its exports, we would expect that trade to peripheral economies, such as 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece, would be significant. However, as figure 1.2 shows, this 
does not appear to be the case. 
 
Figure 1.2: German trade balances by country in billions of euros (average figures from 2000-2012) 
Source: IMF Direction of trade statistics 
 
As figure 1.2 illustrates, the peripheral eurozone countries, account for a marginal 
percentage of German trade since the introduction of the euro. In fact, whereas the top 
three destinations of German exports (France, the US and UK) account for over 100 
billion euros of the German trade balance, Portugal, Ireland and Greece account for just 
over 5 billion euros together, and in fact, this includes a small trade deficit with Ireland. 
Germany has a considerably higher trade surplus with Spain (20.76 billion euros) than 
the other three peripheral countries considered here, but even accounting for this, the 
four peripheral economies account for less than 26 billion euros of Germany’s trade 
surplus altogether, or just under one quarter of the contribution from core and extra-
EMU trading partners. While this figure is not strictly speaking insignificant, in terms of 
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its visible balance of trade, it is nevertheless difficult to argue that peripheral current 
account deficits are the ‘structural mirror’ of core ‘surpluses’. This is intuitive when it is 
considered that Germany’s balance of trade did not decline from 2009 onwards, as 
would be expected, based on the premises of the core-periphery thesis and, given the 
collapse of the propensity to consume across the eurozone periphery (Milios and 
Sotirpoulos 2010, 235). On the contrary, German trade flourished during the crisis, 
precisely because its trading partners in the core of Europe, and outside the eurozone, 
are much more important to its current account surplus that the relatively small 
economies of the eurozone periphery (Reisenbichler and Morgan 2013; Beck 2013).  
None of what is discussed here should be understood as denying the benefits 
Germany has enjoyed, perhaps uniquely, from the construction of EMU. This is beside 
the point. What is at stake is the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ thesis – and the trade balances 
presented here highlight the serious problems in blaming Germany for the periphery’s 
vulnerabilities. In addition, the case of Spain does seem to support Lapavitsas et al.’s 
(2012) claim, even if the examples of Portugal, Ireland and Greece suggest that more 
nuance and complexity is needed in tracing these relationships. 
 
Empirical limits II: Capital accounts 
Although the above raises significant problems for ‘Step 2’ of the core-periphery 
analysis, a modified version of the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ argument can still be made 
by looking at capital account imbalances.21 Lapavitsas et al. correctly identify that 
‘Germany has been exporting capital on a large scale, while peripheral countries have 
been importing capital (2012, 31). Even if Germany is not generating a current account 
                                                          
21 As Milios and Sotiropoulos (2010) do, in spite of their critique of a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ core-
periphery explanation. 
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surplus from trade with the periphery, and even if it is not ‘necessary’ for the core to 
direct massive capital flows to the periphery, the fact that it is doing so, could still be a 
proximate cause of financialised underdevelopment and indebtedness in the periphery. 
German credit still went to where the ‘economic climate was favourable to autonomous 
(credit financed) spending decisions’ (Cesaratto 2013, 113). Lapavitsas et al. 
demonstrate that flows from the core to periphery have actually become ‘more 
important in size’ than any other type of capital flows in the eurozone, at least from 
2005-2009 (2012, 46, 47). However, this argument needs to be unpacked carefully. To 
highlight the relative importance of core-periphery capital flows, Lapavitsas et al. have 
grouped countries into the ‘core’ (Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and 
‘periphery’ (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and it is between these two 
groups of countries, rather than between specific countries that the core-periphery 
relationship, in terms of bank lending and capital flows, has been established 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 46). As was the case with ‘Step-2’, the relationship is not so 
clear-cut if we look at specific country-to-country relations. 
As figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 & 1.6 illustrate, the patterns of cross border lending 
within the eurozone are not clearly reducible to a core-periphery dynamic once we 
examine the countries on a case by case basis.22 For example, in the case of Portugal 
(figure 1.3), we can see that although Germany is heavily exposed to the country 
(meaning that US$ 21.175bn of capital flowed from Germany to Portugal); capital 
inflows from Spain are 3.2 times higher, at US$67.878bn. Additionally, the amount of 
                                                          
22 These figures are calculated using data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) consolidated 
banking statistics. This data set provides information regarding banks’ on sheet financial claims vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world and provides a measure of the risk exposures of lenders’ national banking systems. 
This data set was chosen as Lapavitsas et al. (2012, 46-47) use BIS consolidated banking statistics to 
support their argument regarding the importance of core lending to the periphery. While this data 
provides an illustrative snapshot that complicates the relationship established by core-periphery analysis, 
future research could fruitfully consider the longer term historical patterns of lending between these 
countries. 
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capital inflows from France (US$15.923bn) and the UK (US$17.094bn) are very close 
to the amount from Germany. Similar patterns are identifiable for Greece and Ireland; 
although Germany is significantly exposed to each, in no case is it most exposed. Only 
in the case of Spain, does the pattern theorised by Lapavitsas et al. emerge (figure 1.6).
Figure 1.3: Portugal - Consolidated Foreign Claims 
in billions of US dollars 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Greece- Consolidated Foreign Claims in 
Billions of US dollars 
 
Figure 1.4: Ireland Consolidated Foreign Claims in 
Billions of US dollars 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Spain - Consolidated Foreign Claims in 
Billions of US dollars 
Source for figures 1.3, 1. 4, 1.5 & 1.6: Bank of International Settlements Consolidated Bank Statistics end of March 2013. 
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Naturally, none of this should be seen as denying the significant impact of core exposure to the 
periphery.23 However, the central point remains that analysing these flows through a ‘core-
periphery’ prism can be limiting, leading to the omission of  important specificities in relation 
to ‘peripheral’ cases, so as to occasion important blind spots in the understanding of the how 
crisis has originated (Dooley 2014, 945). One such blind spot is the under-appreciated salience 
of inter-periphery financial flows, as well as the importance of exposure to a variety of different 
countries as illustrated by the above figures. Financial and trade imbalances are certainly crucial 
to any understanding of the crisis in the European periphery, but it may be limiting if these 
multiple flows are contorted into a simplistic core-periphery model.  
 
Theoretical limitations: from immaturity to victimisation 
The above critical approaches represent an important to the immaturity thesis. Yet the 
empirical limitations that have been identified above suggest some theoretical problems. 
These can be summed up in the single observation that the asymmetry of the eurozone 
crisis is not reducible to German dominance alone (Dooley 2014, 945). Although the 
framework of core-periphery analysis has drawn attention to the importance of capital 
flows, imbalances, and the design flaws of European integration, it has been let down by 
two inter-related theoretical limitations. First of all, it has replaced the internalism of the 
immaturity thesis with externalism – thereby neglecting the agency of the European 
periphery and retaining an analysis based on assigning blame. Secondly, because of this, 
it has missed an opportunity to develop a theory of ‘capitalist diversity’ which could 
                                                          
23The case could be made that the ultimate source of Portuguese debt, indirectly, is Germany and France 
via Spain. However, rather than contort these relationships further into the core-periphery model (why 
would Germany indirectly lend to some peripheral states while directly lending to others?), I suggest that 
it makes more sense to take the specificities of financialisation in each state more seriously. 
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have challenged the notions of ‘non-convergence’ at the heart of the immaturity thesis, 
thereby downplaying the diversity of peripheral economic trajectories.  
Core-periphery analysis actually stands in the way of a potentially more 
compelling critique of the immaturity thesis. By neglecting the agency and histories of 
the countries of the European periphery, this perspective misses out on an opportunity 
to challenge the immaturity thesis on its own turf, and in doing so, overlooks its own 
potential to directly challenge some of its central assumptions.  Core-periphery analysis 
has traded the problematic internalism of the immaturity thesis for its own equally 
problematic externalism; thus reducing the complex and multiple trajectories of political 
economic change in countries such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece, to a passive 
function of the interests of their more powerful European neighbours. Similar to the 
immaturity thesis, the periphery is still represented as the ‘other’ of the core, except that 
such frameworks adopt assumptions of victimisation; ‘rather than a failure to act 
appropriately, the peripheral state is represented with an inability to act efficaciously 
due to structural constraints’ (Dooley 2014, 945). Whereas the immaturity thesis 
explains away divergence by pathologising different forms of development (rendering 
them immature, incomplete); core-periphery analysis views peripheral models as 
‘stunted’ modernisations. This is a problem because it relegates peripheral agency to 
being analytically secondary and passive, as not having a role in its own history. This is 
particularly disappointing, because as I elaborate on in section three, ‘Step-1’ of core-
periphery analysis has the potential to rethink the origins of divergence in these 
countries while taking their agency and histories seriously.  
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Although this is not the place for an extensive account or critique of the neo-
Gramscian School24, it can be argued that this literature falls into the same trap as core-
periphery analysis. Namely, it generates its own version of externalism by reducing the 
development and transformations of a variety of European states to the interests of a 
transnational neoliberal capitalist class. Other strands of such analysis exaggerate the 
constraints of EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (especially the work of 
Gill 1998) - refusing to take seriously the so-called mainstream literature’s insistence on 
the peripheries’ non-compliances to these very constraints, see (Strange 2012) and tend 
to represent all major economic and political actors in the periphery as comprador elites 
(Rodrigues and Reis 2012; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013).  
This kind of functionalist externalism is a problem because as I have stressed so 
far, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and indeed, Spain, Italy and Cyprus have all experienced 
very different kinds of crisis. The paths that led them to their respective IMF-ECB-EU 
bailouts were far from homogenous. It is clear enough that in order to account for these 
different trajectories, there is a need to account for the complexities of peripheral 
agency. Reducing it to a function of another country’s model of growth is empirically 
limited and an inadequate placeholder for a genuine critical rethinking. As one of the 
epigraphs to this chapter suggests, if the immaturity thesis has smuggled in the 
problems of modernisation theory to research on the eurozone crisis, critical approaches 
have responded by smuggling in the problematic assumptions of dependency theory 
(Young 1999). 
As such, although these two theories of asymmetry emerge fundamentally 
opposed to one another, scholarship relying on assumptions of victimisation in place of 
                                                          
24 Not least because, when these accounts turn explicitly to accounting for the crisis in the periphery, they 
tend to explicitly reproduce narratives of core-periphery victimisation anyway. But see also van 
Apeldoorn 2009, and see Germain and Kenny 1998; and Strange 2012 for good critical accounts. 
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‘immaturity’ actually runs into very similar pitfalls. While the immaturity thesis can be 
criticised for its neglect of external factors, core-periphery analysis and neo-
Marxian/Gramscian approaches respond by replacing internalism with externalism. 
While the immaturity thesis is inadequate to the task of accounting for the diversity of 
the crises in each country due to a focus on ‘obstacles to convergence’, the victimisation 
thesis downplays the very same diversity by explaining each crisis as a passive and/or 
structural result of German/European victimisation.  
Furthermore, while the immaturity thesis has a narrow conceptualisation of 
peripheral agency due to a focus on ‘irresponsibility’, agency in the approaches 
discussed in this section are even more limited, being reduced to a simple passive 
function of external interests. In one scheme the periphery can’t act maturely, in the 
other, it essentially can’t act at all.  Narratives of immaturity and victimisation both 
leave scholarship on the eurozone crisis without an adequate solution to the 
internalism/externalism problem, without a positive theory of peripheral agency, and 
without an explanation for the dramatically different forms of crisis experienced by the 
countries of the European periphery.  
In order to take the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis seriously, we need to move 
beyond the safety of the ‘immaturity’ vs. ‘victimisation’ debate, itself a reanimation of 
the modernisation vs. dependency theory debates of decades ago – as (Gourgouris 2015) 
has said – ‘no matter how dressed up with new terminologies and allegedly new 
significations’.    
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Section Three: Theoretical framework: Comparative Political 
Economy and the Europeanisation of the Periphery 
Identifying the theoretical limitations underlying existing literature on the crisis in the 
European periphery allows the ground to be cleared for an alternative theoretical 
framework. This is the task of this final section.  
So far, this chapter has shed light on two main gaps that have been created by 
literature which relies on either the immaturity or victimisation thesis. The first gap 
relates to how the agency of the periphery is accounted for. The agency and history of 
the periphery is represented in one narrative as immature and pathological, accounted 
for principally in the sense that the periphery has stubbornly refused to ‘get its house in 
order’ in the decades before the crisis. In the other, the agency of the periphery is 
neglected almost altogether by those frameworks which understand its evolving 
economic trajectory as the product of its victimisation by more powerful European 
countries.  
The second, very much related issue concerns how the diversity of the eurozone 
crisis is accounted for. Greece, Ireland and Portugal have all followed very different 
paths to crisis, but most explanations have attempted to contort this complexity into 
very blunt mono-causal explanations of ‘non-convergence’ that actually neglects to 
account for divergence as an active process. Diversity is typically explained away, 
rather than brought front and centre as a phenomenon to be explained. The immaturity 
thesis explains it all away as ‘non-convergence’, while the victimisation thesis 
(typically without case-study analysis) understands it all as a function of powerful 
external interests. These two problems suggest that a more robust critique of the 
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‘immaturity thesis’ should be able to account for peripheral agency, while at the same 
time taking capitalist diversity seriously.  
This section proposes how a framework that tackles each of these problems can 
be developed. I outline this in three steps. In order to capture the diversity of the 
eurozone crisis, I begin by drawing on the literature on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
and Comparative Political Economy (CPE) more broadly.  I pay particular attention to 
VoC’s problems of path dependency and methodological nationalism. Situating core-
periphery analysis within CPE makes it possible to propose adopting a modified ‘step-
1’ of core-periphery analysis as a more fruitful ‘post-VoC’ CPE approach.  
Second, in order to trace the evolving economic trajectories of Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland I propose that the following three chapters focus on the modernisation of 
the European periphery. I begin by making a distinction between modernisation theory 
and a non-linear conceptualisation of modernisation that is sensitive to the multiple 
ways in which ‘modernisation’ can occur, and the consequences of modernisation 
beyond its simple ‘success’ or ‘failure’. This conceptualisation of modernisation ties 
back to CPE’s sensitivity to capitalist diversity. 
Finally, I bring this CPE literature into dialogue with the literature on 
Europeanisation – or the study of a country’s ‘domestic adaptation to European 
integration’. By combining these two approaches it is possible to explore how Greece, 
Portugal, and Ireland negotiated and adapted to a ‘one size fits all’ model of European 
integration in different kinds of ways. Above all, the combination of these two 
approaches makes it possible to study the modernisation and the Europeanisation of the 
European periphery in a way that can capture the agency of the European periphery and 
the diversity of the eurozone crisis.  
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I bring these three sections together by proposing the following central research 
framework. The subsequent three chapters provide an historicist, multiple-case study 
research framework for exploring the evolving economic trajectories in Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland. In these chapters, I historically trace how processes of institutional 
change (modernisation) and the domestic adaptation to European integration were 
pivotal in driving these three countries towards their respective crises. A note on case 
study selection is also provided. 
 
Addressing the diversity of the eurozone crisis: Varieties of Capitalism and 
Comparative Political Economy 
In recent years, more and more scholarship has begun to direct its attention to studying 
‘capitalist diversity’, comparative capitalisms (CC), or comparative political economy 
(CPE).25 A ‘capitalist diversity’ approach to the eurozone crisis should aim to 
acknowledge the systemic or general nature of the crisis while ‘remaining aware of the 
considerable range of ways in which it has been and is playing out across different parts 
of the world’ (Bruff and Ebenau 2014, 4). As Bob Hancké (2009) notes, a theory of 
capitalist diversity is something very different from a theory of ‘non-convergence’. 
Whereas the latter explains diversity in terms of incomplete, externally stunted or 
pathological attempts at modernisation, a theory of capitalist diversity should recognise, 
and take seriously, the notion that modernisation is always multiple; there is no one, 
single model of development. As Justin Rosenberg (2006) has written in his critique of 
unilinear modernisation theory, ‘empirically speaking, there is not, and never has been, 
                                                          
25 See especially – ‘capitalist diversity’ as an emerging research agenda - Lane and Wood 2009; Bruff and 
Ebenau 2014; Bruff and Hartmann 2014; Bruff and Horn 2012; Bohle and Greskovits 2012; but also the 
varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature - see Hancké 2009, 19-22; Bruff and Horn 2012, 163, 164; and 
Justin Rosenberg's work on uneven and combined development (U&CD) 2006; as well as those studies 
on the 'asymmetry' of the eurozone crisis which are increasingly common, see Jäger and Springler 2015; 
Dooley 2014. 
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a single path taken by social development’ (313-4)26. The potential of a theory of 
divergence is that it can recognise the fact of empirical diversity, but also incorporate it 
into a theoretical framework that is not distorted by the a priori culturalist and 
modernisation theory assumptions of the immaturity thesis. In this way the divergence 
of the periphery can be studied as a positive process, rather than explained away as a 
straightforward ‘failure to converge’.  
In this subsection I outline the potential of the literature on comparative political 
economy to account for the origins of the crisis in the European periphery. This will be 
done in two steps. I begin with an account of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach. Second, I provide an overview of how VoC and post-VoC (especially ‘step-1’ 
of core-periphery analysis) approaches can contribute to an understanding of the origins 
of the crisis in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland through their shared meta-theoretical 
grounding in historical institutionalism. 
 
Institutions Matter: The Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
Although the comparative study of capitalisms has a long pre-history27 the field has 
been dominated by the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach since Peter Hall and 
David Soskice published their ground-breaking monograph in 2001 (Hall and Soskice 
2001; see also Hall & Gingerich 2009; Hall & Thelen 2009; Hancké 2009; Myant & 
                                                          
26 It is likely that the argument proposed here could be brought together with a U&CD framework (see 
especially Rosenberg 2006). However, recent work that has begun to consider the applicability of a 
U&CD approach to the eurozone crisis and European integration has tended to run into ‘victimisation’ 
problems in accounting for the agency of the European periphery (for a sympathetic critique see Bruff 
2010; and for a recent application of U&CD to the crisis, see Sandbeck and Schneider 2013). Future 
research may explore the possible bridges and tensions with my argument and U&CD. 
27 See Schonfield 1969; the 1970s literature on neocorporatism – Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979; the 
comparative study of production regimes, Streeck 1992; and the comparative study of welfare regimes, 
Esping-Anderson 2013. Dependency Theory :Frank 1971; Amin 1977; Galtung 1971; and World Systems 
Theory: Wallerstein 2011, also are of this broad tradition. 
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Drahokoupil 2012 Amable 2003; Coates 2005;  Becker 2009; Deeg & Jackson 2006;  
Allen 2004; Lane & Wood 2009). In it, the authors aim to explain national economic 
performance or welfare provision by reference to ‘crucial distinguishing structural 
conditions of each domestic system, grouping countries into relevant typologies’ 
(Featherstone 2008, 1).   
The VoC framework is constructed around a fundamental distinction between 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). The 
central conceptual innovation of VoC is that it places the firm at the centre of its 
analysis (Hancké 2009, 2) which as Thelen (2009, 472) notes, allows VoC scholars to 
trace the key difference between these two varieties of capitalisms back to the question 
of how employers’ co-ordinate their activities:  
whether mostly through the market (as in liberal economies), or through various 
arrangements that allow firms to achieve joint gains through co-operation (as in 
the co-ordinated economies). This literature has focused special attention on the 
rather different institutional arrangements one finds in the CMEs that distinguish 
them from LMEs, including but not limited to: co-ordinated collective 
bargaining, arrangements for worker participation and voice at the plant level… 
(Thelen 2009, 472). 
 
LMEs and CMEs are ideal types and opposing equilibria. VoC scholars typically 
identify how different institutions can act complementary to one another, bestowing 
certain comparative advantages to economies that conform closely to either ideal type. 
The presence of ‘correctly calibrated’ institutions determines the overall efficiency of 
any specific economy (Hancké 2009, 3). Institutional complementarities imply that the 
various institutions within an economy – ‘labour relations and corporate governance, 
labour relations and national training system, corporate governance and inter-firm 
relations – reinforce each other’ (Hancké 2009, 3-4).  
57 
 
 
There are numerous different strands to the VoC approach, but there are three 
important assumptions that are shared in common and worth drawing out (Clift 2014). 
First, different institutional configurations produce different economic capacities and 
problems.  Second, national institutions matter. Third, these national institutions 
develop over long periods of time and are ‘sticky’ or path dependent (Nölke 2015, 5; 
Clift 2014, 199-200).  These assumptions appear well suited to the research question of 
this project. From the beginning, the VoC approach has sought to ‘refute the idea that 
contemporary market pressures (broadly captured under the headings of ‘globalization’ 
and/or ‘deindustrialization’ will drive a convergence on a single ‘best’ or ‘most 
efficient’ model of capitalism’ (Thelen 2009, 472). In contrast, VoC approaches posit 
two possible models, and insist that these models are very durable, and exhibit strong 
‘self-reinforcing tendencies’ (ibid 472). A similar study of national institutions in 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland is a fruitful starting point to trace the evolution of their 
respective economic trajectories. 
Yet while its continued influence is hard to deny, the limitations and 
shortcomings of the VoC approach are well documented and have been thrown into 
sharp relief since the beginning of the eurozone crisis.28 Somewhat surprisingly VoC 
literature on the origins of the eurozone crisis has actually been notably thin (but see the 
work of Hall 2012; 2014; Hancké 2013; Hancké et al 2013). This is partially due to the 
key actor in VoC being the firm, which leads to a neglect of the role of the state in 
national political economies (see Ó Riain 2014, 23-27). This is quite deliberate, as 
Hancké notes ‘the VoC approach starts – axiomatically – with the firm at the centre of 
the analysis’ (Hancké 2009, 2). This leads to problems when accounting for Southern 
                                                          
28 See Hancké 2009, 5-17; Clift 2014; Jordan 2015; Bruff and Ebenau 2014; and Coates 2014 for some up 
to date reviews. 
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European or Irish ‘varieties of capitalism’, where the state has historically played a 
crucial role in processes of capitalist restructuring (see Featherstone 2008).29  
Others have highlighted VoC’s limits in accounting for diversity and the 
eurozone crisis (see Jordan 2015; Jackson and Deeg 2006; 2008; Allen 2004). Clift 
(2014) disputes that VoC is a theory of diversity at all and claims that it actually posits a 
pattern of ‘dual convergence’ (206). Featherstone notes that none of the peripheral 
European economies fit neatly into the dominant typologies of VoC. Southern Europe 
and Greece in particular are typically explained away as exceptional or are simply left 
out of VoC scholarship (Featherstone 2008).30  
Beyond these problems, VoC can be charged with more limitations relating to its 
understanding of path dependency and methodological nationalism which I discuss 
later. But before doing so, I outline the potential of existing VoC and post-VoC 
approaches to provide an explanation of the origins of the eurozone crisis, and situate 
some of the claims of ‘core-periphery analysis’ within the literature on CPE in order to 
contribute to the development of my research framework. 
                                                          
29 Yet, newer generations of VoC literature have emerged which take the state much more seriously.  
Featherstone (2008) offers a useful review of this second generation literature, and conducts an ‘empirical 
check’ to see if such a VoC approach can capture the Greek model and explain poor reform capacity as a 
result of the institutional make up of Greece. Featherstone concludes broadly in favour of the ‘mixed 
market economy’ model provided by Molina and Rhodes (2005). ‘In MMEs, unions and employers have 
stronger organisational structures than in LMEs (like US, UK), but they are more fragmented and have 
more problems in articulating their interests than in CMEs (like Germany, Sweden). They have difficulty 
in delivering collective goods and in sustaining autonomous coordination in collective bargaining. 
(Featherstone 2008 14,15).  
30 Yet,it is important to recognise that VoC is not attempting to argue that there are only two types of 
capitalism from an analytical standpoint. What the first generation claims is that there are, in ideal typical 
form, two (or more, but at least two – Hancké 2009, 2) institutional equilibria: the LMEs and CMEs. 
Naturally, there are models that are intermediate, or fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum (and 
second generation approaches are allowing for the possibility of at least hybrids, potentially different 
kinds of models outside the spectrum). But the real implication is that there are only two models of 
capitalism that work. As Goodin notes, ‘[t]he implication is that the middle ground between LME and 
CME is ultimately economically untenable, in a fiercely competitive international environment. Countries 
in that region must, if they are to remain internationally competitive for finance capital, move wholly in 
one direction or wholly in the other… On the logic of ‘institutional complementarities’, it is only to be 
expected that intermediate cases should be expected to pay a hermaphrodites penalty’ (Goodin 2003, 
206). 
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Back to ‘step-1’: CPE analysis of the eurozone crisis and core-periphery analysis as a 
post-VoC approach 
First generation VoC (see Jordan 2015 for a detailed review) has indeed been limited to 
the study of western, advanced, industrial economies, but the concept of Mixed Market 
Economies (MMEs) have been applied to study the European Periphery (Molina and 
Rhodes 2007; Featherstone 2008; Hall 2014). Hancké (2009, 14-16) notes the 
emergence of market based, state centred and associational modes of economic 
governance in the work of Schmidt (2002) and Amable (2003), and of finer grained 
distinctions still which include family-based Mediterranean Market Economies (another 
‘MME’, see Whitley 1999). Naturally there is a trade-off between empirical coverage 
and analytical sharpness implied in the expansion of typologies, ‘ultimately one could 
claim that every capitalist country has produced its own variety’ (Hancké 2009, 15). 
The attempt of Molina and Rhodes (2007) to retain the parsimonious spirit of first 
generation VoC while including the Mediterranean economies within a third category of 
Mixed Market Economy has been a reasonably popular solution, taken up by 
Featherstone (2008) and Hall (2014).   
Moreover, as already mentioned, VoC has been applied to explain the origins of 
the eurozone crisis. Hall (2014) has attempted to show how the lack of institutional 
complementarities on show in Mixed Market Economies partially accounts for the 
emergence of fragile economic performance in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and 
Ireland: 
To stylize slightly, on one side is a set of coordinated market economies in 
‘northern’ Europe, operating export-led growth models… [and a]nother set of 
countries in ‘southern’ Europe might be described as mixed market economies 
where, apart from periodic ‘social pacts’, wage bargaining is difficult to 
coordinate because trade unions are relatively strong but view with one another 
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for the alliegance of the workforce and the right to negotiate wage bargains (Hall 
2014, 5,6 italics added). 
 
Hall’s VoC approach focuses on the absence of the kinds of institutional 
complementarities that allow LMEs and CMEs to act as relatively more sustainable 
models of capitalism in Southern Europe. In doing so VoC seems to offer little more 
than the non-VoC domestic level analysis reviewed in section one; providing a theory of 
non-convergence, rather than divergence. To be fair, the modest departure Hall’s VoC 
does make is important. By paying attention to the long, path dependent institutional 
development of these national political economies, Hall is able to recognise that it 
would have been very difficult for these economies to introduce painful but necessary 
reforms during the 1990s and 2000s. Given the reality of an EMU made up of CMEs, 
LMEs and MMEs, the eurozone and single market themselves should have reformed in 
order to be more sensitive to this variation, rather than the other way around. 
Nevertheless, arguably, post-VoC approaches to study of the eurozone crisis are 
taking over in prominence from the analyses of Hall and Hancké due in part to the 
limitations mentioned (as argued by Ebenau, Bruff and May 2015, 1). Although they 
modify or reject VoC assumptions, many of these newer approaches still build on the 
historical institutionalism of the VoC approach.31 As Hall (2014) argues, VoCs focus on 
how institutions gradually develop over time and how they are relatively durable 
provides a useful starting point for explaining the key difference between the ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ in Europe. The strength of this institutionalist foundation is on clear display 
within step-1 of core-periphery analysis which makes claims about how nationally 
distinct capitalisms within EMU have responded very differently to the external 
                                                          
31 Although others draw instead from more heterodox sources, including Keynesian and Kaleckian 
political economy, as well as dependency theory and uneven and combined development (see discussion 
in Bruff and Ebenau 2014). 
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pressure of European integration. It is useful to situate core-periphery analysis within 
this CPE literature, in order to draw out how the claims of ‘step-1’ can contribute to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. 
Nölke (2015, 6) characterises many of the works containing broadly core-
periphery analysis claims as Critical Comparative Capitalisms (CCC) (see 
Stockhammer, 2011; Becker and Jäger, 2013; Becker, 2014; Jessop, 2014; 
Stockhammer et al., 2014, all cited in Nölke 2015).  He argues that although CCC 
approaches do not tend to speak of CMEs, LMEs or MMEs, they do contrast export-led 
or profit-led growth regimes (or models) in the core of Europe with demand-/ 
consumption-/debt-/wage-led growth regimes/models in the periphery of Europe. These 
export- and debt-led models do not need to viewed as homogenous, as, for example, 
‘demonstrated in a juxtaposition of recent developments within the one-sidedly export-
led German economy and the more balanced export and consumption-led Swedish 
economy, both usually classified as CMEs’ (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2015 cited in 
Nölke 2015, 6).  
Working within this CCC, or post-VoC approach, the core-periphery analysis of 
Lapavitsas (et al 2012) and others recognises that the economies of Germany and 
Southern Europe display dramatically different histories of institutional development. 
Here I return to the potential of ‘step-1’ of that argument. While steps 2 and 3 of core-
periphery analysis have relied on notions of German economic dominance, the first step 
is distinct from the others because it contains an implicit theory of capitalist diversity; 
namely the idea that there is something about the European project that has led to the 
emergence of different models of economic development in Europe. By participating in 
the project of European Integration, peripheral countries often had to adapt to western 
European norms and practices (Featherstone 2003, 6-7). As I argued earlier, the 
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‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ relationship between ‘debt-led’ and ‘export-led’ models is not 
analytically necessary to account for their emergence in the first place. They were 
simply multiple responses to the common pressure of a particular ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
project of European integration that not all countries were well suited to emulate/adapt 
to.  
Nölke (2015) provides a useful overview of how such a CPE approach can 
account for these different institutional histories, and of how the common pressure of a 
‘one size fits all’ model of European integration affected the core and the periphery 
differently. He focuses on wage bargaining systems, differences in competitiveness 
systems, and the relationship between the state as a central coordination mechanism and 
rising indebtedness (Nölke 2015).   
First, in the core, institutions were developed over time that facilitated 
comprehensive wage restraint (especially in Germany) and accordingly, price 
competitiveness. A very different history of institution building in Southern Europe 
meant that the workforces in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy were not able to repeat 
this fate, in particular due to a lack of a wage coordination tool, and due to the strength 
of (certain) labour unions (Nölke 2015, 7-8). Given the ‘stickiness’ of wage bargaining 
systems which have been ‘established over many decades, with coordinated wage 
systems being particularly difficult to emulate - Höpner and Lutter (2014, p. 19) call the 
German case a ‘relic of a historical stroke of luck’ (cited in Nölke 2015, 9; see also Hall 
2012: 359).  
Second, according to CPE approaches (especially VoC), different national 
institutional contexts create different comparative advantages between core and 
peripheral economies. CMEs or export-oriented economies such as Germany have an 
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advantage in building up incremental innovations in high-quality manufacturing, ‘based 
on a sophisticated system of skill formation, in particular through vocational training’ 
but also through relative job security and traditions in long term investment practices 
(Nölke 2015, 10). Peripheral economies typically have more of an advantage in the 
production of low to medium quality goods which rest on a more uneven system of skill 
formation. This has a number of consequences, not least of which are the relative price 
sensitivity of peripheral-type goods, and their vulnerability to competition from 
emerging economies outside of the EU single market (Nölke 2015, 10). Moreover, as 
Chen et al., (2012) and Baccaro and Pontusson (2015, 28 cited in Nölke 2015) note, 
extra EU demand for EU goods is typically stronger for advanced German products, and 
much lower for the low-medium goods produced by peripheral economies. All of these 
implications help to explain why the countries of the European periphery have lost 
export competitiveness over the decades, and have accumulated trade deficits vis-à-vis 
the rest of the Eurozone, as well as huge extra-EU deficits.  
Thirdly and finally, Nölke reviews CPE scholarship that focuses on the role of 
the state in the European periphery and on increasing public and private indebtedness. A 
CPE approach can allow us to recognise that financial and capital flows will interact 
differently with different types of capitalism (Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013 cited in 
(Nölke 2015, 13), leading to different growth regimes, with export oriented growth in 
Germany and credit/demand-led growth regime in Southern Europe, the USA and the 
UK (Stockhammer, 2011 cited in Nölke 2015, 13). LMEs such as the UK and CMEs 
such as Germany were able to adapt successfully to increasing capital flows following 
the introduction of the euro. This external pressure reinforced already existing 
institutional complementarities. The periphery on the other hand were in a much weaker 
position, and were lacking in the institutions that the USA and the UK had built up over 
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the course of three decades which focused their economies on the provision of 
innovative financial services, (Nölke 2015, 14). Instead, the periphery developed a 
dependency on foreign capital,  
but with a strong tendency towards deindustrialisation.  Due to long standing 
trends towards deindustrialisation already in place in the periphery, economic 
activity moved towards finance, real estate and construction, and often from 
production for export to the management of imports (Nölke 2015, 14). 
 
Nölke’s review demonstrates the applicability of CPE approaches, grounded in the 
meta-theoretical historical institutionalism of VoC, to the study of the eurozone crisis in 
the periphery. Studying the historical evolution and ‘stickiness’ of peripheral 
institutions helps flesh out the claim of ‘step-1’ of core periphery analysis that the 
European project was tailored to core Europe, and not to the European periphery 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012). Yet in spite of its value, this CPE approach leaves a number of 
questions unanswered, as I now discuss. 
 
Beyond non-convergence: the problems of path dependency and methodological 
nationalism 
A broadly CPE approach to the study of the crisis in European periphery makes two 
central claims which can help orient the research framework of the next three case study 
chapters. First, the political economies of the European periphery are ‘shaped’ clearly 
by national institutional contexts. Second, these institutions develop historically, are 
‘sticky’, and set the periphery apart from the core.  In other words, CPE can approach 
the study of differential capitalist restructuring of European economies by recognising 
the institutionally embedded differences, and the path dependency of these differences, 
in national political economies.  
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Yet, historical institutionalist path dependency cannot tell us the whole story. 
Focusing on the resilience of path-dependent institutions can certainly help us explain 
‘non-convergence’, but is far less helpful in explaining institutional change (Streeck 
2009; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Jackson and Deeg 2008; Thelen 2009). The key 
strength of VoC, post-VoC, and CPE more generally is also its greatest limitation. That 
is its meta-theoretical foundations in historical institutionalism, approaches which, as 
Thelen notes (2009, 473) have quite poor records in explaining institutional change. 
CPE has tended to involve the analysis of ‘comparative statics, in which institutions are 
invoked as an independent or intervening variable to explain some other outcome – for 
example, policy differences or divergent patterns of social or political stratification’ 
(Thelen 2009, 473).  
This makes a lot of sense if we consider the origins of the approach. It first 
emerged as a critique of the hyper-globalist thesis and makes the argument that national 
models of capitalism can resist transformation in the face of external pressure for 
convergence (Featherstone 2008). ‘To this day, scholars are still generally more apt to 
ask what institutions do than how they evolve and change over time’ (Thelen 2009, 
473). Because institutions are ‘sticky’, these approaches have a strong tendency to 
emphasize continuity through time in the basic structure and logic of models of political 
economy (Thelen 2009, 473). VoC scholars have very little to say about institutional 
change over time – because the ‘idea of persistence is virtually built into the definition 
of an institution, it should perhaps not be a surprise that the question of change is a 
weak spot in the literature as a whole, and indeed across all varieties of institutionalism’ 
(Thelen 2009, 473). As such, like domestic level analysis, it emphasises obstacles to 
convergence, path dependency, and non-convergence.  
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As was the case with domestic level analysis, reproduction of the problem of 
non-convergence leads to a number of empirical blind spots. Focusing only on ‘sticky’ 
institutions which act as ‘obstacles to convergence’ shuts down the possibility that 
something other than these obstacles has acted as a catalyst for divergence. It generates 
a research framework that cannot recognise that simply because a country has ‘failed to 
converge’, doesn’t mean that an economy has not transformed. Fundamentally, it is not 
well suited to exploring the important institutional change that has taken place in 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland in the decades before their respective crises. Historically 
‘sticky’ institutions matter, but there is also an important and neglected story of 
institutional change that VoC has been unable to tell. 
 
Methodological Nationalism 
Mainstream CPE and VoC in particular have also been widely critiqued for their 
methodological nationalism (Jordan 2015, Bruff et al. 2015, 33; Jessop 2011). As Bruff 
et al. note, VoC scholarship has an ‘overwhelming tendency to neglect both intra-
national and transnationally relational character of capitalism’ (2015, 33). While 
institutions matter, little appreciation is given to the international constitution of 
national institutions (cf Rosenberg 2006). Jordan (2015) notes that while the VoC 
approaches of Hall and Hancké pay due attention to the importance of current account 
imbalances and the design flaws of the eurozone, nevertheless, ‘the boundaries erected 
by an approach underpinned by methodological nationalism mean that there is no ability 
to explain this important political economy development in relation to anything but 
national factors and how these change’ (Jordan 2015, 14). In other words, the 
methodological nationalism which underpins much of CPE reproduces the internalism 
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of domestic level analysis. In spite of its ability to distinguish between divergence and 
non-convergence, and to reject simplistic modernisation theory assumptions, VoC 
analysis tends not to move beyond ‘step 1’ (in terms of core-periphery analysis) in its 
own analysis (see Hall 2012, 357 – 361), and this is a result of its inability to account 
for the international constituents of ‘internal’ development. While core-periphery 
analysis has a problematic conception of the international dimensions of the peripheral 
economic development, the VoC literature does not provide one at all.  
 
Modernisation in the European periphery: Beyond linear conceptions of development 
How can a CPE approach be utilised to account for the origins of the crisis in the 
European periphery in a way that captures their multiple paths to crisis? How can a CPE 
approach overcome the three gaps identified in this chapter: the problems of agency, 
diversity and the internal external problem? In the remainder of this section I propose 
that a CPE approach can be used to orient the following three chapters by adopting, 
first, a non-linear conceptualisation of modernisation, and second, by focusing of the 
effects of Europeanisation in these three countries.  
A CPE approach can trace historically specific economic trajectories in the 
European periphery by tracing different national strategies of modernisation. Unlike 
much of Western Europe, the countries of the European periphery were ‘economic 
latecomers’ – all members of the ‘cohesion countries’. Countries such as Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece all attempted strategies of ‘catching up’ with their industrialised 
European neighbours at different junctures in the decades before the crisis. Historically, 
these countries of the European periphery have had much in common; they were all 
agrarian dominated economies characterised by little to no industrialisation, high levels 
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of emigration, high unemployment, balance of payments problems, and very low levels 
of GDP per capita. Crucially, they all attempted to modernise, ‘catch up’ and to 
converge with Western Europe (Featherstone 1998; 2005).  
Yet, it is important to make a distinction between the study of ‘modernisation’ 
and ‘modernisation theory’. Modernisation theory typically portrays economic 
development as a ladder, where, as Selwyn (2014) explains, ‘once on the bottom rung, 
poor countries have the possibility of climbing further up and, by doing so, accelerating 
the human development of their population’ (1). As Lyberaki and Tsakolotos quote, this 
macroeconomic orthodoxy claims to ‘Spread the truth – the laws of economics are like 
the laws of engineering. One set of laws works everywhere’ (quoted in Lyberaki and 
Tsakolotos 2002, 96).  Modernisation is conceptualised as evolutionary, linear and 
occurring in stages (Rostow 1990; see discussion in Leys 1996, 9-11; Payne and 
Phillips 2010, 61-72; Selwyn 2014). Modernisation is conceived of as a process of 
change that is both transformative and progressive (Payne and Phillips 2010, 66) and 
occurs when countries ‘get the policies right’; when they adopt norms, structures and 
behaviours that together will produce economic development (Leys 1996, 9-11).  The 
assumption is that all economies are basically going in the same direction and that the 
central aim of policy makers should be to dismantle obstacles to that process of 
convergence (ibid 96). On the other hand, as Anthony Giddens puts it, the sources of 
underdevelopment 
don’t come from the global economy itself, or from the self-seeking behaviour 
on the part of the richer nations. They lie mainly in the societies themselves – in 
authoritarian government, corruption, conflict, over-regulation and the low level 
of emancipation of women (2000, 120 cited in Selwyn 2014, 1). 
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It is not hard to find these assumptions at work in the literature on the eurozone crisis. 
As mentioned in section one, modernisation theory acts as a meta-theoretical 
assumption underpinning much of the claims of the ‘immaturity thesis’. For example, 
Jason Manopoulos characterises Greece as having a peculiar impunity for the ruling 
classes, their corruption, and Oligarchical business structures. Greece is understood as 
distinct from ‘advanced’ ‘strong real’ economies, and contrasts are drawn between the 
USA and Northern Europe (mature economies) and Russia, Turkey and Greece (2011, 
9; see Antoniades 2013 for an account of the pervasiveness of this view).  
Unsurprisingly, modernisation theory assumptions are also clearly evident in the 
economic analysis and policy prescriptions of the European Commission, ECB and the 
IMF, centred as they are on the ‘correction’ of peripheral immaturity. If Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland got into trouble by failing to remove obstacles to modernisation, 
pushing through painful but necessary reforms now is nothing if not long overdue. 
Transposed from Cold War era analyses of underdevelopment in the ‘developing world’ 
to the analyses of the crisis in the European ‘PIIGS’, approaches underpinned by 
modernisation theory bring with them the same built in tendency towards moralist 
representations of agency in the periphery as ‘immature’ (Payne and Phillips 2010, 62; 
see Young 1999). 
 The major limitations of this linear conception of development have already 
been discussed in section one. Domestic level analysis of the crisis in the European 
periphery has tended to smuggle in Rostowian stadial determinism, leading to a 
preoccupation with the identification of obstacles to development. Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal encountered crisis because of a failure to introduce ‘painful but necessary 
reforms’ in the decades before the crisis hit. Yet, a failure to modernise is not the same 
thing as a straightforward continuity of ‘tradition’. Focusing on so-called ‘obstacles to 
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convergence’ discounts the possibility that there are other, potentially important sources 
of economic divergence.  Modernisation theory can only account for the path not taken, 
it cannot explain the institutional change that has actually taken place.  
 Nevertheless, in order to explore the origins of the crisis in the European 
periphery, I propose historically tracing processes of modernisation across Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal in the following chapters. This implies the adoption of an 
alternative conception of modernisation; one that goes beyond the stadial and linear 
assumptions of modernisation theory. This alternative conception comprehends the 
possibilities of ‘economic latecomer’ economies pursuing ‘catch up development’, 
recognising at a basic level that Greece, Portugal, and Ireland would not follow any 
linear pattern of development such as Rostow’s (1990) five-stage modernisation 
trajectory (Selwyn 2014, 79-81; see also Rosenberg 2006; Gerschenkron 1962).  
Unilinear conceptions of development are ill-suited to understanding the 
evolving economic trajectory of the European periphery because conscious projects to 
‘catch-up’ are evaluated in terms of success and failure, whether the development 
project in the third world or ‘convergence’ in the countries of the European periphery. 
When they encounter crisis, such as these three countries did, failure becomes the 
dominant theme. Yet, in framing such projects in terms of ‘success’ and ‘failure’, 
existing approaches have overlooked the important ways in which failed attempts at 
modernisation can actually be generative of social and political transformation. Through 
analysing the origins of the eurozone crisis it is possible to show how in no case did 
‘failure’ result in mere persistence of existing institutions or a return to the ‘drawing 
board’, as existing narratives frequently imply. Indeed, that very conception results in 
the erasure of significant change. Failed, but nevertheless active attempts to converge on 
a vision of modernity propelled the trajectories of both Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 
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new and unexpected directions. Studying the ‘modernisation’ of the European 
periphery, but moving beyond unilinear understandings of modernisations highlights 
how existing narratives of ‘success and failure’ within the literature have led to 
important and longstanding blind spots that could be overcome by recognising how 
‘failure’ is just as generative of change as ‘success.’ 
A CPE approach can therefore study the transformative effects of attempts made 
by these ‘economic latercomers’ to modernise, rather than measure convergence or non-
convergence against an arbitrary yardstick of ‘modernisation’ as a presumed stage of 
development. Studying modernisation in this way has the potential to provide a history 
of divergence, rather than non-convergence. 
 
Europeanisation and capitalist diversity 
As I argued in section two, critical perspectives that highlight the deleterious effect 
European integration has had on the periphery already exist. In spite of their strengths, 
such as those illustrated by ‘step-1’ or core-periphery analysis, they tend to reproduce 
many of the problems associated with the problem of victimisation. On the other hand, 
domestic level analysis, including much CPE (and especially VoC) has a problem with 
methodological nationalism. 
A notion of capitalist diversity can overcome the internalism/externalism of such 
approaches by emphasising the international dimensions of domestic change through 
bringing it into dialogue with the literature on Europeanisation.32 Scholars of 
                                                          
32 In a certain respect, this framework takes up the invitation of Bache, Bulmer and Gunay (2011) who 
have called for Europeanisation studies to engage with critical political economy. They argue that 
Europeanisation studies has not done enough to interrogate its own metatheoretical foundations, and that 
by taking on board some of the insights of, inter alia, critical political economy, Europeanisation literature 
could ‘catch up’ with the eurozone crisis in a way that it has yet to do (Bache, Bulmer, and Gunay 2011, 
18). 
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‘Europeanisation’ study a country’s ‘domestic adaptation to European regional 
integration’ (Graziano and Vink 2007). In this respect, there is clear potential here to 
account for the domestic level agency of the European periphery in a way that is 
sensitive to international (or at least European) dimensions of that agency. Scholars in 
this field have developed a well established research agenda which asks question about 
what happens ‘when Europe hits home’ (Börzel and Risse 2002). As Radaelli notes, 
Europeanisation as such is not a theory, but ‘rather a phenomenon that needs to be 
explained’ (Graziano and Vink 2007, 12).  
Europeanisation and CPE (especially VoC) approaches are typically seen as 
opposites, according to Featherstone (2008, 32). If we baldly claim that the first asserts 
the likelihood of increasing convergence, while the latter anticipates persistent non-
convergence, it is easy to see why. 
In addition, the VoC approach has a very weak conception of the international. 
External pressure will not lead to domestic change, it will only shed light on and 
confirm existing national specificities. All meaningful change comes from within. ‘Thus 
the approach would support hypotheses of path dependency in relation to external 
pressure and would stress the resilience of the particular market model in interpreting 
such pressures’ (Featherstone 2008, 32). Europeanisation on the other hand takes the 
possibility of domestic transformation as a result of adaptation to European regional 
integration as its starting point. Yet, in the case of southern Europe, as Featherstone 
notes enthusiastically in his 2008 article on VoC and the Greek crisis, Europeanisation 
literature often assumes a great deal of path dependency – precisely for the reasons VoC 
would suggest. This is why, as Featherstone notes, the approaches are ‘two sides of the 
same coin’. 
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 Unsurprisingly, Europeanisation studies has generated a lot of case study 
research, but also a number of works explicitly concerned with developing its 
theoretical parameters (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Graziano and Vink 2007). Due 
to its focus on domestic adaptation to European integration, or in other words, the 
‘bottom up’ dynamics of European integration (Radaelli 2004), there is a clear benefit to 
positioning the research question of this project in relation to the literature on 
Europeanisation.33 But how useful is it in accounting for the divergence we are 
concerned with? 
Promisingly, the Europeanisation literature has recognised that domestic 
adaptation to European Integration is very unlikely to lead to convergence. ‘Diversity of 
domestic responses – across countries, institutions, and policy domains – has become a 
key theme in Europeanization research’ (see Radaelli 2004, 3; Bulmer 2007, 52; Börzel 
and Risse 2003; (Knill 2001; Heritier et al. 2001; Knill, Tosun, and Bauer 2009). ‘In 
fact, it has become something of an article of faith that Europeanization is not 
associated with convergence’ (Wessels et al. 2003) (quoted in Goetz 2007, 76). Some 
literature has focused on the ‘differential impact of European integration’ (Wessels et al. 
2003, xv; Héritier and Knill 2001; Vink and Graziano 2007, 9; see also Radaelli 2003, 
33). Existing specific domestic contexts may lead to differential results from the process 
of Europeanisation (Vink and Graziano 2007, 9). Laffan (2007) sees a persistence of 
diversity across national executives rather than convergence towards a particular model. 
Although European directives are aimed at harmonising national policies, in reality, 
                                                          
33 Yet, Europeanisation studies has sometimes been accused of being overly structural– see especially 
(Woll and Jacquot 2010; Héritier and Knill 2001, 2). Because Europeanisation studies often emphasises 
the ‘impact’ of European integration on member states, a passive conception of agency often results 
instead of one that focuses on the ways in which European integration can be positively and creatively 
‘used’ by member states to pursue domestic goals. My framework emphasises creative ‘usages’ of 
European integration rather than ‘impact’ through focusing on how ‘Europe’ was used to advance 
national modernisation strategies (see also Radaelli 2004, 4-5). 
. 
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they leave much room for continued national diversity (Vink and Graziano 2007, 10-11; 
Wessels et al. 2003, xv). 
A particular strength of the Europeanisation literature is its domestic focus 
which allows for a recognition of the constitutive role of the international (European 
level) in transformation of politics, policy and polities, and indeed, many have 
suggested that ‘the new research agenda of Europeanization has provided the study of 
European integration with a ‘Second Image Reversed’ theory (Vink and Graziano 2007, 
16; Raedelli 2003, 35;  see Gourevitch 1978), along with its recognition that 
Europeanisation is unlikely to lead to convergence. Studying ‘when Europe hits home’, 
clearly moves us beyond the internalism of the immaturity thesis. Its ‘domestic level’ 
focus also facilitates the (potential) avoidance of the externalism of the victimisation 
thesis (Radaelli 2004). As Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) note, it is useful to make a 
distinction between Europeanisation, which is a process, and convergence and 
divergences, which are outcomes, ‘[t]here is now substantial evidence that EU politics 
provides different opportunities to different actors in terms of creative usages of Europe 
– the implication being that there is more differential impact than convergence’ 
(Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007, 39; see also Woll and Jacquolt (2010) and Héritier and 
Knill (2001).  
However, digging a little deeper, it is possible to see that the discussion of 
‘divergence’ within such debates is actually quite limited. Europeanisation of policies, 
politics or polities can either lead to convergence (and thus, transformation) or a 
persistence of diversity (effectively a continuity with the past, and in a theoretically 
meaningful sense, a lack of transformation). This leads back to the problem of 
immaturity, because there is little discussion of how divergence is a form of 
transformation in and of itself, and how a state can diverge while marking a significant 
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discontinuity with its past. Scholars of Europeanisation have been sensitive to the non-
uniform effects of European integration on nation states (Graziano and Vink 2007, 8). 
Yet, the different variants of Europeanisation tend to be explained as ‘non-convergence’ 
rather than ‘divergence, or in other words, how nation states can account for the timing, 
extent and terms of their adaptation to European integration. Radaelli notes that 
Europeanisation is sometimes measured in four ways (specifically in this case, Radaelli 
(2000) looks at European nations states adaptation to EMU – but the four criteria are 
widely used).34  The first is accommodation, which indicates a pre-existing closeness of 
fit (i.e. Germany). The second is transformation, indicating lack of fit, but leading to 
fundamental challenges to existing domestic structures. Third is inertia, indicating a 
lack of change due to lack of fit and deeply entrenched domestic institutional veto 
players. Finally there is retrenchment, which indicates a paradox of negative 
Europeanisation.35 
Studying ‘transformation’ as a result of Europeanisation is the most fruitful 
direction to take from the above. Yet, most research on Europeanisation and the 
European periphery tends to focus on inertia. This is perhaps because as of yet, not 
enough attention has been paid to how transformation due to ‘lack of fit’ is much more 
likely to lead to divergence, rather than convergence. When convergence fails to occur, 
researchers tend to focus on obstacles to that convergence – leading them to identify 
cultural and political obstacles (the problem of immaturity identified in section two). 
Indeed, in cautioning against using the concept of Europeanisation as ‘yet another way 
to refer to convergence and homogeneity in Europe’, Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) 
                                                          
34 The above is paraphrased from Dyson 2000, 12, and see also Radaelli and Pasquier 2007; 40, Heritier 
et al 2001; Bulmer 2007, 55. See also Börzel and Risse (2003) for a ‘slightly different threefold 
classification: absorption, accommodation and transformation’ (quoted in Bulmer 2007, 55). 
35 A pattern that is arguable occurring in Syriza-led Greece since 2015, and has been observed in Italy 
also (see Dehousse 2013). 
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recommend that ‘the prediction to test is about lack of convergence, not its presence’ 
(39, italics added). Other studies question whether the EU has really determined 
domestic institutional arrangements in member states beyond very narrow requirements 
to meet EU stipulations (Bulmer 2007, 53). Much recent scholarship on Europeanisation 
therefore emerges as a critique of earlier studies in the field which tended to expect 
convergence as a result of domestic adaptation to European integration. Framing their 
positions in this way has led them to emphasise the resilience/persistence (non-
convergence) of national differences (as Wessells et al 2003 and Héritier and Knill 2001 
do).   
However, the multiple forms of divergence encountered by Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece suggest something much more significant than mere resilience of existing 
national differences. Yet it is also certainly true that Europeanisation has not led to 
convergence, harmonisation or homogeneity across political economies. At this point 
we can bring in the insights of capitalist diversity to provide a third option: the 
possibility that domestic adaptation to European integration can lead to divergence, or 
in other words, the fundamental transformation of existing domestic structures. It is 
possible to conceive of Europeanisation leading to the emergence of radically new 
hybrid domestic structures and patterns of growth. Divergence is more than the 
resilience of national differences. It is the possibility of the emergence of entirely new 
kinds of national differences. The transformations that occurred in the developmental 
trajectories of the European periphery cannot be easily located within existing 
trajectories. Therefore, the dramatic transformations of the 1990s and 2000s are not 
mere ‘persistence’ or continuations of existing trajectories. Rather, ‘when Europe hit 
home’, it could potentially have led the countries of the European periphery in multiple 
different directions. Recognising the possibility of Europeanisation being generative of 
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divergence (as opposed to non-convergence) addresses both the limitations of the VoC 
approach – as it allows for the possibility of institutional change, and recognises the 
international (in this case European) constituents of domestic institutional development. 
As the next three chapters show, in no case did the periphery fail to transform or 
‘converge’ as a result of adapting to European Integration. Instead, something much 
more radical occurred. The European periphery went in new and unexpected directions.  
 
Europeanisation and the agency of the European Periphery 
This conceptualisation of Europeanisation also has implications for how I conceptualise 
peripheral agency in this project. The problematic conceptions of agency have already 
been well established. Approaches underpinned by immaturity thesis assumptions 
portray the history of the European periphery as one of neglect. These countries 
neglected to ‘get the policies right’, they neglected to introduce painful but necessary 
‘structural reforms’ and above all they failed to modernise. As mentioned in section 
one, when political and economic irresponsibility are the processes of agency that are 
privileged, other forms of agency are neglected or entirely absent from analysis. 
 On the other hand, CPE approaches emphasising path dependency leave us with 
limited analytical scope to capture peripheral agency. The dominant theme in this 
instance is the inability to act. For Hall (2012), the European periphery could not 
reasonably have been expected to pursue different economic policies, because the 
institutions which shape the structure of their economies are built up slowly over time 
and are very difficult to change. 
 I propose studying processes of modernisation and Europeanisation in a way that 
is more sensitive to the agency of the European periphery in two ways. First of all, 
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while I accept that path dependency matters, parallel to this, I allow space to focus on 
how institutional change was happening in Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and how 
peripheral agency has an important part to play in that story. ‘Sticky’ differences in 
national institutional configurations will, in part, explain the different kinds of crisis 
experienced by the Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. However, institutional and political 
economic change clearly did take place in these countries and in order to capture that 
change, it is important to trace how domestic actors negotiated path dependency as they 
consciously pursued strategies of ‘catching up’. Similarly, Europeanisation is a common 
external pressure, but the periphery will have some say in how it responds and how it 
negotiates it. It is likely that each case negotiated European integration in a different 
way, and that this played a role in the different paths to crisis. As Menz (2003) puts it, 
while the external pressure of Europeanisation was constant, the actual impact of 
Europeanisation is conditioned by domestic actors (545-7). Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal may have emphasised certain aspects of Europeansiation and showed less 
success in adapting to others. A ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration may 
have nevertheless provided different kinds of opportunities and constraints for different 
actors (Radelli and Pasquier 2007). Focusing on peripheral agency can help draw out 
the different experiences and results of Europeanisation in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
 Second, related to the above, ‘agency’ in this project is conceived of as 
addressing the problematic conceptions of agency which dominate existing accounts. 
The following case study chapters will allow space to consider the role of putatively 
‘mature’ processes of agency in catalysing divergent economic trajectories. This 
addresses the problem of focusing only on ‘obstacles to convergence’, and recognising 
that there are neglected counter-narratives that can be illuminated. In other words, this 
project utilises a conceptualisation of agency that moves beyond narratives of blame 
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(immaturity/victimisation) and allows Greece, Portugal, and Ireland an active role in 
their own evolving economic trajectories. 
 
Modernisation, Europeanisation and historicist approaches: proposed framework for 
studying the cases of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland 
Drawing all of this together, a clear guide to research is provided. I argue that a focus on 
previously overlooked ‘non-immature’ sources of divergence (as opposed to immature 
sources of ‘non-convergence’) implies a multiple-case study, historicist framework 
which focuses on Modernisation and Europeanisation.  
The above dialogue between Europeanisation and Comparative Political 
Economy guides the research framework of this thesis in the following three ways. First 
of all, I adopt a multiple-case study approach which explores, in turn, the evolving 
economic trajectories of Greece, Portugal and Ireland in the decades before the 
eurozone crisis. Instead of a comparative methodology, I have opted for this historicist 
multiple-case study approach that examines the historical specificity of institutional 
change in Ireland, in Greece, and in Portugal. This approach is more useful as it allows 
for an inductive, theory generating research framework. While it is a truism that each 
economy can be treated as a sui generis and as not representative as cases of a broader 
category (Schonfield 1969, Goodin 2003, 203), if we are to gain a deeper understanding 
of the very different paths to crisis followed by Greece, Portugal, and Ireland – it is 
important to keep the historical specificity of these political economies front and centre 
in the analysis. The aim of the analysis is to reveal how very different political 
economies experienced Europeanisation differently.  
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This methodology certainly does not dispute the role of path dependency 
articulated by VoC, ‘step-1’ core periphery analysis and the CPE analyses of differences 
between wage levels, competitiveness, and financial systems outlined by Nölke and 
others. Rather, a historicist case study approach avoids the ‘use and abuse’ of ideal 
types, and the dangers of forcing the ‘square peg of empirical reality into the round hole 
of the conceptual ideal type’ (Clift 2014, 209). Institutional ‘stickiness’ is important, but 
it is not the whole story, and a historicist multiple case study approach will allow light 
to be shed on the histories of institutional change that the path dependency of the VoC 
approach has caused to be neglected.  This project is conceived much more as a critical 
historicist analysis that seeks to illuminate how institutions and (especially) institutional 
change produced an evolving political economic trajectory in these three countries 
specifically. While not necessarily generating generalizable claims, such an approach 
can potentially tell us something new about the origins of the Eurozone crisis. In other 
words, I propose a historical multi-case study methodology in order to provide a 
complementary yet neglected history of institutional change in the European periphery. 
In this respect, the intention is to offer a critical contribution to the CPE accounts Nölke 
(2015) reviews, rather than a straightforward rejection. 
By bringing CPE and Europeanisation together it is possible to study the 
evolution of modernisation across my three case study chapters. Most importantly, 
rather than tracing convergence or non-convergence, I ask whether or not active 
attempts at ‘adapting the European integration’ generated brand new patterns of 
economic development in the European periphery? What, if any, impact did 
‘Europeanisation’ have on the periphery’s modernisation? By situating the European 
periphery’s adaptation to European integration within their histories of modernisation, I 
pose the following question - did the periphery’s adaptation to a ‘one size fits all’ 
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project of European integration have any significant impact on their evolving economic 
trajectories? Studying the impact of European integration in this way allows me to 
consider the ways in which putatively ‘mature’ processes of Europeanisation may have 
been generative of divergence. 
This approach has potential to deepen existing critical debates on the origins of 
the eurozone crisis. Studying modernisation in this way implies taking domestic-level 
analysis more seriously, and in this way the agency of the periphery can be better 
accounted for. This makes it possible, across a multiple-case study analysis, to also 
account for the specific paths to crisis followed by the periphery. In addition, by 
bringing the insights of CPE together with those of Europeanisation, issues highlighted 
by narratives of victimisation can be dealt with in a way that existing domestic-level 
approaches tend to avoid. Studying ‘domestic adaptation’ to European integration 
makes it possible to consider the role of the latter in catalysing peripheral divergence in 
a way that does not posit the periphery as being ‘passively reshaped’.  
Finally, a note on case selection. The countries that were worst hit by the crisis 
were chosen, and these were deemed to be those countries that faced pressure to agree 
to IMF-ECB-EU bailout agreements. Of course, this relates to five countries, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus (and there is certainly a strong case to include Italy 
on this list also). For reasons of space, three countries were chosen, and in the interests 
of maximising the diversity that needed to be accounted for, Cyprus and Spain were left 
out because - important differences notwithstanding – Spain and Cyprus’ crises were 
very similar to the Irish case in that they both stemmed from banking crises due to 
housing bubbles (not to mention that Cyprus was heavily exposed to the Greek crisis). 
Portugal, Ireland and Greece on the other hand represent well the different kinds of 
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crisis which occurred across the European periphery, i.e., stagnation and recession, 
banking crisis and a public debt and fiscal crisis respectively.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I offered a critical overview of the literature on the eurozone crisis that 
purports to account for the origins of the crisis in the periphery. In doing so I paid 
particular attention to the assumptions existing debates make about the asymmetry of 
the crisis. Why have the countries of the European periphery been hit hardest? I outlined 
two opposing answers.  
The ‘immaturity thesis’ is used to argue that the periphery is responsible for its 
own problems, because it failed to introduce difficult but necessary reforms at the 
appropriate times. This ‘failure to converge’ meant that Portugal, Ireland and Greece did 
not become modern, mature, European economies, and pre-existing political and 
economic pathologies persisted, meaning it was ‘only a matter of time’ before they got 
into trouble. The ‘victimisation thesis’ is used to argue that the periphery was 
‘victimised’ by the core of Europe. The modernisation of the periphery was stunted and 
contorted in order to ensure the interests of its more powerful European neighbours.  
Framed in this way, the debate asks us to choose between one of two scapegoats 
– the ‘lazy PIIGS’ or the German ‘big bad wolf’. This framing has stood in the way of a 
genuine critical rethinking of the eurozone crisis. So far it has not provided an 
explanation of the divergence of the European periphery that can take seriously the 
diversity of individual paths to crisis or the periphery’s own agency, leading to a 
number of important blind spots. 
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The theoretical framework proposed in the final section of this chapter allows 
the next three case studies to investigate how the economic trajectories of the European 
periphery evolved and diverged in the decades before the crisis. It also allows these 
chapters to question just what effect putatively ‘mature’ patterns of political agency, 
such as adaptation to European Integration, had on these changing economic trajectories 
through looking at three different histories of national modernisation strategies. 
Studying peripheral divergence in this way makes it possible to overcome the limits of 
immaturity and victimisation because it places the agency of the periphery and the 
diversity of their respective crises front and centre. It also has the potential to study the 
impact of a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration on the periphery’s 
economic trajectory in a way that is not limited by assumptions of convergence/non-
convergence. 
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2 
It’s Mostly Fiscal? The European Dimensions of the 
Greek Crisis 
 
 
Greece must …adopt a European policy that breaks away from its ‘traditional’ 
attitude of seeking exemptions and defending the self-defeating notion of its 
own exceptionalism. It is in every country’s interest not to be seen as a perpetual 
exception—a ‘problem’ that never goes away.  
Costas Simitis, former Prime Minister of Greece, 2015. 
 
For Greece …accession [to the EC] meant an enormous reorganisation of its 
economic structures, which were the most significant ones in the recent history 
of the country. 
Tassos Giannitsis, economic advisor to Costas Simitis, 1997. 
 
 
This chapter begins the first of three case studies. Greece is the epicentre of the 
eurozone crisis and ‘patient zero’ for the immaturity thesis.  The country is often, as 
Tsakalotos (2014) has observed, conceived of as ‘exceptional’ to a purported European 
norm of fiscal responsibility, and thereby cast as the principal architect of its own 
downfall. Antoniades (2013) has noted that Greece has been portrayed in popular media 
as the ‘corrupted other of European modernity’. Although widespread, this narrative is 
unpopular, and in response to such claims, many critical approaches, especially from the 
discipline of IPE, have unpersuasively attempted to ignore or downplay the causal role 
of Greek public debt and fiscal deficits in Greece’s contemporary difficulties (see 
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especially Lapavitsas et al. 2012). Yet at the same time, Greece’s crisis has never been 
purely fiscal, and scholarship that has over-relied on notions of immaturity in the guise 
of ‘Greek exceptionalism’ has proved inadequate to the task of accounting for the 
deeper structural problems facing the Greek economy (see discussion in 
Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013). In this chapter I argue that a convincing 
understanding of the Greek crisis must accordingly begin with the recognition that it has 
two components - it is both a fiscal and a competitiveness crisis – and these dimensions 
should be analysed separately. 
As the first of three case studies, this chapter adopts the analytical framework 
outlined in chapter one to draw attention Greece’s experience of Europeanisation, and to 
the ways in which ‘non-exceptional’ dynamics played a key causal role in Greece’s 
crisis by tracing the evolution of the country’s economic trajectory since 1974. In doing 
so I show that, rather than Greek fiscal irresponsibility, the most important factor in the 
origins of the contemporary crisis may be found precisely in the process of Greece’s 
integration with Europe.  
This argument is developed over four sections. Section one engages with the 
‘exceptionalism’ thesis, the Greek version of the ‘immaturity thesis’, examining those 
perspectives which emphasise how particular ‘exceptional’ national and political traits 
are primarily responsible for the country’s fiscal crisis. I take some of these insights on 
board by focusing on how long-standing problems relating to tax collection, welfare 
provision, and poor reform capacity do indeed have an important role in the crisis. Yet, 
I also outline two important limitations. First, perspectives in this vein have 
misleadingly explained the origins of these problems as stemming mainly from 
processes of corruption and irresponsibility. Second, they have problematically 
conflated the fiscal crisis with the causes of the competitiveness crisis. 
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Section two lays the groundwork for an alternative narrative of the Greek crisis 
by focusing on modernisation strategies during the 1980s. It argues that public debt 
accumulation should be understood as bound up in a process of state directed 
investment in a project of industrialisation, with a specific focus on the high-tech sector. 
This strategy was undoubtedly a failure, but it is important to understand that this failure 
is indicative of the challenges faced by a small peripheral ‘latecomer’ economy 
attempting to realise a rather typical modern vision of development.  
Section three focuses on the emergence of ‘debt-led’ growth in Greece. It was 
during this decade that the Greek economy started to grow for the first time in decades. 
Greece underwent important changes during the 1990s as a result of joining the 
European Single Market and as a result of its preparations for the euro. A puzzle 
emerges: just as Greece got its inflation and exchange rates under control, experienced 
above average GDP growth, and introduced liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation, its economy became increasingly inward looking and less competitive. 
This suggests a linkage between ‘Europeanisation’ during the 1990s, growth, and falling 
competitiveness in Greece.  
The final section considers the ways in which euro membership catalysed 
existing vulnerabilities in the run up to the sovereign debt crisis in two main respects. 
First of all, the trajectory of debt-led growth which had already emerged in the 1990s 
expanded rapidly as a result of increased capital flows following deepening financial 
integration. Secondly, EMU contributed to new and unsustainable dynamics of public 
debt management. 
Shedding light on the ‘non-exceptional’ causes of the Greek crisis reveals the 
crucial role played by Europeanisation in the country’s divergence. It is no coincidence 
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that Greece’s economic trajectory transformed most dramatically during the 1990s and 
2000s, following the emergence of the ‘one market, one money’ project of European 
integration (Emerson, Gros, and Italianer 1992). The economic trajectory that led 
Greece to its 2010 sovereign debt crisis was catalysed by ‘non-exceptional’ processes of 
Greek agency, and especially by its attempt to catch up with its Western European 
neighbours. Preparing for the Single Market and EMU presented Greek elites who were 
concerned with modernisation with a clear vision for what it means to be both ‘modern’ 
and ‘European’, and clear guidelines (in the form of EU targets, directives and 
legislature) on how to reshape Greece in order to emulate this vision. This suggests an 
intriguing challenge to the immaturity thesis and notions of Greek exceptionalism. 
While the country’s failure to follow specific rules of European integration appears to 
account for its fiscal crisis, it is precisely its success in following other rules of 
European integration which accounts for its competitiveness crisis. 
 
Section One: Contesting the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Greek crisis 
Greece is often represented in mainstream scholarly, political and media narratives as 
‘exceptional’ and as the antithesis of ‘advanced’ Northern European economies. As the 
previous chapter has suggested - existing ‘domestic-level’ approaches tend to emphasise 
the ways in which Greece failed to ‘play by the rules’ befitting a modern, mature 
member of the European project. On the other hand, critical and ‘systemic’ literature on 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis has had difficulty in ‘explaining away’ Greek 
immaturity, as Kevin Featherstone’s response during a debate with Costas Lapavitsas 
demonstrates: 
[you say that it] has “nothing to do with state profligacy.” Sorry, I had 
understood that the debt to GDP ratio since 1993 has been consistently around 
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100% of Gross Domestic Product. How could a state sustain those levels of debt 
and not be vulnerable? (in Lapavitsas 2010). 
 
It is clear that clientelism, corruption and tax evasion have played important roles in 
Greece’s crisis.  However, in this chapter I argue that these well documented, 
supposedly ‘exceptional’ aspects of Greece’s political economy do not tell the whole 
story. This section sketches the most important claims of the exceptionalism thesis,36 
before identifying some important limitations. Crucially, I argue that while notions of 
exceptionalism may capture important aspects of the historical character of Greece’s 
fiscal crisis, they are inadequate in accounting for the origins of Greece’s 
competitiveness crisis. 
 
Debt-fuelled clientelism: the ‘exceptional’ origins of the Greek crisis 
The story of Greece’s crisis typically begins with the foundation of a new party, the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in 1974 under the leadership of Andreas 
Papandreou. PASOK secured an overall majority in the 1981 elections at the expense of 
New Democracy (ND). As figures 2.1 and 2.2 show, public deficits and debt rose 
significantly from the late 1970s, and particularly from 1981-1989. Most of the debt 
was accrued by PASOK governments in the 1980s, through socioeconomic policies 
aiming to expand the public sector and increase social spending and raising wages 
through borrowing. For many, the electoral success of Papandreou and PASOK can be 
explained through skill, party organisation and ingenuity on the one hand, and personal 
charisma and the inherent emotive appeal of populist rhetoric on the other. In this 
                                                          
36 In the case of Greece, notions of ‘exceptionalism’ can be seen as synonymous with notions of 
‘immaturity’. It is precisely the various aspects of political and social life wherein Greece is viewed as 
‘immature’ that account for its ‘exceptionalism’. As such, in this chapter, I use the ‘immaturity thesis’ and 
the ‘exceptionalism’ thesis interchangeably. 
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narrative, Papandreou and PASOK effectively ‘seduced’ the masses, and then 
consolidated this support once in power through patronage, at the expense of Greek 
public finances and macroeconomic sustainability. 
 
Figure 2.1: Greek government deficit/surplus in millions of national currency (drachma). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics  
 
According to this perspective, the public debt of the 1980s is the primarily the result of 
reckless short term political power consolidation by PASOK and their supporters (see 
various chapters in (Clogg 1993; Clogg 2002, 173–209; see discussion on ‘Hellenic 
Peronism’ in (Manolopoulos 2011, 1-13).   
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Figure 2.2: Greek Public debt as percentage of GDP, 1979-2012 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Historical Public Debt Database 
 
PASOK’s strategy of political power consolidation in the 1980s is understood to have 
catalysed a ‘Greek Tragedy of the Commons’, or in other words, in tandem with rising 
deficits and debt, PASOK transformed the Greek state into a complex system of 
clientelism/patronage, the upshot being that major sections of society became dependent 
upon the state for favours, employment, and a particular lifestyle, in return for electoral 
support. The absence of the state governance in this regard was just important, as tax 
evasion became a common and widely practiced phenomenon. Bribery and corruption 
in the everyday provision of public services became a ‘national pastime’ (Manolopoulos 
2011, 103–4). Put very simply, Greek society became bound up and complicit in the 
debt fuelled clientelism of PASOK’s state during the 1980s; as PASOKs power became 
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consolidated, so did a widespread ‘culture of entitlement’(see Triandafyllidou, Gropas, 
and Kouki 2013 for a summary of this argument).  
Thereafter, in spite of wide ranging reform efforts, this system of debt-fuelled 
clientelism proved impossible to supplant. In such analysis, the 1980s emerges as a ‘big 
bang’ moment for Greece – giving rise – in a once and for all fashion - to static and 
immovable political and economic pathologies that would, in due course, lead Greece to 
inevitable fiscal and sovereign debt crisis (Diamandouros 2011). Although this literature 
has produced important scholarship which recognises, evaluates and takes seriously the 
emergence of modernising forces in Greek politics and civil society from as early as the 
1980s (but mainly in the 1990s and 2000s), the battle between ‘modernity’ and 
‘tradition’ in Greece is analysed as a losing one for modernisation.  
As a result, much of the debate concerns discussions of the causes and dynamics 
of ‘poor reform capacity’ in Greece.37 The upshot of this argument is that no meaningful 
reforms were made during the 1990s and 2000s (see Diamandouros 2011) because debt-
fuelled clientelism had become endemic and impossible to supplant; the state’s growth, 
and the interests of society at large, not to mention powerful interest groups, were all 
too dependent on the ‘Greek’ model.38  
 
The limits of emphasising Greek exceptionalism 
This approach has key strengths in terms of its ability to account for a number of central 
causes of Greece’s fiscal and public debt crisis. For instance, tax evasion in Greece is 
                                                          
37 For contributions to the literature on Greece's 'poor reform capacity', see Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008 and various essays in Mitsos and Mossialos 2000. See also various essays in Kalyvas, 
Pagoulatos, and Tsoukas 2013, and for more critical contributions see Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002; 
Monastiriotis and Antoniades 2009. 
38 For literature on the persistence of clientelism through the decades, the discussion in Triandafyllidou, 
Gropas, and Kouki 2013. See also Manolopoulos 2011, 1-13 & 81-109; Diamandouros 2011, 1994; 
Tsoukalas 1995. 
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pervasive and a practice that has significant effects on its economy. For example, 
relative to GDP, Greece spends four times as much collecting income tax as does the 
United States. It has been suggested that as much as 64 per cent of eligible taxpayers in 
Greece did not pay any tax in 2009 (Oltheten et al. 2013, 332).39 In addition, Greece has 
one of the largest ‘shadow economies’ in Europe, amounting to about 30 per cent of 
GDP – implying an annual loss in taxes of about 8 – 10 billion euros (Oltheten et al. 
2013, 332). Moreover, as Featherstone and others have argued (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008; Featherstone 2008), problems of state efficiency cannot be ignored 
– even if Greece’s fiscal difficulties are more to do with revenue shortfalls than 
overspending (contrary to common misconceptions). State spending on social provision 
compares favourably with other EU states, but the coverage is relatively limited. For 
example, unemployment benefit is relatively low and limited in scope and duration, 
while that spent on pensions is notoriously high. The weakness of the welfare state and 
social provision in turn contributes to widespread tax evasion (Featherstone 2008, 24). 
In spite of these important contributions to our understanding of the historical 
character of the Greek political economy, there are two key limitations to the ability of 
accounts which emphasise Greek exceptionalism to explain the contemporary 
problematique. First, they tend to neglect of the ways in which Greece’s economic 
trajectory dramatically transformed over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. In 
clarifying his own position on this debate, Nikos Diamandouros neatly outlines this 
manoeuvre, 
Let me immediately clarify that my argument is not that the dominant paradigm 
has remained entirely unchanged or frozen in time for more than a century. Such 
an assertion would be clearly untenable, both theoretically and empirically. It is, 
                                                          
39 Although there is good reason to be sceptical of these widely reported figures. A recent article in BBC 
News notes that although Greece has a ‘massive’ tax collection problem, such exorbitant figures are 
likely a product of accounting anomalies (BBC News 2015). 
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rather, that,  notwithstanding  significant evolution, notable improvements, 
important modifications, and occasionally substantive reforms , the  fundamental 
logic underpinning and informing the  dominant paradigm has, in fact, retained 
its integrity  throughout this period ([authors own italics], (2011, 2). 
 
Emphasising the stubborn persistence of particular exceptional national traits posits an 
unbroken continuity in how the Greek economic trajectory is conceptualised from the 
1980s onwards. In doing so, it provides a framework that is not well suited to 
accounting for the important changes that took place during the 1990s and 2000s that I 
argue in sections three and four contribute to the emergence of brand new and 
unanticipated trajectory of Greek economic development.  
A second limitation is the disproportionate focus on the fiscal dimension of 
Greece’s crisis, which is by now, widely recognised as simply one part of the twin crisis 
facing the country, comprising also of a competitiveness dimension (Wihlborg, Willett, 
and Zhang 2010; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013; Lapavitsas 2010).  
This is not simply a problem of emphasis; the causes of the fiscal crisis have 
actually been used to also account for the competitiveness crisis. As Oltheten et al. 
(2013) argue, the reason that Greece has underperformed and lost competitiveness in 
past decades is because ‘the education system is ineffective, the government is 
incompetent, the tax system is corrupt, and the system of justice is dysfunctional’ (330). 
All of this supposedly culminates to make Greece a deeply unattractive small country in 
which to do business. ‘The private sector, normally a source of entrepreneurship and 
growth is so weighted down that it can no longer overcome the burden of its own 
government’ (Oltheten et al. 2013, 330-1). Featherstone similarly writes about 
corruption as a cultural phenomenon and claims that it is ‘anti-competitive: it imposes 
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costs and distorts the market, whilst offering privileged contact via enclosed networks. 
It is evident at all levels and across sectors’ (Featherstone 2008, 19). 
 Eliding the causes of these twin crises appears somewhat misleading because, as 
I argued in chapter one, there is a crucial distinction that should be made between an 
explanation of non-convergence and one of divergence. Even if Greece had tackled the 
above ‘exceptional’ traits via structural reforms aimed at convergence, its failure to do 
so does not automatically explain the particular path of debt-led growth Greece diverged 
onto. In fact, as I argue in the following sections, beginning with the period of 
PASOK’s first governments, precisely that period in which Greece is conventionally 
considered to have diverged most signally from modern European norms – Greece’s 
road to crisis was paved with good, non-exceptional intentions. 
 
Section Two: The limits to Greek modernisation: 1974-1989 
Greece’s exorbitant public debt, persistent public deficits, and pervasive corruption and 
clientelism can all be traced back to the late 1970s and 1980s. During this critical 
period, Greek policy aimed at ‘modernising’ the economy. However, this agenda was 
shaped by both the pathological features identified by the ‘exceptionalism’ thesis, and a 
number of further factors which are conventionally understood as non-exceptional – the 
importance of which has hitherto tended to be overlooked by literature on the 
contemporary Greek crisis. As I show in this section, Greek policymaking in the 1980s 
was aimed at modernising the economy – but this agenda was operationalised within the 
parameters set by political, economic, and at times, geopolitical imperatives. In doing 
so, I claim that Greece’s, in many important respects, ‘non-exceptional’ attempt to 
modernise during the 1980s was just as important as its embrace of corruption and 
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clientelism in sowing the seeds for its eventual crisis. Accordingly, without denying the 
role of the well documented emerging ‘dysfunctions’ of this period, I argue that running 
parallel were dynamic and complex patterns of policy making that contained a distinctly 
‘modern’ vision for Greece, that were in turn subject to and limited by various 
constraints, challenges and imperatives.  In this section, I provide a revisionist historical 
narrative of the origins of the Greek crisis in the 1980s which reveals the ways in which 
distinctly ‘non-exceptional’ patterns of Greek agency may be seen to have been equally 
as generative of divergence as those which may be identified as exceptional. 
 
The era of ‘Metapolitefsi’: Challenges to Greek modernisation, 1974-1989 
Like so many other peripheral European countries, Greece in the 1970s and 1980s was 
clearly an ‘economic latecomer’, attempting to modernise and ‘catch up’ with its 
Western European neighbours. Greece attempted national development strategies in the 
face of a number of urgent challenges during this period. Following the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus, the first oil crash and mounting social unrest, the seven year right-
wing authoritarian Regime of the Colonels collapsed in 1974, beginning the period of 
Metapolitefsi40 in Greece (see Clogg 2002; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 109-134). In 
1974 Constantine Karamanlis and his party New Democracy (ND) formed a 
conservative government which began the process of ‘de-juntafication’ which carried on 
throughout the 1980s, in a context of the international economic crisis, and where, as 
Clogg (2002) argues, the overriding priority of this new government was to defuse risk 
of war with Turkey’ (166). Hence, the newly established ‘Third Hellenic Republic’ 
began a process of modernisation in the middle of unprecedented and severe 
international economic and geopolitical crises.  
                                                          
40  Democratisation; for the purposes of this chapter, this refers to the period from 1974-1989. 
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By 1980 per capita GDP was only 68 per cent of the EU average, higher only 
than fellow peripheral country Ireland’s (Oltheten et al. 2013, 319). Greece remained 
predominately agricultural, and de-industrialisation had generated serious economic 
difficulty for the country from as early as 1973 (see Louri and Minoglou 2002, Sapelli 
1995; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2012, 2013; Markantonatou 2012) and these difficulties 
were accelerated by the oil shocks of that decade. Although it had witnessed some 
industrialisation in the post war period (the so-called ‘Golden era’ - see Mavroudeas 
2010, 5), by the 1970s this had already begun to decline; and as Louri and Minoglou put 
it, Greece ‘never fully completed the transition from a backward mercantile/agricultural 
economy to an advanced capitalist economy’ (2002, 324, 337). Even at its peak, 
industrial employment in Greece was 30% as opposed to roughly 47% for other 
Western economies. The trend was set to continue; by 1994 the share of manufacturing 
output in GDP was 15 per cent, down from 19.8 per cent in 1951 (these figures are 
provided by Louri and Minoglou 2002, 338). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also fell 
sharply and technology intensive sectors stopped increasing and remained basically 
static from the mid-1970s onwards. Following the second oil crisis and EEC 
membership, Greece became increasingly exposed to import penetration and declining 
export competitiveness into the 1980s.  
In addition to the above economic crisis, the processes of Metapolitefsi and 
‘dejuntafication’ required a new urgency on the part of the Greek state to respond to the 
demands of those who had been excluded under, not just the authoritarian regime of 
Colonels, but via the various repressive tendencies of the post-war Greek state since the 
post-war period.41 Concretely, various imperatives aligned during the 1970s and 1980s 
                                                          
41 For more on this see Clogg 2002; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 80-109; Draenos 2009; Gerakis and 
Wald 1964; Botsiou 2009; Michaelides, Papageorgiou, and Vouldis 2013, 811; Kornetis 2010; Michael-
Matsas 2010. 
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which meant that the (comparatively late, especially compared to Britain and Western 
Europe) necessity to begin the establishment of a welfare state. This is crucially 
important to note: Greece found itself in a position of having to respond to an 
unprecedented economic crisis, while also having to begin the construction of a welfare 
state. Modernisation, stabilisation, and the establishment of the welfare state were 
pursued all at once (Markantonatou 2012, 422).  
Adding insult to injury, the (seemingly legitimate) prospect of a war with 
Turkey made Greece one of the world’s highest per capita military spenders’ during this 
period and right up until the present day (Pappas 2013, 34). Precipitated by the 1974 
Cyprus emergency, tensions between Greece and Turkey continued from 1974-1990 
and beyond. Massive expenditures on military hardware meant that ‘infrastructural 
reforms, e.g. in education and health care, that demanded urgent attention received a 
low priority’ (Clogg 2002, 173), something that fell to the 1980s PASOK governments 
to rectify. Although there is not the space to provide a more detailed account, suffice to 
say, tensions regarding Turkey continued to be significant from 1974-2009, and this 
translated into persistently high defence spending for Greece – something that had a 
clear and direct effect on debt (see Clogg 2002). 
As such, Greek governments in the 1980s found themselves compelled to tackle 
a triple challenge; an economic crisis, a welfare crisis, and a potential geopolitical crisis. 
This triple crisis contributed to a particular strategy of modernisation – one that 
attempted to meet the welfare and economic crisis together through fostering economic 
modernisation. Conventional accounts that highlight corruption and clientelism tend to 
downplay this aspect of 1980s Greece. It was the goal of economic ‘stabilisation 
through development’ (Tsakalotos 1991, 179) that best explains the transformation of 
the Greek political economy at this time, to which I turn in the following section.   
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Stabilisation through development: Greek modernisation strategy in the 1980s 
‘Stabilisation through development’ refers to PASOK’s attempt to meet this triple 
challenge through an early programme for modernisation. It aimed to manage the 
economic crisis while at the same time attempting to restructure the public sector, 
modernise the banking system, and harness the private sector for developmental 
purposes (Lavdas 1997, 149). Specifically PASOK made use of an inherited post-war 
dirigiste strategy of development which hinged on publically financing a national 
project of industrialisation. It was a strategy that suffered from serious limitations and 
ended in outright failure by the end of the decade. Specifically, it contributed 
detrimentally to the accumulation of public debt and deficits, rising inflation, and had 
little success in modernising the Greek economy in the way it intended. I argue that this 
strategy failed because, aside from being constrained by the political, economic and 
social imperatives outlined above, the strategy was caught between a particular vision of 
Greece’s future, and a particular institutional framework inherited from Greece’s past 
that was to prove no longer effective.42 Nevertheless, in this respect, we can re-interpret 
the dysfunctions of the 1980s as a product not simply of the exceptionalism noted in 
section one, but as a product of the limitations of an ambitious project of modernisation, 
that nevertheless could not escape the imperatives that shaped its attempted 
implementation.  
Turning to the strategy itself, Euclid Tsakalotos argues that PASOK’s strategy 
was based on its structural analysis of the problems facing the Greek economy at the 
time. In particular, PASOK wished to reverse deindustrialisation in Greece through 
coordinated national development plans and public investment (Tsakalotos 1991, 136). 
It was widely perceived by PASOK elites at the time that existing state investment was 
                                                          
42 See Pagoulatos 2003 for a detailed version of this argument. 
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ad-hoc and that no previous government had ever effectively integrated the ‘financial 
sector into any specific strategy for development’ (Tsakalotos 1991, 137) and 
furthermore, the deteriorating economic performance of the Greek economy by 1981 
represented the failure of the private sector to invest in industry (Tsakalotos 1991, 152). 
PASOK’s national development plan, in contrast, assigned a clear role for a reformed 
public sector along with various supervisory councils to direct the financial sector 
towards national development goals. 
A key element of PASOK’s new development agenda, particularly in its first 
term (1981-1985) involved a policy of ‘sectoral targeting’.  Law 1262/1982 was 
introduced (Lavdas 1997, 152; see also Tsakalotos 1991, 154) to explicitly target ‘high 
end’ ‘export’ manufacturing sectors – and so public investment was concentrated in 
what were perceived as dynamic areas (electronics, IT related branches, biotechnology 
and precision instruments’ (Lavdas 1997, 152). This strategy is widely agreed to have 
had limited success, partly to do with poor implementation and planning, but also 
because the sector targeting policies failed to take into account that some of traditional 
sectors in Greece (cement, food and beverages, textiles, clothing etc.) were more likely 
to be areas where Greece had a comparative advantage, while the manufacturing sectors 
were declining (Lavdas 1997, 152). It was also aggravated by Greece’s entry into the 
EEC in 1981 which led to an increase in import penetration and poor export 
performance (Tsakalotos 1991, 154). Eventually, this policy provided assistance to a 
majority from the traditional sectors. 
This strategy was also expected to tackle the much prolonged issue of welfare 
provision. As Markantonatou (2012) notes, during the post-War period, an authoritarian 
state ‘undertook an active ideological role in the perpetuation of the division between 
the losers and the winners of the [Civil] war, by offering jobs and state subsidies to the 
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latter, repudiating and purging the former, long after the end of the hostilities’ (418). A 
particular form of economy emerged during this period, one that was characterised, inter 
alia, by low wages and little to no welfare state (418, 419). The 1980s represented an 
attempt to rectify this in various ways. Papandreou introduced a number of reforms, 
including the establishment of a National Health Service, the building of hospitals and 
clinics, the raising of salaries in the public sector, and other measures (see Clogg 2002 
181-186). Yet, as Clogg argues, any hope of creating a modern welfare state ‘hinged 
critically on putting the economy on a sounder footing and in particular, on improving 
productivity’ (2002, 181). The limited success achieved by this strategy by the end of 
the 1980s meant that Greece never really ended up with a modern welfare state, which 
was to have consequences for tax evasion and fiscal policy going into the 1990s and 
2000s.  
In spite of its failure, it is important to note that the PASOK governments’ 
pursuit of ‘high tech’ industrialised growth was a distinctly ‘modern’ vision for Greece 
that should be understood as a not unusual example of a ‘late developing’ economy 
catch up or converge with its Western neighbours. Indeed, in aspiring towards a ‘smart’ 
and high-tech’ economy, it anticipated many aspects of the Single Market and Lisbon 
Agenda that emerged years later43, as Lavdas notes: 
In business circles, the perception of the PASOK strategy was that the 
Papandreou government wished to achieve a dominant role for the public sector 
supported by clusters of ‘smart’ SMEs in areas that were new or almost new for 
Greece (Lavdas 1997, 152). 
 
This is true, even if the means by which this vision were pursued were somewhat out of 
step with the abandonment of domestic demand led growth strategies in most European 
countries at the time. Because the PASOK strategy resulted in nationalisations and 
                                                          
43 This will be further discussed in chapter five. 
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enormous public spending and investment, it goes without saying that the pursuit of this 
modernisation strategy was to be politically and economically costly for Greece. 
Numerous advisory bodies were also set up to function as ‘channels for the flow of 
information and proposals between public and private agencies’ (153). The infamous 
OAE (Organisation for Business Reconstruction) was set up during this period also to 
deal with ailing firms problems, to restructure them in line with this modernising vision. 
The OAE was set up as Law 1386/1983 to take over bankrupt or overburdened firms in 
order to reduce unemployment (Lavdas 1997 162). It was justified as being in the public 
interests with reference to unacceptable levels of employment (ibid 162). By 1985 the 
OAE had obtained control of 41 industrial firms with a total debt of Dr350bn (Lavdas 
1997 162). Of course, the restructuring of these firms proved ineffective, and many of 
these problematic companies remained on the public balance sheet for years to come. 
If ‘high tech’ modernisation was a vision of Greece’s future, it was to be 
implemented using an institutional framework inherited from Greece’s recent past. The 
dirigiste model was an inheritance from the so-called golden years of Greek economic 
growth, which took place in a context where the US was imposing and directly dictating 
policy in Greece (Clogg 1993, Fouskas and Dimoulas 2013, 80-109; Draenos 2009; 
Kaplan 2010; Gerakis and Wald 1964; Botsiou 2009). Accordingly, the 1980s in Greece 
do not represent an ‘abrupt discontinuity’(Louri and Pepelasis Minoglou 2002, 323; see 
also (Alogoskoufis 2000) with the post-war model, but an appropriation of it to continue 
a project of modernisation (Pagoulatos 2003). The first PASOK government’s economic 
plan made use of this existing state-bank-industrial investment infrastructure to tackle 
the economic and employment crisis that had emerged since the 1970s, but also to 
restructure the Greek economy away from traditional towards advanced and semi-
advanced industrial production – partially stimulated by domestic demand.  
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However, it was becoming clear that a dirigiste industrial model was no longer 
appropriate for Greece post 1974. For one thing, the repressive political mechanisms of 
the post-war Greek state were no longer available. Previously marginalised groups, 
especially labour, were now able to demand and receive economic benefits previously 
denied to them. These demands, however, partially translated into an attempt to protect 
the ‘industrial model’ as a way of maintaining employment over the course of the 1970s 
and 80s which explains why the industrial sector continued to receive state support 
during the period (Pagoulatos 2003, 88-89). As such, Greek democratisation took place 
using the tools available from the pre-existing pre-1974 ‘developmentalist’ or dirigisme 
model. Pagoulatos describes such measures as ‘[the] last ditch effort of what remained 
of a developmental state seeking to prop up industrial growth amidst a highly adverse 
economic environment’ (2003). Indeed, joining the EC can be actually be seen as an 
initial post 1974 attempt to rescue, not dismantle the pre-1974  model, and the 
Karamanlis government attempted to prop up the Greek manufacturing sector though 
exports and direct investment towards heavy industry (Pagoulatos 2003, 88). 
These attempts by PASOK governments to ‘catch up’  by pursuing a ‘modern’ 
developmental agenda during the 1980s while continuing to utilise the pre-existing 
infrastructure of the post-war dirigiste model generated a number of key contradictions 
in the Greek economy which have had major significance for the contemporary 
conjuncture.44 Firstly this bank-based institutional model contributed heavily to the 
accrual of public debt in Greece during the period. Secondly, the expansion of the 
public sector and the raising of salaries can be seen as an attempt to develop a form of 
welfare provision.   
                                                          
44 See Tsakolotos 1991 for a comparison between the PASOK strategy and the contemporaneous model 
of the French Socialists under Mitterrand before the ‘U Turn’ (43-50). 
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It is important to recognise that using this model was a necessary and immediate 
decision of both ND in the 1970s and PASOK in the 1980s – there wasn’t another 
model that was readily available or ‘waiting in the wings’. Crucially, PASOK’s policy 
agenda during its second term in office was shaped by the evident failures of its first 
term, and represented something of a radical shift in policy. PASOK knew that it 
needed to control inflation, tackle the deficit, and confront the problem of falling private 
investments, whose decline since 1979 (two years before PASOK took office) had 
reached a record low in 1985 (Lavdas 1997 174-5).  Indeed, as the next section shows, 
from as early as 1985, the project of Greek modernisation resulted in the gradual 
supplanting of the old dirigisme model. 
To conclude this discussion of the first ‘turning point’ in Greece’s economic 
trajectory, it is certainly impossible to ignore the unprecedented growth of public debt 
and budget deficits that emerged during this period and it would be unwise to downplay 
their impact in Greece’s current crisis. It would also be unwise to fully discount the 
importance of new modes of corruption and clientelism that emerged during this period, 
and their constitutive role in Greek debt and deficits. However, the 1980s, as I have 
shown, cannot be understood solely as an abandonment of a sound project of 
modernisation in favour of a nefarious project of political power consolidation. 
Rather, the problems of the 1980s are better understood as stemming from the 
imperatives of modernising, within the context of an international economic crisis, 
geopolitical turbulence in the Aegean, achieving legitimate democratisation, and the 
desire to transform into an industrialised modern economy using the inherited dirigisme 
institutional structures of the post-war period, all at the same time as trying to develop a 
welfare state.  
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These were the real imperatives which Greek modernisers had to negotiate. 
PASOK governments of the 1980s faced nothing less than the complex problematique 
of a late developing peripheral European state attempting to catch up with its Western 
European neighbours.  
As the next section shows, dealing with legacy of this ‘failed modernisation’ 
was to become central to the emergence of a new modernisation strategy for Greece – 
one that was much more clearly defined by a vision of ‘European modernity’, and 
unlike the strategies of the 1980s, this vision was to be explicitly underpinned by the 
attempted construction of European institutional frameworks.  
 
Section Three: Greece adapts to Europe: ‘debt-led’ growth as a result 
of Europeanisation  
If the 1980s were characterised by early, failed, attempts by the newly formed Greek 
democracy to mark a rupture with its past, the 1990s saw subsequent Greek 
governments succeed in doing just that. Yet, transformation was not achieved through 
enhanced export competiveness or ‘high tech’ industrialisation as was hoped. Rather, 
the second ‘turning point’ in Greece’s economic trajectory relates to its transformation 
during the 1990s into what scholars have identified as an economy driven by ‘debt-led’ 
growth (Lapavitsas et al. 2012).  
This section draws attention to the ways in which Greece’s debt-led growth was 
driven by the country’s adaptation to European integration. Successive Greek 
governments began to develop a new strategy of modernisation during the 1990s. This 
new agenda was synonymous with Greece’s successful participation in the Single 
Market and admission to the eurozone, which were understood by Greek governments 
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as representing both a useful external imperative for necessary yet unpopular reforms, 
as well as an historic opportunity for development. The dramatic institutional and policy 
changes that took place during Greece’s efforts at joining the euro led directly, yet 
unintentionally, to the country’s transformation into a ‘debt-led’ economy.  
In this section I illustrate that while Greek ‘exceptionalism’ or resistance to 
European-style convergence may account to a limited extent for Greece’s fiscal 
problems, at the same time, successful adaptation to Europe during the 1990s resulted in 
the transformation of the Greek economy into a fragile and non-competitive model of 
growth. The narrative of Greek exceptionalism is not well suited to explaining the 
specificities of Greek divergence in the 1990s. In fact, quite the contrary; many of the 
areas where Greece most successfully adapted to the European agenda were constitutive 
of its subsequent debt-led trajectory of economic growth. 
 
Preparing for the euro: the emergence of a new modernisation agenda in 1990s 
Greece 
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a very different strategy of modernisation for 
Greece from what had come before. PASOK’s second term in office coincided with the 
1985 ‘re-launch’ of the European project by the first Delors Commission, which set out 
a dramatic new agenda for enhancing the international competiveness and growth 
prospects of the EU, starting with the completion of the Single Market by the end of 
1992, and culminating in the single currency in 1999. As that PASOK government 
slowly resigned amid scandal45 and economic disarray in the late 1980s, it is hardly 
                                                          
45 PASOK finished its second term in controversy due to the Koskotos/Bank of Crete scandal in 1989. 
This was a financial scandal which implicated Papandreou and many PASOK officials in charges of 
embezzlement. The personal life of Papandreou also contributed to the PASOK crisis at this time. 
Electoral instability followed in the years after, leading to a mandate for ‘catharsis’ regarding corruption 
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surprising that Greece’s rejuvenated ‘modernisation agenda’ in the 1990s was to be 
shaped very heavily by a desire to leave the experience of the 1980s behind. But 
crucially, as Kevin Featherstone argues, this new agenda was also to be defined ‘within 
the frame of ‘Europe’: it had little meaning without reference to the need to adapt to the 
EU; the latter defined and legitimised their project’ (2005, 227).  Adjusting to the Single 
Market and preparing for EMU was to provide the new ‘blueprint’ for Greek 
modernisation. 
Greece’s modernisation in the 1990s is most closely associated with the 
emergence of Costas Simitis as leader of PASOK in 1996. Simitis had long been 
associated with the ‘modernising wing’ of the PASOK party, and brought a clear 
modernising agenda to Greek politics in the 1990s; and with the death of Papandreou in 
1996 and of Karamanlis in 1998, many commentators heralded the ‘end of the era of the 
dinosaurs’ in Greek politics (Clogg 2002, 88). Specifically, Simitis and others aimed at 
overcoming the limits of the dirigiste strategies of the 1980s, and indeed, 
‘modernisation’ was typically defined against the corruption and economic 
misgovernment of the earlier era. By the 1990s both the Greek public and policy-
makers realised that the strategies of the 1980s had ‘not only failed to deliver steady 
economic growth and to secure high employment. On the contrary, they had produced 
high inflation, a stagnant economy, high unemployment and growing fiscal deficits’ 
(Herz and Kotios 2000, 170). It was clear that the old strategy needed to be abandoned 
in favour of something new.  
Policy makes found their new agenda in the specific reforms and adjustments 
required of Greece in order to join EMU and the Single Market.  European integration 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in Greek politics that was to inform the changing political environment of the 1990s. See Clogg (2002) 
for a full account. 
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thus translated into a strategy of modernisation for Greece in two ways – through 
adapting to constraints and through anticipating new opportunities. It is clear enough 
that preparing to join the Single Market and particularly, EMU created pressures and 
constraints for Greek governments to liberalise, privatise and deregulate. Greek 
governments during this period introduced a number of convergence programmes over 
the course of the 1990s – a requirement of Article 116 (2a) of the Treaty on European 
Community (Herz and Kotios 2000, 171). Specifically, these were the three-year 
Medium Term Adjustment Programme (MTAP) of 1991-93; the Convergence 
Programme (CP) of 1993-98; the Revised Convergence Programme (RCP) of 1994-99, 
and the Updated Revised Convergence Programme (URCP) following that (Arghyrou 
2000,158). As part of these plans, Greece committed itself to an ambitious 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy in order to reduce inflation, restrict budget deficits 
and reduce public debt (Herz and Kotios 2000, 171). Greece also fulfilled a number of 
EMU requirements such as joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1998 and 
granting independence to the Greek central bank (Herz and Kotios 2000, 171). 
The pursuit of an extensive privatisation agenda by successive Greek 
governments was also associated with EU pressure concerning Greece’s obligation to 
meet the five ‘Maastricht criteria’ in order to join EMU. Because the Greek state was 
obligated to lower its ratio of public debt to GDP to 60 per cent, and its budget deficit to 
3 per cent of GDP – privatisation became incentivised as a strategy for meeting the 
conditions of joining EMU. It allowed the government to raise public revenue without 
having to increase tax receipts while at the same time, relieving the state budget from 
subsidising various expensive loans (Pagoulatos 2005, 360)  as was the case with the 
overmanned ‘problematic’ OAE companies nationalised during 1970s and 1980s 
(Featherstone 2005, 235; Clogg 2002; Pagoulatos 2005, 360).  
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Greece was also expected to make reforms relating to the banking and financial 
sectors as part of its accession to the EC and in particular due to its participation in the 
Single Market project (Christodoulais 2013; Pagoulatos 2005; Pagoulatos and 
Triantopoulos 2009; Featherstone 2005; Pasiouras 2012). Capital movements were 
liberalised and the financial sector was deregulated and strengthened through various 
reforms, legislature and directives associated with deepening European integration from 
the late 1980s onwards (Deeg 2012; Bakker 1996). As I elaborate on, since the mid 
1990s, the Greek banking and financial system has operated as the engine of the 
national economy, developing rapidly since the 1990s as a result of the liberalisation 
and modernisation that took place under the Simitis reforms, and in the context of the 
EU Single Market programme (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 2009; see also Pasiouras 
2012; Pagoulatos 2005, 360; Christodoulakis 2013, 94-95; OECD 1994).   
As significant as these reforms were, we should not understand Greek 
modernisation during the 1990s and 2000s as either simply passive or reactive in 
relation to EU pressure. For one thing, as I implied in section one, it is quite clear that 
Greece resisted and failed to implement highly important aspects of the European 
blueprint. As Featherstone has pointed out, official reports from the EU consistently call 
out Greece as having the ‘worst records in terms of the infringement procedures 
instigated against it, in the transposition of single market legislation, and in adoption of 
the provisions of the Lisbon Programme of 2000 on socio-economic structural reform’ 
(2014, 8). Greece emphasised particular aspects of ‘Europe’ to adapt to – privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalization in particular - with far less success in areas such labour 
market reform, tax collection, and the pension system reform (Featherstone 2014, 7). 
The upshot of this ‘poor reform capacity’ is that many of the problematic legacies of the 
1980s persisted throughout the 1990s, into the 2000s. The exceptionalism thesis is 
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correct to argue in this sense that the trajectory of fiscal crisis first set in motion during 
the 1980s, was not adequately overcome during subsequent decades. However, taking 
this insight on board does not necessarily require a wholesale subscription to the 
‘exceptionalism thesis’, for two reasons. First, as section two as argued, many of these 
fiscal and public debt problems can be understood as having ‘non-exceptional’ as well 
as ‘exceptional’ roots. Second, as I go on to argue, recognising the persistence of fiscal 
problems is not enough to explain the separate emergence of the competitiveness crisis. 
In addition to poor reform capacity, indirect pressures from Europe were often 
just as important as direct pressures, and created plenty of scope for Greek agency. For 
instance, although Single Market legislation does require the liberalisation of state 
monopolies in certain sectors, ‘it does not require a change in the ownership structure of 
those enterprises’ (Featherstone 2005, 232; see also Clogg 2002). Nevertheless, Greek 
political elites who identified themselves as pro-EU modernisers supported a vigorous 
privatisation agenda – one that was fraught with opposition, setbacks and reversals – 
including the infamous attempted privatisation of the Athens Bus Company which was 
renationalised by PASOK in 1994 (Pagoualotos 2003, 234). Dyson and Featherstone’s 
concept of a vincolo esterno (1996) is well known in the literature of European political 
science, and it can be helpful in explaining how the EU was frequently evoked as an 
external imperative by Simitis and other modernisers, who wished to introduce 
particular and often unpopular reforms.46  
What is important to draw out here is that ‘adjusting to Europe’ was just as 
much an active vision of Greek modernisation by Greek elites, as it was a reaction to 
EU constraints. This is clear from much of the political discourse associated with 
                                                          
46 See Featherstone (2005, 232); although Featherstone, Kazamias, and Papadimitriou (2001) note that 
Greek reformers had limited success in their attempts at using Europe in this way. 
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Simitis and PASOK at the time.47 Simitis clearly expressed deepening integration as a 
historic opportunity (Featherstone 2005, 228) for Greece to transform into a 
‘competitive and dynamic’ European economy by claiming that:  
[t]he globalisation of the economy and the development of technology create 
opportunities and capacities to those that are able to adjust and those who have 
the will and creativity to take advantage of them…They give to smaller 
countries like Greece the ability to participate further and more dynamically in 
international markets (Simitis 2000, quoted in (Antoniades 2010, 72).  
 
In this way, privatisation, on the one hand part of the toolkit of fiscal consolidation, was 
on the other also expected to help induce a brand new environment of competition and 
efficiency for the Greek economy (Pagoulatos 2005, 361). In addition, increased access 
to domestic and international capital through public listing and participation in the 
Single Market and EMU was expected to allow Greek firms to raise funds to aid their 
technological investment and modernisation (Pagoulatos 2005, 361). Such incentives, 
together with the immanent pressure of Greek firms competing in a highly competitive 
open Single European Market, was expected to create positive pressures that would 
encourage the modernisation of the Greek private sector.  
Greece’s participation in the integration process was, as Simitis put it, the 
‘strongest lever for our exit from a reality of economic and social retardation’ (quoted in 
Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008, 190).  Many observers, such as Jason 
Manolopoulos have been sceptical that Greece’s meeting of the targets of nominal 
convergence meant that the country was genuinely modernising and reforming during 
this period; ‘you can hit numbers without having convergence, while maintaining the 
different structures of the economies. You can put someone in a corset, but it doesn’t 
necessarily make them thin’ (2011, 54). The large body of literature on ‘poor reform 
                                                          
47 See Antoniades 2010 for an important study of discourse, globalisation and the 'modernising' Greek 
governments during the 1990s and 2000s). 
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capacity’ and ‘reform fatigue’ mentioned in section one, along with the 2009 Greek 
crisis has seemed like a clear vindication to many of such claims. Yet, what 
Manolopoulos and so many others in the literature cited above overlook is that the EU 
‘corset’ didn’t simply maintain the different structures. It contorted and reshaped these 
structures in brand new ways. In this way, Greece’s successful admission to EMU did 
not represent culmination of its drive for modernisation. Instead, it helped drive Greece 
down a path of unanticipated and historically specific divergence.  
 
Rethinking the origins of the Greek ‘debt-led’ model: Modernisation and European 
Integration 
While the legacies of the fiscal crisis persisted from the 1980s, the 1990s sowed the 
seeds for a parallel crisis of competitiveness. The EU/Simitis reforms of the 1990s 
contributed to the transformation of Greece’s economic trajectory, from the declining 
pre-1974 semi-industrial model to one based strongly on domestic consumer demand 
and import penetration. Greece’s attempts to modernise/Europeanise, at their most 
successful, resulted in the transformation of its economy into a consumer driven one, 
with negative consequences for its current account and its competitiveness. It was the 
growth that was achieved during this period, premised so strongly on the negotiation of 
EU convergence and ‘typical’ visions of European modernity that, to a large extent, 
made Greek ‘divergence’ possible during this period (see figure 2.3).  
As I have already argued, the Greek model  had been de-industrialising since the 
post-war period, with the share of the tradable sector declining from about 23 per cent 
of GDP in the late 1970s, to less than one seventh of output by 1999 (Christodoulakis 
2000, 98). Yet in spite of the declining of Greece’s industrial base, there was an 
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unprecedented upsurge in Greek GDP (3.7 per cent on average, one of the highest rates 
in the EU) from the mid-1990s onwards, as figure 2.3 shows, which is in stark contrast 
to the growth levels recorded during the 1980s (Markantonatou 2012, 423).  The 
reforms introduced as part of the accession process to EMU as well as the Single 
Market contributed to the expansion of the non-tradable sector. This was partially a 
result of the dramatic fall in interest rates as a result of ERM and EMU 
(Christodoulakos 2000, 108).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in Greece and euro-area at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
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contracting-out of public services to private firms and privatizations of banks and public 
companies’ (423) – all phenomena associated with the EU/modernisation agenda of 
Simitis. As the OECD put it in 1994: 
 
Reforms undertaken since 1986 in the area of financial liberalisation have 
considerably changed the structure of financial markets and contributed to their 
fast development…[f]oreign investors directly benefitted from the liberalisation 
of exchange controls…[and] the attraction of foreign capital…gas been 
identified as an important aspect of development policy (OECD 1994, 7). 
 
Optimism due to its preparations to join the euro, coupled with newly strengthened 
financial and banking sectors and the expansion of the stock market due to 
privatisations, led to increasing inward investment into Greece during the 1990s. This, 
together with the declining fortunes of manufacturing and industrial sectors, resulted in 
economic activity shifting conclusively to domestic consumption and other non-tradable 
activities (Markantonatou 2012, 423). The sectors of the Greek economy that began to 
grow during this period contributed to the transformation of Greece into a less 
competitive and fragile economy. The upshot of all this being that the growth registered 
in Greece from the mid 1990s until the crisis became increasingly debt driven (Fouskas 
2012, 35).  
Based on the discussion in section one, the ‘changing economic structure of 
Greece’ that Fouskas and Dimoulas and others identify (Fouskas 2012; Fouskas and 
Dimoulas 2013; Fouskas and Dimoulas 2012) discuss is to be expected – the ‘industrial 
model’, such as it was, had been in decline since the 1970s, and exhaled its last gasp in 
the 1980s. The 1990s represent the period where the state, along with private capital, 
attempted to move beyond and adapt to the evident decline of the old model, leading to 
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the eventual, but not necessarily preconceived or ‘planned’, emergence of something 
new (cf. Fouskas and Dimoulas 2012, 8).48 
 The 1990s represented Greece more firmly supplanting the dirigisme-industrial 
(failed) project of modernisation that had existed in many different guises in the post-
war period. The reforms of the 1990s, centred on the objectives of transforming the 
banking sector, reducing inflation, reducing budget deficits and public debt and 
restructuring the supply side of the economy (Featherstone 2003; Pagoulatos 2005; 
Lavdas 2005). In direct and indirect ways, this was achieved through EU facilitated 
privatisations, liberalisation and deregulation. These measures consolidated the 
changing model of the Greek economy, from the pre-1974 semi-industrial model to one 
based strongly on domestic consumer demand and import penetration. Declining 
interest rates and levels of inflation attracted significant international investment into 
Greece. However, with no opportunity for industrial development, and an increasing 
culture of ‘short-termism’ on behalf of international investors (Deeg 2012, 77), this 
investment tended to flow towards the non-tradable sector, rather than the tradable 
sector (Nicos Christodoulakis 2000, 98) which damaged Greek competiveness and 
widened its current account deficit.  
To sum up this second ‘turning point’ in Greece’s economic trajectory since 
1974, the 1990s reveal a transformation in the Greek model – evidenced by the GDP 
growth that began to emerge, and the emergence of growth in brand new sectors. The 
project of Greek modernisation in the 1990s was driven by the imperatives of a) 
rectifying the economic problems of the 1980s and b) meeting the criteria for 
                                                          
48 Neo-Marxian approaches such as Fouskas and Dimoulas (2012) tend to understand the emergence of 
‘debt-led’ growth as causing the destruction of Greece’s productive base. The narrative I present 
challenges this argument – Greece’s productive base was already in marked decline – debt-led growth 
should be seen as a response to this changing reality and not a cause of it. 
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completing the Single Market and joining EMU. These imperatives reshaped Greece’s 
project of modernisation. Above all, the 1990s transformations represented Greece’s 
attempt to follow the prevailing model of European modernisation – and the various 
targets and accession criteria set by the EU as part of the Single Market project and 
EMU provided a very clear blueprint for Greece to follow that model.  
By the end of the 1990s Greece was thus on track to enter EMU, but in a very 
fragile position. In sections one and two, I noted that the 1980s had left Greece a legacy 
of exorbitant levels of public debt and budget deficits. While important steps were taken 
to mitigate this legacy during the 1990s, improvements were often temporary and 
insufficient (Simitis and Stournaras 2012; Featherstone 2008). In this respect, my 
argument so far converges – to a certain extent - with the literature on Greece’s ‘poor 
reform capacity’ (Christodoulakis 2013; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). What I 
have argued in this section is that, during the 1990s, new sources of tension emerged for 
Greece’s political economy that were analytically separate to the fiscal dimensions of 
Greece’s crisis. As sections one and two noted, Greece’s fiscal difficulties emerged in 
the 1980s, and persist to the present day. However, in this section, I argued that the 
1990s witnessed the emergence of new, parallel fragilities, as EU driven reforms 
catalysed a competitiveness crisis through creating a trajectory of debt-led growth. By 
the turn of the century, Greece’s fiscal problems were accompanied by an embryonic 
crisis of competitiveness. As I now argue, Greece’s political economy was not robust 
enough to take the strains of EMU membership, which led to important and damaging 
developments for its fiscal sustainability, as well as its competitiveness. This is now 
discussed. 
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Section Four: Greek modernisation in Crisis: the impact of European 
financial integration in the 2000s 
Over the course of the 1990s, Greece had already developed debt-led patterns of 
economic growth. Against this background, membership of EMU in 2001 led to the 
rapid destabilising of its newly emerging economic model, in a number of ways. First of 
all, the structure of the economy continued to transform, locking in patterns of non-
competitive debt-led domestic demand level growth. Secondly, although public debt did 
not rise, at least initially, as a percentage of GDP (see figure 2.5), there is a radical shift 
in the structure of public debt; during the 1990s it was mostly domestically held, but 
from the 2000s onwards it became mostly external. Thirdly and in relation to this, 
Greece, along with many other eurozone member states, begins to make use of new 
financial technologies available for public debt management. All of these factors 
undermined Greece’s debt-led growth, contributing the country’s relative vulnerability 
to external shock circa 2009.  
 
EMU membership: catalysing the Greek competiveness crisis 
Greece’s debt-led growth throughout the 1990s had already generated current account 
deficits and damaged economic competitiveness. But nothing approached the scale of 
the country’s current account deficits following euro membership. Cheap borrowing 
costs, extensive financial integration and capital availability stirred consumer demand to 
an unprecedented extent (Polychroniou 2013, 3).  Greece’s annual average growth rate 
of above 3.5 per cent since joining the euro was second only to Ireland but as it grew, its 
current account deficit also doubled (Pagoulatos and Quaglia 2013, 188). This consumer 
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demand was financed by an annual average credit growth rate that Pagoulatos and 
Quaglia note was among the highest in the eurozone, (2013, 188-189).  
EMU entailed a significant drop in interest rates for peripheral economies such 
as Greece. A big rise in consumer borrowing drove Greek growth as individuals began 
to take advantage of significantly falling interest rates. As Matthew Lynn notes, the 
overall indebtedness of the country rose by the equivalent of 55 per cent between 2002 
and 2005 (2010, 115).  However, it is worth noting, at this point, that Greece has one of 
the lowest levels of private and household debt in the eurozone (see Pagoulatos and 
Triantopoulos 2009; Pasiouras 2012). Pagoulatos and Quaglia note that although there 
was a surge in rates of credit growth, Greek household debt as percentage of gross 
disposable household income remained consistently below the eurozone average. In 
fact, household leverage ratios in Greece rose from 35 to 70 per cent in 2003–9, 
compared with the 80–90 per cent for the eurozone (Pagoulatos and Quaglia 2013, 188-
198). Unlike Ireland and Spain – Greece was quite clearly not a banking crisis. 
Nevertheless, household debt became an important force driving the Greek 
economy during the 2000s. As argued in section two, after the stagnation and recession 
of the 1970s and 1980s, from the 1990s onwards Greece was one of the fastest-growing 
economies in Europe. Its annual real GDP grew at a rate of 3.92 per cent from 1996-
2007 (Pasiouras 2012, 15). According to various annual reports of the Bank of Greece, 
the high GDP growth rates between this period were ‘mainly driven by an increase in 
domestic demand and production capacity’ (Pasiouras 2012, 15). Such a situation was 
aided by the ‘deregulation of the financial system in the 1990s and the entry of Greece 
into the euro area’ which resulted in a ‘decline in borrowing costs, high credit 
expansion, a rise in consumption, and both private and public investments’, or in other 
words, the changing economic structures of the 1990s, catalysed by increased 
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availability of cheap capital following EMU (Pasiouras 2012, 15, 16). Greece’s current 
account deficit effectively doubled during EMU membership from 7.3 percent of GDP 
in 2001, to 14.1 per cent in 2007 (Manolopoulos 2011; see figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: Current account balance of Greece (percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
 
Yet, current account deficit expansion was not simply demand led. EMU brought with it 
deepening financial integration among member states, and increasing capital availability 
meant that there was a big demand for investment opportunities. Greece, as a debt led 
model with high rates of GDP, attracted over €180 billion in lending from 2000 to 2010 
(Manolopoulos 2011, 168). By the 2000s, Greece was registering one of the highest 
average GDP growth rates, while the core of Europe was stagnating, partially as a result 
of the dot.com crash (see Perez 2009). Between 1995 and 2008 Greece experienced a 
real increase of GDP amounting to 61 percent, whereas Germany only recorded a 19.5 
percent increase for the same period (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2012). Higher inflation 
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and low interest in countries like Greece, a situation brought about mainly by the euro, 
led to increased investment in the county (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2012, 8). As such, 
the rapidly expanding periphery represented a relatively more attractive location for 
investment than the stagnating core of the eurozone for much of the 2000s. Greece 
slotted into this broader context as an investment opportunity for European capital. As 
such, Greece’s enormous current account deficit during the 2000s should be understood 
as the joint result of the country’s transformation into a debt-led trajectory of growth in 
the 1990s, and of the dangers of participating in the financially integrated eurozone with 
such an economy. 
 
The changing dynamics of Greek debt: financialisation and externalisation 
In addition to consolidating a dangerous pattern of debt-led growth, EMU membership 
also had consequences for Greece’s fiscal stability. As should be clear by now, Greece 
certainly has had a long history of public finance problems. However, as Manolopoulos 
(2011) notes, ‘the crisis would not have taken on the scale that it did without huge 
volumes of investment funds being ploughed into eurozone government bonds’ during 
the 2000s ‘(165).49 It is worth emphasising, as figure 2.5 shows, joining the euro did not 
result in an ‘explosion of debt’ for Greece – in fact, as a percentage of GDP it exhibited 
a slight downward trend. What did change as a result of the euro was that Greece’s 
public debt became mostly held by external lenders. For example, in 2009, Italy only 
                                                          
49 Greek public debt rose from about 20 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to almost 100 per cent of 
GDP in the 1990s. Yet, in 2000, public debt stabilized at around 100 per cent, and displayed a weak 
downward trend until 2007. Greek public debt exploded in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. From 2008 
until 2011 it rose to more than 150 per cent of GDP. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the average fiscal 
deficit in the euro area rose from just 0.7 per cent of GDP to 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2009. Public debt 
also rose, from 66.2 per cent in 2007, to 88.5 per cent in 2012 Greece made significant adjustment during 
the 1990s and 2000s – e.g., the general government deficit declined from 7.5 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 
3.6 per cent in 2006 – but the situation deteriorated again in 2007. In 2009, the deficit exploded to 13.6 
per cent (these figures are all taken from Alogokoufis 2012, 5, 17, 26- 27). 
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had 50% of its public debt held abroad, contrary to 80% of Greece’ (Pagoulatos and 
Quaglia 2013, 190-191). During the 1990s, the vast majority of public debt in Greece 
was domestic, held by the Greek banking system – most of which was state controlled 
(see Manolopoulos 2011, 137). Manolopoulos notes that in 1994, 85 per cent of Greek 
government debt was held by domestic financial institutions, and by 2007 this had been 
practically inverted with 75 per cent held by foreign investors (Pagoulatos and Quaglia 
2013, 190-191; see Manolopoulos 2011, 137). Membership of the euro had transformed 
Greece as a source of risk to international bond holders – and this externalisation of 
debt, in addition to its high level, can be argued to be fundamental to understanding the 
2009 crisis. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Total Greek central government debt percentage of GDP, 1998 - 2010 
Source: OECD 
The public debt conversion from domestic to foreign was accelerated into the 
2000s. The euro made it much easier for Greece to push its debt servicing burden to the 
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future while becoming highly exposed to global debt market fluctuations’ (Pagoualtos 
and Quaglia 2013, 190-191; see also Simitis and Stournaras 2012). Once Greece 
adopted the euro in 2001, it experienced a sharp reduction in interest rates. The nominal 
interest rate on 10-year Greek government bonds declined from 20 per cent to 3.5 
percent by 2005 (Kouretas and Vlamis 2010, 391-393). Low inflation and low interest 
rates led to an increase in private investment and robust real growth rates of 3.9 per cent 
per year over the period 2001-2008 (Kouretas and Vlamis 2010, 391-393). ‘Greece’s 
adoption of the euro in 2001 provided sharply-reduced interest rates.  Nominal interest 
rates declined from about 20% in 1994, at the time when Greece announced its intention 
to join the eurozone, to less than 3.5% in early 2005’ (Panageotou 2011).  For the Greek 
government itself, debt repayments had been consuming 12 percent of government 
revenues in 1994, but by 2006 this figure had dropped to just 4 percent of revenues 
(Lynn 2011, 115). Joining the euro entailed a significant change in the dynamics of 
Greek public debt, in that the low interest rates lowered the costs of servicing public 
sector debt (Kouretas and Vlamis 2010, 391-393; see also Hardiman and Dellepiane 
2010, 15). 
This section brings to a close this chapter’s narrative of the origins of the Greek 
crisis. In 2010, following reports of severe recession and that the figures for Greek 
budget deficits were considerably higher than originally reported, credit ratings agencies 
downgraded Greek debt to junk status, effectively locking the country out of 
international financial markets. Greece, and the eurozone itself, has been in jeopardy 
ever since. In this section, I have demonstrated how long-standing fiscal and 
competitiveness issues came to a head following Greece’s participation in the eurozone. 
This suggests two important points. First, as sections one and two demonstrated, 
Greece’s fiscal problems have their lineages in the 1980s. They were a product of the 
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well documented ‘dysfunctions’ of a clientelistic state with a poor reform capacity, but 
also manifestations of the difficulties faced by a late-developing peripheral economy 
attempting to modernise and catch up with its Western neighbours. Throughout the 
1990s, Greece managed to get its public spending and borrowing under control, but 
levels of each remained comparatively high by European standards. In the 2000s EMU 
membership negatively affected Greece’s high budget deficits and levels of borrowing 
in two ways. First of all, low interest rates and high international demand of EU 
sovereign bonds made Greek debt easier to service, and contributed to an expansion of 
borrowing. Secondly, and in relation to this, the profile of Greece’s sovereign debt 
became increasingly internationalised, changing the risk dynamics involved. 
Second, as section three argued, Greece’s crisis was never purely fiscal. On the 
eve of EMU membership, Greece’s already high GDP levels were sustained by a model 
of growth reliant on domestic consumption and imports – signalling the poverty of 
Greece’s new model of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ that first emerged in the 
1990s. In this section I argued that EMU membership helped translate this already non-
competitive debt-led trajectory of economic growth into a crisis of competitiveness. 
International demand for investment opportunities in an increasingly financially 
integrated Europe led to a surge of investment into non-productive sectors in Greece, 
ultimately doubling its current account deficit.  
 
Conclusion 
As the first eurozone member country to encounter a sovereign debt crisis, Greece has 
borne the brunt of the charges of the immaturity thesis – it has been understood as 
responsible, not only for its own difficulties, but for triggering a crisis of systemic 
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proportions, threatening the supposedly ‘mature’ economies who were not ‘living 
beyond their means’. This chapter has offered an explanation as to why Greece was 
relatively vulnerable to a sovereign debt crisis in 2009 in a way that challenges both the 
immaturity and victimisation theses that I outlined in the first chapter. The Greek 
immaturity or ‘exceptionalism’ thesis traces the origins of the country’s sovereign debt 
crisis back to 1981, when the fiscally expansionary socio-economic policies of the 
PASOK governments created a corrupt and clientelistic state, heavily reliant upon debt 
to fund an overstaffed and inefficient public sector. This debt-fuelled clientelism is 
understood to have persisted throughout the 1990s and 2000s, apparently immune to the 
efforts of the ‘modernisers’. Greece, in this analysis, is ‘exceptional’, and the 2009 
crisis was ‘predictable… [and] a long time coming, one that was to expected from a  
country that did not quite modernize’ (Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013, 1–2). 
In response to this, I have provided an alternative narrative of the crisis. By 
locating it in the longer history of the Greek economy and in the context of critical 
international dynamics associated with European integration, I have sought to uncover 
the various ways in which ‘non-exceptional’ processes of Greek agency contributed to 
its fiscal, and particularly, its competitiveness crises. The modern Greek Republic has 
been attempting to modernise since the 1970s, and has introduced ambitious projects of 
modernisation in order to catch up with Europe, overcome various economic crises, and 
aimed to move beyond its historic economic role as an agrarian, ‘relatively backward’ 
economy. However, it was only during the 1990s that Greece began to follow a 
relatively clear blueprint of ‘European style’ modernisation – in order to ensure its 
participation in the EU, the Single Market and EMU. Adapting to European integration 
– in spite of clear instances of ‘poor reform capacity’, nevertheless dramatically 
transformed Greece’s economy into one characterised by domestic demand debt-led 
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growth. By neglecting these processes, in favour of the more readily apparent 
pathological features of the Greek political economy, conventional accounts do not 
adequately capture the limits to the capacity of Greek policymakers to transcend the 
parameters within which they operated, which were, as I have shown, bequeathed by, 
inter alia, a long and complex history of indebtedness and geopolitical competition. 
Contrary to this, I argue that Greek attempts to modernise according to the European 
blueprint are the key causal factor in the genesis of the political economic features 
which the ‘immaturity thesis’ has identified as exceptional and backward. Integration 
with Europe has, as I have shown, played a critical role in catalysing the crisis of 2009. 
This chapter can also be read as a challenge to the victimisation thesis by 
emphasising the agency of Greek governments in their own evolving economic 
trajectory. Greece was not passively transformed by European integration or by its more 
powerful European neighbours. Rather, Greek governments, especially during the 
1990s, actively ‘used’ Europe (Woll and Jacquot 2010) as part of their own strategies of 
modernisation. As this chapter argued, drawing upon the literature on Greece’s ‘poor 
reform capacity’, Greece emphasised particular aspects of ‘Europe’ in its modernisation 
strategies, and quite clearly jettisoned others. Greece’s current difficulties are certainly 
the product of its negotiation of a European vision of modernity, but the analysis must 
allow scope to account for the agency of Greek governments in how exactly this vision 
was negotiated.  
As such, Greece’s vulnerability cannot be solely reduced to the exceptional 
character of its political or national culture. After all, the clientelistic model persisted 
through numerous and very distinct periods of significant economic transformation in 
Greece. As such, negotiating a European-style project of modernisation within a more 
general project of European integration can be seen as a cause of the Greek crisis; 
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Greece’s problem was not that it did not modernise enough, it was that it modernised in 
the way that it did. As such, Greece’s weaknesses cannot be solely explained with 
reference to its exceptional national and political traits – because just as crucial were the 
‘non-exceptional’ patterns of Greek agency that were generative of its divergence.  
Paying attention to the putatively ‘mature’ causes of the Greek crisis has 
highlighted the important role played by European integration in that country’s ongoing 
crisis. The next chapter will turn to Portugal, to investigate the extent to which its 
trajectory resembles that of Greece. 
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3 
Overheating Without Accelerating: The Portuguese 
Recession and Crisis 
 
Portugal has been, over the last 15 years in the paradoxical situation of 
displaying all the signs of overheating without enjoying any acceleration in 
GDP. 
Deutsche Bank report, 2010. 
 
To Portugal, acceding to the EEC means making a fundamental choice for a 
progressive and modern future. But let no one believe that it is a choice made for 
the sake of convenience. It will make heavy demands on the Portuguese, while 
at the same time opening up completely new prospects for development to them. 
Mário Soares, 1986. 
 
 
 
 
This second case study chapter traces the evolution of Portugal’s economic trajectory in 
the decades before its crisis in order to shed light on its contemporary difficulties. I 
claim that the origins of the Portuguese crisis can be traced by examining the impact of 
its ‘Europeanisation’ over the course of the mid-1980s to the 1990s. As was the case 
with Greece in the previous chapter, Portugal’s adaptation to the European project 
during this period resulted in the dramatic transformation of its economic trajectory. It 
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was as a result of Portugal’s Europeanisation that the country transformed into a ‘debt-
led domestic demand’ driven model of growth.  
In April 2011, Portugal requested a bailout of €78 billion from the EU and IMF. 
This bailout occurred in the midst of severe instability in Europe. The eurozone had 
never seemed so likely to break apart as it did during late 2010 - 2011. Ireland followed 
Greece in officially applying for bailout funds in November 2010, causing bond yields 
to soar across Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. European leaders continued to muddle 
through in their responses to the Greek crisis, leading to countless debacles and 
escalations. Particularly destabilising were the repeated rumours regarding private 
sector involvement culminating in the infamous Deauville Agreement on October 18th 
of 2010, sending financial markets into repeated panics in the months to come.50 The 
‘PIIGS’ acronym, referring to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, had come to be 
widely used by international media, capturing an apparent shared economic 
vulnerability across the European periphery, and contributing – in a kind of self 
fulfilling prophecy – to market anxiety (Brazys and Hardiman 2013, 8-10). Fears of 
exit, sovereign default, banking insolvency and break-up propelled Europe from one 
emergency summit to another.   
It was within this broader tumultuous context that the Portuguese bailout 
occurred.  Following the Greek crisis, successive Portuguese governments had 
introduced numerous austerity programmes to reduce the countries budget deficit and 
public borrowing and also to send positive signals to the international community. But 
such measures were unable to alleviate the entrenched international nervousness of the 
                                                          
50 This was a surprise agreement between Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy which stated that in future, 
sovereign bailouts would require that losses be imposed on private creditors. This agreement was blamed 
for widening sovereign spreads in late 2010 and early 2011. The proposal was subsequently watered 
down and effectively abandoned (Mody 2014). 
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time (Fishman 2011; Mody 2014; Brazys and Hardiman 2013). By 2010, risk premiums 
on Portuguese bonds hit record highs as credit ratings agencies downgraded the 
country’s sovereign bond rating and Portugal had little choice but to seek help.  
 For many, the Portuguese crisis is a simple case of contagion (Fishman 2011; 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2012; Kalbaska and Gątkowski 2012), while for others, the 
country’s ‘chronic fiscal misbehaviour’ and long standing productivity problems 
(Pereira and Wemans 2012; Royo 2012; Soares 2012; Royo 2013; OECD 2013; 
Blanchard 2007) echo the Greek crisis. Yet for many others, the Portuguese crisis is 
more complex (Blanchard 2007; Rodrigues and Reis 2012; Krugman 2011; Serra 2014; 
Reis 2013). On the eve of its bailout, Paul Krugman suggested that the ‘difficult’ 
Portuguese macro story is harder to tell than those of Greece, Spain and Ireland: 
Greece was excessive government borrowing; Ireland and Spain, housing 
bubbles. Portugal, by contrast, wasn’t all that bad fiscally — debt/GDP on the 
eve of the crisis roughly comparable to Germany. But it also didn’t have surging 
house prices. There was a lot of private-sector borrowing, but it’s not that easy 
to explain exactly why (Krugman 2011).  
 
More puzzling still, while Greece and Ireland were booming post-euro membership, 
Portugal was in the midst of a decade long recession. As a 2010 Deutsche Bank report 
(quoted in the epigraph to this chapter) put it, Portugal exhibited all of the signs of 
overheating, but without the growth.  It quickly becomes clear that we are dealing with 
a very different crisis to that afflicting Greece. Portugal is not just out of sync with core 
Europe; it is out of sync with the rest of the periphery (Lourtie 2011, 5). 
I examine this ‘difficult story’ over three chronological sections. In section one I 
argue that, much like Greece, the story of Portugal’s difficulties begins with a 
democratic revolution in 1974. After a period of tremendous economic and political 
volatility, the centre right modernising Social Democratic Party (PSD) governments of 
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the 1980s and 1990s looked towards European Integration for stability and as a strategic 
framework for the country’s modernisation (Serra 2014, 42). I discuss how the nascent 
Portuguese democracy sought to sublimate the conflictive experience of the revolution 
(Maxwell 1995) by introducing a number of ‘structural reforms’, which were made, and 
legitimised with specific reference to joining the European Community by 1986.  
Section two explores the consequences of these reforms during the 1990s. 
Portugal went through a remarkable improvement in its economic conditions during this 
period, registering some of the highest rates of growth in Europe. The country was even 
held up by the European Community institutions as a model for Central and Eastern 
European (CEEC) candidate countries, due to the apparent success achieved during the 
1990s (Soares 2012, 121). This growth occurred as Portugal incorporated the acquis 
communautaire into its domestic law, opened its frontiers to the Single Market, and 
completed the process of nominal convergence, successfully participating in the euro in 
1999 (Soares 2012, 121). Yet, this growth was also indicative of the transformation of 
the Portuguese economy into one driven by ‘debt led domestic demand’ growth (Lagoa 
et al. 2014). In other words, the ‘Europeanisation’ of Portugal’s economic trajectory 
during the 1990s catalysed a divergent and fragile trajectory of growth. 
Section three discusses how these new patterns of growth were to cause 
considerable difficulties in the 2000s. Rising levels of private indebtedness together 
with declining export competitiveness contributed to a severe recession at the turn of the 
century. This recession has typically been understood as an outcome of chronic fiscal 
misbehaviour and unwillingness by the state to encourage productivity. On the contrary, 
I argue that the recession is a direct legacy of the form of economic growth that 
emerged in the 1990s. This was the context that led to Portugal being viewed as a weak 
link after 2010.  
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Accordingly, echoing Greece, the story of Portugal’s economic transformation 
since 1974 is one of it largely following the rules of European Integration. Portugal’s 
participation in the European project led to the emergence of a new, precarious, model 
of growth. Even though there are many respects in which Portugal’s trajectory was very 
different to that of Greece, I show that the important turning points occurred as Portugal 
began to view adapting to Europe as a strategy of modernisation. 
 
Section One: Revolution and structural reform - Portugal 1974-1990s 
The contemporary Portuguese economy emerged in the 1980s and 1990s during a 
period of revolutionary turbulence. On the 25th April 1974, the ‘Carnation Revolution’ 
overthrew the forty year old dictatorship of Olivier Salazar’s Estado Novo.51  The 
revolution began as a bloodless military coup but quickly turned into a full-scale 
revolution, leading to years of political uncertainty and revolutionary change. In this 
section I illuminate the ways in which successive Portuguese governments set about 
moving beyond the instability of the revolutionary period and towards European 
integration via the introduction of a number of ‘structural reforms’.52 I trace the ways in 
which the contentious politics of the revolutionary years set the scene for Portugal’s 
embrace of European integration in the 1980s.  I then briefly discuss the structural 
reforms which were introduced during the 1980s and 1990s, with a focus on 
privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation. These agendas were very much in line 
with the EU’s Single Market programme as well as preparations for the euro. The 
                                                          
51 Although Salazar had resigned in August 1968 due to health problems, and it was his successor 
Marcelo Caetano who was to be the last Prime Minister of the Estado Nova regime. 
52 The ‘structural reforms’ refer to the reforms introduced by the centre-right Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) from the mid-1980s onwards. I discuss these reforms in detail later in this section. They aimed to 
dismantle the more socialist elements of Portuguese state following the revolution. But they also were 
defined positively in relation to Portugal’s adaptation to European integration. 
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structural reforms took Portugal on a path which aspired towards European style 
modernity, but as I argue in sections two and three, actually began the process of 
Portugal’s development into a debt-led, non-competitive peripheral economy. 
 
Revolutionary instability: Portugal in the 1970s 
The revolutionary period (typically understood as from 1974-1979, see Morrison 1981) 
was characterised by ‘political turmoil, social upheaval and military factionalism’ 
(Maxwell 1995), 157). Tensions between socialists, communists, peasants and the 
Military were deeply destabilising. Conflicts over the militarization of the politics, and 
between the Socialists (PS) and Communists (PCP), as well as between the landowning 
classes of north and central Portugal and the PCP were particularly destabilising 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Morrison 1981, 19, 20; Maxwell 1995, 135–137). The 
institutional structure that was emerging during this time leaned towards the radical left, 
and included such policies as the constitutionally ‘irreversible’ nationalisations of 
banking and industry (Macedo 1990, 311). Yet, institutional construction during this 
period was a highly fluid, highly unstable process, and the socialist vision ultimately 
failed to take root. The authority of the state during the revolutionary period was 
frequently in question, with successive short lived and unstable governments ‘barely 
having enough time to introduce their programs and nominate their ministers’ (Maxwell 
1995, 163; 170). Manuel Braga Da Cruz (1998) describes the fragile political settlement 
in the years immediately following the revolution: 
‘In party political terms, …[a] conflict was waged between the forces that 
defended an electoral legitimacy and those that affirmed a revolutionary 
legitimacy. This period was also marked by strong governmental and party 
instability, which favoured high levels of presidential interventionism in 
governments established by presidential initiative. The period also witnessed a 
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confrontation between a presidential majority and a governmental majority’ 
(113). 
 
This political crisis was to be punctuated by severe economic instability.  By the 
spring of 1975, an economic crisis emerged that had so far been postponed by the $2.8 
billion of gold and foreign-currency reserves left behind by the Salazar dictatorship 
(Maxwell 1995, 139). Governments since 1974 had pursued large scale borrowing, 
nationalisations and expansionary fiscal policies aimed at redistribution. These policies 
quickly dried up the Estado Nova reserves by as early as 1975. As a consequence, 
Portugal had accumulated massive debts, balance of payments deficits, and inflation 
was out of control (Macedo 1990, 324). This economic crisis was to prove decisive for 
the institutional fate of the Third Portuguese Republic. Socialist governments led by 
Mário Soares were pressured into imposing austerity - measures which were likely to 
result in increasing unemployment, and which the Communists labelled a ‘capitalist 
offensive’ (Morrison 1981, 60-61). As a result of the gravity of the economic problems 
during these years, Portugal faced pressure to apply for a loan from a consortium of 
industrialised western economies. In 1977, the European council of ministers agreed 
that the consortium would lend Portugal $750 million, with the catch that Portugal 
would also need to qualify for a $50 million standby credit line from the IMF, which 
came with strict conditions (Morrison 1981, 75). As Morrison argues, the consequences 
of this first IMF loan were significant.53 The Socialists had accepted a highly unpopular 
agreement that would force Portugal to reduce its rate of growth and increase its rate of 
unemployment. Imports would cost more, and there would be higher taxes and prices on 
domestic consumption (Morrison 1981, 77-78). The Socialists identification with this 
                                                          
53 A second IMF bailout agreement was made in 1983. 
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agenda of ‘revolutionary austerity’ ultimately undermined their political base and led to 
their dismissal by the electorate in the late 1970s (Maxwell 1995, 164).  
Accordingly, an opportunity arose for the centre right to reshape the 
constitutional settlement and remove the Marxist overtones of the revolutionary period 
(Maxwell 1996. 166).  From the 1980s onwards, Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
governments began to introduce a new institutional infrastructure which was to be 
defined against the turmoil of the 1970s, and made possible through deepening 
European integration. In these years, the more radical elements of the 1974 
revolutionary state were dismantled. Although the Socialists continued to be an 
important political party, their more radical leftist tendencies were to become subsumed 
within the emerging institutional structure of an alternative vision for Portugal (see 
Stoleroff  1992).  
The real turning point came in 1985 when, under the leadership of Aníbal 
Cavaco Silva, a new minority government of the PSD was formed with the support of 
the newly created PRD (Democratic Renewal Party). The economic situation began to 
improve shortly afterwards, bolstered by pre-accession EC aid (Magone 1997, 32). 
Accession to the EC in 1986 rapidly restored international confidence in the Portuguese 
market. Cavaco Silva and the PSD consolidated this popularity with a programme for 
economic and political stability in 1987, when they formed the Third Republic’s first 
majority government (Magone 1997, 32, 33). This government saw Portugal into the 
EC, and the accession coincided with the adoption of the Single European Act and 
progress towards the Single Market (Magone 1997, 34). It was these governments that 
implemented the structural reforms which were to characterise the Portuguese new 
economic trajectory in the following decades. 
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The popularity and success of the PSD structural reforms was helped by the fact 
that they appeared to be working well. By 1986, all indications suggested that Portugal 
was on the road to recovery. Rising GDP, increasing domestic demand, falling 
unemployment and a positive balance of payments all served as evidence of the 
apparent success of the PSD’s policies. Collective bargaining agreements were also 
introduced during this period which managed to secure popular pay rise agreements, 
and eventually, certain stability in industrial relations (Stoleroff 1992, 122). In this 
context, the ‘expedient’ - as opposed to revolutionary - political solution of the PSD 
proved highly attractive, and ‘the PSD, as the incumbent minority government since 
1985, was able to reap the profits of the positive economic situation of 1986, the latent 
optimism associated with joining the EC as well as the fatigue accumulated during two 
years of austerity and perceived political instability’ (Stoleroff 1992, 124).54  
 
The ‘European option’ and structural reforms 
Democratic consolidation and moving beyond the turbulence of the revolutionary 
period may certainly have acted as a motivation for an alternative vision of Portuguese 
modernity. But it was also defined positively in relation to Europe. Corkill (1999, 64-
70) noted that from the 1980s onwards ‘it is clear that the motivating force 
behind…policy shifts was the accession to the European community’. EC membership 
was expected to promote the modernisation and economic development of the country 
by introducing structural reforms which would modernise and improve the 
                                                          
54 It is important to note that the implementation of structural reforms was not without (significant) 
conflict. For example, in 1986 alone, ‘the Ministry of Employment and Social Security (MESS) registered 
a total of 363 strikes, involving 231,535 workers and 381,917 working days lost (see Stoleroff 1992, 
138). 
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competitiveness of the economy (Corkill 1999).55 Since the revolution, there has been a 
wide consensus among Portuguese political parties regarding European integration 
(Teixeira 2012, 13).56 In 1992 Portugal held the presidency of the EU and during this 
time deepening European integration was defined as a ‘new national goal’. This goal 
was strongly motivated by a view of the integration process as ‘the only way to keep a 
peripheral country at the heart of the EU’s decision making process’ (Teixeira 2012, 18, 
19).57 As a strategy, Portugal swiftly adopted legislative changes that were outlined in 
various EU treaties, earning the country the nickname of the ‘good student’ of European 
integration (Teixeira 2012, 18-19).58 
Crucially, Portugal’s accession to the EC took place at precisely the moment the 
European project was undergoing its ‘re-launch’ with the Single European Act (SEA) 
(Teixeira 2012, 25). As such, Portugal’s experience of European integration involved 
adaptation to a very specific blueprint for modernisation from the very beginning. This 
was to lead to a decade and a half of accelerated modernisation which was to have a 
clear transformative impact on the structure of its economy (Teixeira 2012, 25). 
Through the introduction of various EC/EU reforms after 1986, Portugal’s economy set 
out on ‘a process of structural reformulation, with the goal of achieving macroeconomic 
stability and increased competitiveness which became one of the key consequences of 
                                                          
55 Some authors have noted that deepening European integration may also have represented a solution to a 
peculiarly Portuguese identity crisis. As Magone (2004) put it, the ‘traumatic loss the huge colonial 
empire with feet of clay and the misfortunate decolonization process…’ played a role as an ‘important 
escapist route for democratic political elites’ (Magone 2004, 16-17). 
56 Illustrated by the slogan of the Socialist Party – ‘Europe is with us’ (Seabra 2003, 355). 
57 Although Seabra (2003, 355) notes that during the 1980s, Portuguese governments had a low-profile 
pro-European policy, due to deep concerns over the impact of integration for the country. Nevertheless, 
all major parties, save for the PCP, were pro-European, and in spite of concerns, adapting to the post-SEA 
European project was an expedient and pragmatic choice for PSD governments. 
58 However, for  Coppolaro and Lains (2013) EEC/EU membership for Portugal did not represent a 
breaking point, but simply a continuation of an economic policy that had already been pursued since 1947 
(79). While they draw attention to the important to the long-term historical lineages of Portugal’s 
integration with Europe, they underestimate the significance and transformative effects of deepening 
integration since 1986. 
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accession’ (Teixeira 2012, 25). The most important reforms during this process were 
introduced by the PSD and related to privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation (as is 
discussed in more detail in section two). Privatisation transformed the domestic 
economy by reversing the extensive nationalisations of the revolutionary period. An 
intense cycle of privatisation from 1993 - 2003 averaged at about 23 per cent of GDP (at 
2000 prices) (Rodrigues and Reis 2012, 196-197). Liberalisation and deregulation of 
banking and finance had particularly important effects. As (Leão, et al. 2013) note, the 
development of the Portuguese financial system occurred relatively late when compared 
with the other EU countries, mainly due to the nationalisation of the banking system in 
the aftermath of revolution (2013, 6). In order to join the EC, the Single Market and 
later EMU, Portugal was required to begin the gradual dismantling of constraints on its 
financial system during this period, ‘particularly regarding State ownership of banks 
and insurance companies’ (Leão, et al. 2013), 6). By the end of the 1980s, a new set of 
liberalising measures were adopted. These included the progressive elimination of 
administrative limits to interest rates, to credit growth and to the number and location of 
banks’ branches in the country, amongst many other measures (Leao, Barradas, 
Mamede, Lagoa 2013, 6). The response of the re-privatized financial sector has been 
‘very vigorous’ as Patrick Honohan has argued: 
The past decade has seen this regulated regime almost entirely replaced by one 
which approximates that in most other EU member states in respect to openness 
and deregulation, and where the state’s ownership share declined rapidly from 
more than 90 per cent to around one-quarter by 1997 (1999, 28). 
 
As I elaborate on in the following section, these structural reforms were to have 
dramatic consequences for the Portuguese economy. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s Portugal began to experience economic recovery 
and even growth, and this change in fortunes was to be closely associated with the 
structural reforms of the PSD and with European integration (Stoleroff 1992, 137). In 
this section I have highlighted how the introduction of these structural reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s were defined in a positive and a negative sense. They were negatively 
defined against the political and economic volatility of the revolutionary period, and 
overcoming this turbulence was a strong motivation for their introduction. They were 
defined positively in relation to European integration. This positive aspect is 
particularly important because it provided a clear blueprint for reform and 
modernisation for the country, as I now discuss. 
 
Section Two: Structural reform and ‘debt-led’ growth: Portugal 1990-
2000 
By the mid 1990s, a mere twenty years after the revolution, Portugal had consolidated a 
socio-economic vision for the country that could claim legitimacy, which was no mean 
feat considering the relatively recent turbulence of the late 1970s. Political and 
economic instabilities no longer constituted existential threats. In fact, the economy was 
actually growing, leading to a short but substantial boom in the 1990s. However, as I 
argue in this section, this economic growth was unstable as it represented the growing 
importance of new economic sectors in Portugal, mainly the financial and non-tradable 
sectors.  
I explore two important aspects of the evolving Portuguese economic trajectory 
during the 1990s in this section. First, as a result of EU reforms relating to banking and 
finance, private indebtedness rose dramatically during the 1990s, paving the way for a 
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recession in the early 2000s. Second, investment was redirected to the domestic, non-
tradable sector of Portugal, damaging the country’s competitiveness and generating a 
pattern of growth for the country that had not existed before. 
 
Structural reforms and the growth of private indebtedness 
As I suggested in the first section, Portugal’s experience of European Integration 
involved adaptation to a very specific blueprint for modernisation from the outset. This 
was to lead to a decade of accelerated modernisation which was to have a clear 
transformative impact on the structure of its economy (Teixeira 2012, 25). The re-
launched project of European Integration was to present enormous challenges and 
opportunities to Portugal as it prepared to participate in the Single Market and 
Economic and Monetary Union (Serra 2014, 42).  
Between 1986 and 2000 the Portuguese economy experienced the third fastest 
growth rate among the EU15 countries, falling behind only Ireland and Luxemburg, 
with GDP increasing at an average annual rate of 4.1% (Lagoa et al. 2014, 6; IMF 
2002). Unemployment fell to a record low of 4 percent in 2000, and inflation was 
brought down to just over 2 percent in 1999 (Royo 2012, 187; Cardoso 2005).  
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Figure 3.1: Percentage GDP Growth: Portugal 
Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators 
 
As Lagoa et al. (2014; see also Lourtie 2011; Orsi 2010; Leão, et al. 2013) and some 
critical political economists (Rodrigues and Reis 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2012) have 
noted, Portugal achieved these impressive growth rates through ‘debt-led domestic 
demand growth’. Although I agree that the ‘debt-led domestic demand growth’ label is 
appropriate, I do not posit the origins of debt-led growth as stemming from Portugal’s 
‘insertion’ into a pattern of dependency characterised by ‘core-periphery’ dynamics 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012) or as an unequal partner in the strategy of a powerful 
transnational and influential ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Rodrigues and Reis 2013, 
190). Rather, as I outlined in the previous section, Portuguese governments actively 
introduced various EC/EU reforms for a number of reasons, not least of which were the 
sublimation of the conflictive experience of the revolutionary period, and the desire to 
catch up with Western Europe (Maxwell 1995). In other words, Portugal’s active 
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attempt to become European and modern as a result of ‘adjusting to Europe’ suggests 
that Portugal set its own transformation in motion – although it was following a plan 
that was established with ‘core-Europe’ in mind. The key claim is that Portugal became 
a debt led model through the active negotiation of European integration, or as Mário 
Soares put it, as part of its attempt to narrow ‘the gap which still separates us from the 
more developed European countries, by creating for the Portuguese people genuinely 
European patterns of life and welfare’ (Soares 2012). Yet, much like Greece, Portugal’s 
economic growth during the 1990s was not driven by export competitiveness or by the 
type of modernisation that was hoped for. 
One of the most important factors that contributed to this performance were the 
‘structural reforms’ that I discussed in section one, and in particular, the transformation 
of the financial sector (Royo 2012, 187; Cardoso 2005, 2). A 1998 IMF report noted 
that the Portuguese banking system of the late 1990s: 
differed profoundly from that of yesteryear: a system tightly controlled by the 
state between the mid-1970s and the end of the last decade has, after wide-
ranging reforms associated with Portugal’s accession to the European Union 
(EU) in 1986, given place to a fully liberalized and modern system (Decressin 
and Mauro 1998) 
 
These structural reforms were in turn driven by Portugal’s adaptation to European 
integration. The Portuguese banking sector was rejuvenated as a result of various EU 
reforms relating to banking and finance, and the restructuring of the financial sector 
produced a ‘very competitive and innovative market highly suitable for absorbing the 
rapid increase in credit demand and for sustaining its dynamism’ (European 
Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 11; Banco 
de Portugal 2009, xxi). In anticipation of joining the Single Market and EMU, reforms 
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took place in terms of liberalisation of regulatory frameworks, privatisation and the 
freeing of international capital movements (Decressin and Mauro 1998, 5; Leao et al. 
2013, 6). These reforms represented a dramatic turning point. As I discussed in section 
one, following the revolution, the Portuguese banking system was characterised by 
pervasive public intervention and control. All interest rates were fixed and subsidised 
rates existed for eligible projects in agriculture, housing and exports. From 1983 
onwards, key reforms were implemented that reversed this; and the banking system was 
opened to private, foreign and domestic entry and authorised commercial banks to 
engage in medium-term operations (e.g. housing credit), blurring a pervious distinction 
between commercial and investment banks. Following EC accession, there was a wide-
ranging overhaul of the financial system (see Decressin and Mauro 1998, 7 for a 
detailed summary of these measures), propelled by various EU banking directives and 
other measures. The upshot of many of these reforms was the raising of banks’ 
opportunities to take on more risk, to provide new products, and to access new sources 
of financing. Interest rates were deregulated, credit ceilings were abolished and open-
market operations. All restrictions in consumer credit were abolished in 1995 (albeit this 
was comparatively late) following the completion of the Single Market. Privatisations 
also played an important role in this changing landscape (see Decressin and Mauro 
1998, 10 for a list of selloffs). By the 1990s, as a result of adhering to the requirements 
from the EC/EU, the financial system in Portugal had completely transformed 
(Honahon 1999: 3).59 
These reforms ensured that the profile of economic growth had a powerful 
engine for change in the country’s fledgling financial sector (Royo 2012, 187). By 
1996, it was clear that Portugal was successfully fulfilling the nominal convergence 
                                                          
59 The discussion of this paragraph draws on the detailed account of Decressin and Mauro (1998, see 
pages 5-10 especially). 
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criteria and that it would likely join the euro straight away, in 1999. The prospect of 
joining the eurozone had a dramatic impact on the expectations of households and 
enterprises (see European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs 2004, 11; Cardoso 2005, 2). According to research by the European 
Commission, more than anywhere else in the EU, there was a marked increase in 
consumer confidence and share price indicators in Portugal around 2007 (European 
Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 11). Rising 
incomes and employment bolstered this momentum, with unemployment rates declining 
to 4 per cent in 2000 (Cardoso 2005, 2). 
Credit fuelled consumer spending became a significant driver of economic 
growth during the 1990s (see table 3.1). Over the 1990s, household savings decreased 
and household indebtedness tripled to just over 120 per cent of disposable income 
between 1994 and 2004, which as Cardoso (2005) notes was well above the euro area 
average of 80 per cent (2). Lagoa et al. note,  that private consumption was responsible 
for 70 per cent of GDP growth in the period, gross fixed capital formation (GFCG) for 
36 per cent, and public consumption for 21 per cent (2014, 7). Portugal experienced a 
surge of investment during the 1990s and this would not have been possible without the 
wide availability of credit made possible by deepening European integration (Lagoa et 
al. 2014, 9), and the concomitant liberalisation and deregulation of the banking sector 
during this period.  Credit expansion was dramatic during the 1990s, and as Lourtie 
notes, a consequence of this was that ‘[n]on-tradable, uncompetitive rent seeking sectors 
surged, diverting investment from tradable sectors and thus contributing to low 
productivity growth’ (Lourtie 2011, 5).  
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1995-2000 
GDP Growth 
Contribution of: 
Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation 
Net Exports 
3.6% 2.4% 0.7% 1.8% -0.9% 
 
Table 3.1: GDP growth and contributions of the main demand components in 1995-2000 (annual average, at 2005 
prices) 
Source: reproduced from Lagoa et al. (2014, 9). 
 
Furthermore, the effective absence of exchange risk as part of deepening 
European monetary integration, leading up to and including EMU, meant that 
Portuguese banks had access to European inter-banking markets and could issue euro 
bonds60, resulting in a greater supply of cheap credit to sustain the demand of 
Portuguese consumers (European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 2004). Interest rates plummeted as Portugal prepared to join the euro, 
and this together with improved perceptions of future income levels contributed to 
demand for credit by Portuguese consumers (Lagoa et al. 2014, 9; Lourtie 2011, 5). 
Nominal interest rates dropped from 16 percent in 1992 to 4 percent in 2001, and over 
the same period, real interest rates dropped from 6 percent towards roughly 0 per cent. 
This, along with positive expectations regarding Portugal’s growth after joining the 
euro, led to increased confidence and growth in consumption and investment 
(Blanchard 2007, 3).  
                                                          
60 ‘Euro bond’ in this context, refers to European sovereign and other bond markets, and should not be 
confused with contemporary debates around the issuing of ‘eurobonds’. 
144 
 
 
 Additionally, in order to meet the Maastricht criteria, Portugal engaged in an 
intense cycle of privatisation between 1993-2003, averaging at about 23 percent of GDP 
at 2000 prices (Rodrigues and Reis 2012, 196).  As Rodrigues and Reis put it, these 
privatisations ‘reconstructed corporate groups which had been enfeebled by the 
nationalization process following…1974’ (ibid, 196). Privatisation and financial 
liberalisation promoted the ‘emergence of Portuguese private banks and assur[ed], also 
through a very favourable system of taxation, the enormous expansion of their activity 
(ibid 197).   
All of this meant that household spending and household indebtedness rose 
dramatically during the 1990s. A 2004 European Commission report noted that the 
indebtedness of the household sector and non-financial sector more than doubled 
between 1995 and 2002 (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 2004, 12; Banco de Portugal 2009, xxi). Lagoa et al. similarly note 
that outstanding loans to the above sectors increased from 50% to 93% of GDP, and that 
almost three fifths of this growth was directed at households, three quarters of which 
were mortgage loans (Lagoa et al. 2014, 10). As I discuss further in section three, the 
upshot is that Portugal experienced a relatively early pattern of indebtedness during the 
1990s and the reverse experience during the 2000s. Lagoa et al. note the peculiar timing 
of Portuguese private indebtedness:  
[W]hile in other countries the levels of indebtedness grew slowly until the turn 
of the century, accelerating only after 2000, in the Portuguese case the reverse 
happened – private sector debt in percentage of GDP grew most rapidly in the 
second half of the 1990s, growing slowly thereafter (Lagoa et al. 2014, 11).  
 
The evolution in real rates of credit growth in Portugal during the 1990s was 
remarkable. It accelerated from close to 0% in 1990 to above 25% in 1998, before, as I 
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discuss in section three, decelerating sharply in the 2000s. The result of this dramatic 
growth in credit was that by 2002, household debt approached 71 per cent of GDP in 
2002 – up from just 15 per cent in 1990 (European Commission Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 57; see also Lagoa et al. 2014, 17). Lagoa et al. 
note how by 2000, this resulted in the gross debt-to-income ratio of Portuguese 
households reaching 84 per cent – above the euro area average of 75 per cent, and 
clearly above the average of countries such as Spain (69 per cent) or Italy (34 per cent) 
(Lagoa et al. 2014, 17). 
Credit fuelled consumer spending drove the Portuguese economy during the 
1990s. The favourable conditions associated with the prospect of joining the euro 
encouraged households to increase their borrowing at such high rates – namely 
disinflation, lower nominal and real interest rates, and rapidly rising income levels 
(European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 
57). Similarly, the structural reforms relating to the banking sector ensured that there 
was a wide supply of credit to meet consumer demand, and the liberalisation of the 
credit market helped foster a strongly competitive environment where banks were eager 
to meet the growing borrowing demands (European Commission Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs 2004, 58). Decressin and Mauro (1998) note how 
European integration (through deregulation and privatisation) significantly raised 
competition in the 1990s, triggering a large drop in financial margins for banks. The 
upshot of an accelerated consolidation process was the emergence of five major banking 
groups accounting for 80 per cent of market share. To compensate for declining 
financial margins, these banks ramped up, inter alia, housing and consumer lending as 
sources of new income (Decressin and Mauro 1998, 5). As such, in these different 
ways, the EU/PSD reforms are strongly implicated in the transformation of Portugal 
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into a ‘debt-led domestic demand’ model of economic growth during the 1990s (Lagoa 
et al. 2014, 16). 
 
The expansion of the non-tradable sector 
In addition to increasing indebtedness, this trajectory of credit-fuelled economic growth 
contributed to the expansion of particular sectors of the Portuguese economy. The 
incentives provided by the structural reforms geared investment and capital inflows to 
the newly profitable non-tradable sectors, including construction, retail and privatised 
utilities, which were less exposed to foreign competition (Rodrigues and Reis 2012, 
197).  These sectors were in turn financed through the pivotal role of the newly 
invigorated, liberalised and privatised banking sector. As Leão, et al. (2013, 12) note, 
the financial sector itself began to grow as a result of this capital inflow. 
 David Corkill writes how Portugal became gripped by ‘construction fever’ 
during the 1990s as a result of credit being directed to the sector (1999, 44-46).61 Lower 
interest rates and greater supply of credit created a situation where the construction 
industry was growing at four times the rate of the economy as a whole (Corkill 1999, 
43). A 2012 IMF report notes how a liberalised financial sector combined with 
increased bank competition to direct a surge in capital flows into the non-tradable sector 
which contributed to growing macroeconomic imbalances (IMF 2013, 8). The 
Portuguese economy, following EU membership, tended to favour domestic demand 
over exports – especially in sectors such as construction, real estate, and wholesale/retail 
trade – all sectors where, as the IMF notes, productivity was lagging (IMF 2013, 8). 
                                                          
61 Although it should be noted that this property boom was relatively modest when compared to other 
countries, and is not comparable to the scale of property booms in Ireland and Spain over the 2000s. In 
fact, between 1995 and 2001, supply of property was very much in line with demand, and real estate 
process accelerated by a modest annual average of 1.6 per cent (Cadoso 2005, 4). 
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As I discuss in more detail in section three, the poor performance of the 
manufacturing sector in Portugal, concentrated mainly in ‘traditional sectors’ such as 
clothing, textiles and footwear, also contributed to the emergence of the debt-led model 
in the 1990s. Leão, et al. (2013, 18) argue that in the period from 1993-2007, it is clear 
that the newly liberalised and privatised banking system has given far more credit to 
construction, real estate and other non-tradable activities than to manufacturing, and that 
this difficulty for the latter in obtaining credit is partially due to the reality that banks 
assess manufacturing as a higher risk sector, ‘exposed to competitive pressures from 
abroad’ (see table 3, below) (Decressin and Mauro 1998). During the 1990s, but 
especially during the 2000s, there was clear competitive pressure from abroad which 
threatened the Portuguese manufacturing-for-export sector. Because this sector suffered 
from low productivity and due to (warranted, as it turned out) fears about its future 
growth prospects, economic activity during the 1990s and 2000s redirected towards the 
non-tradable sector.  
Over the course of the 1990s, the Portuguese economy transformed significantly 
into an economy driven by domestic consumption, seeing the growth of the financial 
and non-tradable sectors, and the expansion of their activity. It was the EU/PSD reforms 
which created the conditions for a new type of economic growth. As such, similarly to 
Greece, Portugal’s participation in the project of European integration since the 1980s 
set in motion a new form of economic growth. This new model of economic growth 
emerged directly as a result of Portugal’s adjustment to the Single Market and its 
preparations for the euro. Yet, as I show in the next section, unlike Greece, Portugal’s 
similar model of debt led growth was to head in a very different direction over the 
2000s. 
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Section Three: Recession and crisis – Portugal in the 2000s 
The fortunes of the Portuguese economy turned in the early 2000s when the country 
entered a prolonged recession. In this section I discuss the link between the debt-led 
model of growth that emerged during the 1990s, and the sovereign debt crisis of 2011 
by discussing the causes and consequences of the 2000s recession. I first briefly 
introduce the dominant understanding of the Portuguese recession and subsequent crisis, 
which focuses on Portugal’s failure to improve its own productivity and get its public 
finances in order. I then challenge this narrative by arguing that the causes of the 
Portuguese recession are better understood as stemming from the unintended 
consequences of the 1990s nominal convergence process combined with problems 
stemming from its membership of the eurozone. I also discuss Portugal’s declining 
export competitiveness during the 2000s, arguing that it contributed to the downturn. I 
re-interpret the 2000s recession as having been caused by the transformations generated 
by the EU/PSD structural reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Accordingly, Portugal’s 
current difficulties are the product of the emergence of patterns of debt-led economic 
growth during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Obstacles to productivity: Portugal and the immaturity thesis 
From 1998 onwards, the performance of the Portuguese economy began to deteriorate. 
Inflation began to rise and the trade deficit began to widen, from 5.4 per cent of GDP in 
1997 to 6.6 per cent in 1999 (Royo 2012, 189).  In stark contrast to the impressive and 
above average growth rates of the 1990s, between 2000 and 2013 economic growth 
stagnated to an average rate of 0.1% of GDP, the second lowest in the entire EU (only 
Italy was lower)  (Lagoa et al. 2014, 6) (see figure 3.1). The causes of the 2000s 
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recession are crucial to understanding the difficulties that Portugal found itself in on the 
eve of its troika bailout. It was during this period that rising public and private 
indebtedness coincided with dramatically low prospects of GDP growth. All of these 
factors led to falling investor confidence in Portugal after the 2008 crisis.  
Reis (2013) notes that most literature on Portugal’s crisis tends to mention 
various obstacles to Portugal’s productivity during the 2000s; a list that typically 
includes low average educational attainment, low total factor productivity, an oversized 
government, labour market rigidities, inefficient legal system, low export 
competitiveness (for examples of this approach, see also Selassie 2012, 12; IMF 2013; 
Abreu 2006; Blanchard 2007; Amador and Coimbra 2007; Pereira and Wemans 2012; 
and see discussion in Chapter One for more on this). Perspectives that rely on this 
variant of the immaturity thesis imagine that a country like Portugal could be a modern, 
productive and competitive economy, if only it could clear all of the obstacles and 
impediments caused by its fiscal mismanagement out of its way.62  
Yet, the story I have told so far presents a number of important challenges to the 
Portuguese immaturity thesis. As Reis (2013) notes, all of the facts listed above are not 
an answer for what caused Portugal to ‘stop growing after 2000, instead of in some 
other year when all of these same hindrances to growth were also present’ (148). 
Moreover, the puzzle of Portuguese stagnation in a context of Irish and Greek 
overheating cannot be explained with reference to ‘obstacles to convergence’ – after all, 
Ireland and Greece had any number of well documented ‘obstacles to productivity’ in 
place during the 2000s, yet still experienced above average growth. The puzzle is less 
why Portugal didn’t experience a virtuous pattern of growth, and much more why it 
didn’t even experience a non-virtuous pattern of growth. Accounting for the ‘non-
                                                          
62 See the literature on ‘total factor productivity’ as a particularly strong example of this kind of 
modernisation theory approach  (Amador and Coimbra 2007;see also Lains 2003; Reis 2013, 148). 
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convergence’ of Portugal can tell us little about the causes of its specific divergent 
trajectory. 
 Lagoa et al. (2014) argue, as I noted in section two, that we can explain 
Portugal’s downturn, relative to the experience of Greece and Ireland, as the result of 
timing. During the 1990s, the banking sector in Portugal appears to have been relatively 
more vigorous in fuelling credit led growth than it was in Ireland and Greece at the 
same time (see figure 3.2). The upshot being - Portugal was heavily indebted by 2000, 
to an extent that was not the case for Greece or Ireland. By the end of the 1990s 
consumers ‘re-assessed their income expectations amid high indebtedness and a 
rebound of interest rates, as well as a gloomier outlook with the Portuguese economy’ 
leading to a dramatic fall in consumption (Cardoso 2005). Similarly, a 2013 IMF 
country report notes that Portuguese companies tended to favour debt over equity 
financing in the run up to euro membership, partially due to the availability of cheap 
capital flows (IMF 2013, 9), leading to high corporate leverage. This further damaged 
Portuguese growth by the 2000s. As the IMF notes, ‘excess leverage may …have had a 
negative impact on investment, as over-indebted firms tend to pass up on new 
investment opportunities, particularly those with limited short-term benefits but higher 
long-term productivity gains’ (IMF 2013, 9). Indeed, investment growth in Portugal 
peaked in 1997 and then gradually declined to turn negative, in line with increasing 
leverage (IMF 2013, 9). In other words, debt was so great in the corporate sector that it 
served as a barrier to accessing further debt, stalling productivity (Selassie 2012, 5–7). 
Portugal’s experience from the mid-1980s to the 2010s is the reverse of Greece and 
Ireland. It already had private indebtedness levels that were too high by the turn of the 
century, whereas Greece and Ireland only really began to accelerate their levels of debt 
after the 2000s (Lagoa et al. 2014, 6).  
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Figure 3.2: Private sector debt, consolidated - percentage of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
 
This was to prove a difficulty for Portugal when, in response to signs of overheating in 
the eurozone, the ECB increased the main reference interest rate from 2.5% in early 
1999 to 4.75% in late 2000 (Lagoa et al. 2014, 12). This had a significant impact on 
levels of available income, and accordingly, domestic demand in Portugal – to an extent 
that it didn’t in Greece and Ireland where there were not such high levels of private 
indebtedness around that time. It also had a negative impact on the Portuguese public 
deficit and debt levels, which became more expensive to service, leading to Portugal’s 
breach of the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2001. As a result, the country was obliged 
to follow a pro-cyclical, contractionary fiscal policy, which further contributed to falling 
GDP (Lagoa et al. 2014, 12). As a consequence, economic policy during the 2000s was 
characterised by attempts at fiscal consolidation and improving competitiveness and 
productivity (see Abreu 2006; Lourtie 2011, Royo 2012), which further dampened 
demand and economic growth. 
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Rather than a failure to converge, it can thus be argued that the recession of the 
2000s has clear origins in the model of ‘debt-led domestic demand growth’ that 
emerged in the 1990s.   As the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs reported, ‘Since 2001, private agents and public 
authorities alike have started to readjust their balance sheets, bringing spending more in 
line with incomes/revenues’ (2004, 7). Accordingly, we can understand the role of 
European financial liberalisation and integration as a catalyst of slowdown in the 2000s 
(Banco de Portugal 2009, 66). Portugal’s nominal ‘convergence’ with Europe since the 
1980s had been premised on the inflation of domestic demand. Once this dropped, the 
economy accordingly stagnated.  
Falling consumption during the 2000s is clearly evident when looking at the 
construction sector, which significantly, saw its share in value added as a percentage of 
GDP fall from 7.6 percent to 6.6 percent, in stark contrast with Ireland and Spain (Reis 
2013, 156). In fact, Portugal was the only European country to register an annual 
decline in investment in construction every single year since 2002 until 2011 (Lourtie 
2011, 6). In terms of employment, it was wholesale, retail and in education, health care 
and social work where large increases were witnessed during this period (Reis 2013, 
156). The relative prices of these sectors also rose, and construction contracted 
prominently during this period (Reis 2013, 161). So, unlike Greece and Ireland, and in 
spite of large capital inflows and long term interest rates that modestly raised real wages 
and the real exchange rate, the economic activity that was promoted in Portugal was not 
in sectors that were likely to result in significant growth, and less still, speculative 
bubbles. There are many different ways to have economic activity driven by the non-
tradable sector – and in the case of Portugal, ‘adjusting to Europe’ created reliance on 
wholesale, retail trade and community and other services. By the 2000s, these sectors 
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were still prominent in terms of gross value added and employment, but they were not 
delivering growth. 
 
Declining export competitiveness: the rise of China and the CEECs 
A second cause of Portugal’s downturn relates to its export sector, which suffered a 
decline around the same time as the decline of its debt-led sector. Portugal’s 
unemployment rate began to rise from 5.1 percent in 2000 to 9.2 per cent in 2009, and 
to a peak of 17.5 per cent in 2011. Aside from the steep rise after 2009, much of this 
unemployment can be attributed to declining export competitiveness and difficulties 
faced by the manufacturing sector. Between 2000 and 2007 Portugal lost jobs in 
manufacturing at an average annual rate of 2%, ‘one of the fastest rates of 
deindustrialisation in the EU’ (Lagoa et al. 2014, 13).  Additionally, the increased 
indebtedness of non-financial corporations led to declining investment in Portuguese 
enterprises, because it may have increased the difficulty of their getting additional 
funding (Lagoa et al. 2014, 47).   
As with Greece, it is important to distinguish between the decline of Portugal’s 
export-led growth, and the emergence of its debt-led growth. The emergence of the 
latter is not necessarily responsible for the destruction of the former, as authors such as 
Rodrigues and Reis (2012) have suggested. Just like Greece, the Portuguese export 
sector faced a number of serious challenges that suggested its demise in any event. In 
fact, an already existing trend of declining export competitiveness in traditional sectors 
during the 1990s (but especially during 2000s) contributed to the recession and made it 
increasingly likely that investment was encouraged in the non-tradable and financial 
sectors during this period.  
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Portugal’s exports have historically been concentrated in ‘traditional sectors’, 
especially in textiles, clothing and footwear. This industry has been contracting across 
Europe since the 1970s in the face of fierce competition from low-cost manufacturers in 
East Asia, North Africa, Eastern Europe and other areas (Corkill 1999, 158; Lains 
2007). Portugal was threatened also, but due to its own low wages and integration into 
Europe, by 1999, textile and clothing was still a major industry, accounting for one third 
of manufacturing employment and some 20 per cent of the value of manufacturing 
output. It comprised some 30 per cent of total exports, 22 per cent of which were 
destined for the EU (Corkill 1999, 158, 159).  Corkill, writing in 1999, estimated that 
one million people depended on the Textile and Clothing industry (159). The industry 
has typically been characterised by a large number of small and medium sized firms – 
‘only a little over 10 per cent of cotton textile plants have more than 500 workers’ 
(Corkill 1999, 159). During the 1990s boom, the sector accumulated problems of low 
productivity and a lack of capital investment. This was to become more problematic in 
the 2000s. 
Portugal’s international competitiveness became threatened by China’s entry 
into the WTO, the ending of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 200563, and the prospect of 
EU enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) (Serra 2014, 43). Due to this 
decline, economic growth became more and more dependent on domestic demand (ibid 
2014: 43). As a result of participation in the Single Market, but also to more general 
processes of trade liberalisation happening on a global level, Portugal became affected 
by its traditional productive sectors being exposed to ‘wider and more aggressive 
foreign competition’ (Serra 2014, 43). Portugal encountered difficulties in world trade 
markets, because of its specialisation in low-wage and low-value-added goods, which 
                                                          
63 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement was an international trade agreement on textile and clothing which 
imposed quotas on the amount that developing countries could export to developed countries. 
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were especially hurt by competition from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and 
China (Reis 2013, 148; NSRF 2013, 18; Lane 2013, 10; Mamede 2012; Sebastián Royo 
2012, 205–213). The accession of the latter to the WTO in 2001 introduced a fierce 
competitor for Portuguese exports, one that, like Portugal, specialised in exploiting its 
low wages relative to the richer EU countries (Reis 2013, 154). In 1993, a Uruguay 
round agreement established, as Leão and Palacio-Vera note:   
a progressive elimination of export quotas of textiles, clothing and footwear 
from less developed countries over a 10-year period (1995-2005). As a result the 
market share of China in the EU15 increased sharply at the expense of several 
southern European countries, mainly Portugal and Italy. In 2000-08, Portuguese 
exports of textiles, clothing and footwear suffered steep declines, average annual 
declines of 6.1, 21.2, and 4.5 percent, respectively… [c]onsequently, the share 
of these three goods in total goods exports fell from 25 percent in 1999 (40 
percent in 1993) to only 14 percent in 2008 (Leão and Palacio-Vera 2011, 12). 
 
The ending of the Multi Fibre Arrangement in 2005 ended restrictions on the quantities 
of textiles and clothing that could be exported from developing countries to developed 
countries, further damaging Portuguese competitiveness, especially as so much of its 
exports went to Europe.  
Additionally, nascent attempts at developing a more advanced export sector in 
medium-tech manufacturing (including some emblematic projects such as a large car 
plant – see European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs 2004, 24) were stunted by the prospect of European enlargement and 
competition from the CEECs. As such, in the second half of the 1990s, inflows of FDI 
into Portugal fell below the EU weighted average. In addition, Portugal’s preparation 
for monetary integration entailed the appreciation of the escudo during the 1990s, which 
further damaged export competitiveness, and promoted the redirection of economic 
activity to domestic demand. Portuguese exports of medium-to-high tech products like 
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vehicles and electrical machines also lost market share over the 2000s, mainly to the 
CEECs, which have benefitted from a combination of lower wages and a more skilled 
labour force (Leão and Palacio-Vera 2011, 12). Anticipating the EU’s eastern 
enlargement in 2004, a number of MNCs in automotive and related industries de-
located their productive capacity from Portugal to the new member states (Mamede 
2012). As a result, over the last decade the CEECs have attracted large flows of FDI 
into medium-to-high tech sectors, which formerly had headed towards southern Europe, 
including Portugal (Leão and Palacio-Vera 2011, 12). The consequences for the 
Portuguese manufacturing sector in terms of gross national product were significant 
(Serra 2014, 43). Because the composition of Portuguese exports is almost twice as high 
in terms of ‘low-tech’ goods as compared to the rest of the eurozone countries, it seems 
obvious that their exports are likely to be more directly associated with competition 
from China and East Asia (Leão and Palacio-Vera 2011, 7). As Lourtie (2011, 5-6) 
notes, the textile sector represented 33 percent of total Portuguese exports in 1990. It 
accounted for only 13 percent in 2006. In addition, the market share of Portuguese 
exports in the EU15, the main destination for Portuguese exports (having accounted for 
71% of total in 2008), declined by 33 percent between 2003 and 2009, mainly in favour 
of China and of the CEECs. This led to more imports in the Portuguese market, and the 
skewing of the economic model towards services and non-tradables (Leão and Palacio-
Vera 2011, 11). 
 This changing international economic environment contributed to consolidating 
the redirection of economic activity in Portugal. Economic growth became increasingly 
inward looking (Serra 2014, 43), contributing to the continued widening of Portugal’s 
current account deficit. The competitiveness of China and other East Asian economies 
meant that the Portuguese economy was unable, under these conditions, to attract 
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significant amounts of capital to its manufacturing and export sectors. Instead, 
investment tended to become redirected to non-tradable sectors. The most important 
effect of the rise of China was how Portugal adapted – rather than how much it lost in 
trade64. In other words, the impact of falling revenue from exports is of secondary 
importance to what Portugal did instead of manufacturing for export (Reis 2013). 
  The consequence of the emergence of ‘new players in world trade and the 
erosion of comparative advantage’ in Portugal (Royo 2012, 205) was that ‘many 
economic groups adopted defensive growth strategies based on investments in non-
tradable sectors’ (Royo 2012, 206). These new strategies were made possible by the 
new institutional environment created by the EU/PSD structural reforms. Reis argues 
that the weakness of the Portuguese economy can be explained by the ‘misallocation of 
financial flows’, leading to an expansion in the country’s relatively unproductive non-
tradable sector (2013, 146). The Portuguese production system was transformed as a 
result of the shocks discussed above, and crucially, investment tended to flow towards 
the non-tradable sector (Serra 2014, 43). 
Portugal did indeed transform into a ‘debt-led’ model of growth during the 
1990s. However, as this section has suggested and as was also the case with Greece, the 
emergence of debt-led growth should not be understood as having the effect of 
undermining the productive base of the Portuguese economy. It is worth pointing out 
here that it is extra-EU economies, and fellow ‘peripheral’ European economies (the 
CEECs) that represented a threat to Portuguese international competitiveness, not the 
core (German, France, the UK, etc.), as Lapavitsas et al. (2012) and others working 
within the core-periphery perspective often suggest. The productive base of the 
Portuguese economy was undermined for reasons largely unrelated to the emergence of 
                                                          
64 See Reis (2013) for a critique of a ‘trade based’ explanation of Portuguese decline. 
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its debt-led model. The causality is reversed; the debt-led model, rather than being a 
cause of this undermining, was actually consolidated by declining export 
competitiveness. 
 
Rethinking the Portuguese crisis 
Portugal followed a unique economic trajectory during its membership of the euro. 
Unemployment and public and private indebtedness increased as GDP growth 
stagnated.  Portugal’s budget deficits and net public debt as a percentage of GDP rose 
during membership of the euro, but they were nowhere close to Greece’s levels at the 
time and in fact, its public debt did not exceed 60 per cent of GDP until 2007 (see figure 
3.3) (Baer, Dias and Duarter 2012, 3). Germany’s government debt exceeded 60 per 
cent this year also, and in fact, Portugal’s public debt was lower than Germany’s from 
1996 until 2007. It was not until after the eruption of the eurozone crisis that Portugal’s 
longer term structural fault lines began to mark it as a target for international financial 
market anxiety.   
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Figure 3.3: Portugal’s central government debt, total (percentage of GDP) for Portugal, Annual, 1997-2012, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
Source: World Bank, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
From 2009 the deficit increased dramatically as it did in most European economies 
during this time, to 9.3 per cent of GDP from 2.7 percent in 2008 (Lourtie 2011, 14). 
Portuguese governments responded to international market pressure following the 
Greek and Irish bailouts by introducing new austerity programmes (Lourtie 2011, 20). 
Nevertheless, as the eurozone continued to drift from crisis summit to crisis summit 
during 2010, Portuguese borrowing costs soared. As Lourtie notes, for Portugal in 2010 
and 2011:  
“Even the agreement reached late in the evening of Friday, 29 October, between 
the Portuguese government and the main opposition party (PSD) on the strong 
austerity 2011 budget, after very difficult and tense negotiations, had no positive 
effect on bond prices. It was clear by then that good news at national level could 
always be trumped by bad ones at European level” (Lourtie 2011, 20). 
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Although Portugal was, to an important extent, a victim of contagion during this time, 
this contagion fed off the longer term structural vulnerabilities of the Portuguese 
economic trajectory. This chapter has traced the emergence of these vulnerabilities since 
1974, and argued that it was Portugal’s transformation into a ‘debt-led domestic 
demand’ model of growth as a result of adapting to European Integration during the mid 
1980s and 1990s that can account for its active divergence. As such, Portugal was not 
hit relatively hard by the crisis because it failed to converge. Rather, it was hit relatively 
hard because its attempts to converge led, unsurprisingly, to unintended consequences. 
As such, following the rules of European modernity, rather than failing to, is what 
accounts for the origins of the crisis in the case of Portugal.  
 
Conclusion 
This case study provides an account of Portugal’s evolving economic trajectory since 
1974 in order to understand why it suffered relatively severely as a result of the 
eurozone crisis. The ‘difficult’ Portuguese crisis can be understood as follows. During 
the 1980s a process of structural reforms, facilitated by the EU, created a new 
institutional structure that allowed the expansion of economic growth in the non-
tradable sector via the financial sector. The growth of these sectors was not the aim of 
the reforms but rather an unintended consequence of measures taken to stabilise the 
political and economic volatility of the two decades following the 1974 revolution. 
Secondly, the limits of this new model became evident in the early 2000s when 
declining export competitiveness was not counterbalanced by domestic demand led 
growth – because of over-indebtedness. This led to a prolonged recession, placing 
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Portugal in a particularly vulnerable position in the context of the Greek and Irish crises 
in 2011. 
 Much like Greece, tracing the transformation of the Portuguese economic 
trajectory has highlighted the importance of European integration. Two economic crises 
bookended the narrative offered here. Following the instability of the revolutionary 
period, the PSD governments of the 1980s and 1990s turned towards Europe, and 
implemented reforms necessary to join the Single Market and EMU. Implementing 
these reforms transformed the Portuguese economy during the 1990s into an inward 
looking, debt driven patterns of growth. It was this transformation that led to Portugal’s 
current difficulties. This leads to a remarkable conclusion. Although its trajectory was 
markedly different to Greece, Portugal’s economic crisis was also set in motion by 
deepening European integration. This is an important correction to the narrative of the 
immaturity thesis. This chapter has also challenged narratives of victimisation. Portugal 
was not passively exploited by a neoliberal European project – rather Portugal actively 
participated and negotiated its own European integration in an effort to consolidate its 
democracy and advance its own modernisation. In addition, Portugal’s declining 
competitiveness was not the result of any core-periphery dynamic – in fact, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as East Asia, represented the biggest 
threats to Portugal’s export led growth. Furthermore, debt-led growth did not undermine 
the productive base of the Portuguese economy – it is better understood as a response to 
a situation where export-led growth was already in marked decline.  
Portugal, like Greece, illustrates the damage caused by a small, peripheral 
European economy’s attempt to pursue an agenda of modernisation via an attempt to 
adapt to a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration. So far, the experience of 
these two countries builds towards a fundamental critique of the project of European 
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integration since the late 1980s. Namely, we can see that the European project – through 
the promotion of convergence, has in fact been generative of specific patterns of 
divergence in these two cases. In the next chapter I will depart from Southern Europe to 
the North Atlantic to explore the origins of this thesis’ final case study, the Irish 
financial crisis. Ireland followed an equally distinct path to its own crisis. I will 
nevertheless examine whether a similarly problematic experience of Europeanisation 
can be identified. 
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4 
The Decline of the Celtic Tiger and the Origins of 
the Irish Banking Crisis 
 
What really makes Ireland attractive to corporate America is the kind of 
economy we have created here. When Americans come here they find a country 
that believes in the incentive power of low taxation. They find a country that 
believes in economic liberalisation, they find a country that believes in essential 
regulation, but not over regulation. 
Mary Harney, former Tánaiste of Ireland, 2000.65 
 
How did Ireland get into its current bind? By being just like us, only more so. 
Paul Krugman, 2009. 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the origins of the Irish banking crisis. In the two decades before 
the eurozone crisis, Ireland was the poster child of European integration and a 
‘showpiece of Globalisation’ (Kirby 2010, 3). From the mid-1990s onwards, its 
economy grew at a rate of three times the European average and within four years its 
                                                          
65 Quoted in Laffan and O’Mahony (2008, 234). 
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unemployment rate more than halved. Stunningly, this growth was export-led and 
driven by a high profile, high-tech manufacturing sector, not to mention achieved with 
some of the lowest levels of public debt and spending in the continent. Fast forward to 
2008 and Ireland was in the midst of a banking crisis that the IMF claimed to be among 
‘the most severe in world economic history’ (quoted in Ó Riain 2014, 240).  
Irish public debt soared from 25 per cent to 110 per cent as a consequence of the 
state issuing a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities in 2008 to the tune of €440 billion 
(Cooper 2012; Hendrikse 2013, 192).  Over the next three years, bond yields on Irish 
sovereign debt reached unsustainable levels. Unemployment levels approached 15 per 
cent in 2012 and an unprecedented fiscal crisis developed as Ireland had become overly 
reliant on property related taxes which had collapsed following the end of the property 
boom (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012, 95-96). On November 29th 2010, just over 
fifteen years after a Morgan Stanley report drew world attention to Ireland’s miracle 
‘Celtic Tiger’ economy (O’Hearn 1998, 1) the Irish government found itself responding 
to the most severe economic crisis the country had faced since gaining independence. It 
was forced to negotiate a financial assistance package with the ECB, EU and the IMF 
totalling €85 billion.  
This final case study is a story of the replacement of Ireland’s ‘miraculous’ 
export led growth of the 1990s with unsustainable debt-led growth in the 2000s. I 
explore this shift, as I did in the previous case studies, by situating the Irish banking 
crisis within a longer history of Ireland’s evolving economic trajectory.  
In section one I begin by briefly framing the argument in relation to two 
important explanations of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger and financial crisis. The first and 
arguably most dominant perspective argues that we should make an analytical 
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distinction between the Celtic Tiger of the 1990s and the property bubble of the 2000s. 
The former was hijacked, squandered and supplanted by immature political and 
economic governance from the late 1990s onwards.  
The second perspective emerges as a critique of this analysis, as well as in an 
earlier iteration, a critique of the self-congratulatory readings of Ireland’s growth during 
the 1990s (O’Hearn 1998). It claims that the lightly-regulated, low tax regime that was 
so successful at attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), during the 1990s, contained 
the seeds of the property boom and banking crisis during the 2000s. The property boom, 
in other words, is the other side of the Celtic Tiger coin.  
Challenging each of these perspectives, I argue that an analytical split should 
indeed be made between Ireland’s export boom and debt-led boom, but I also suggest 
that authors such as Ó Riain (2014), Hardiman (2012) and others (Honohan 2010; 
Nyberg 2011; Regling and Watson 2010; Whelan 2013; Lane 2011; Drudy and Collins 
2011, 342–244) have not paid enough attention to the international, European, and pre-
2000 origins of the Irish property boom.   
In sections two and three I provide evidence for the claim that the property 
boom emerged in a context of Ireland’s deepening European Integration. Section two 
discusses the rise and fall of Ireland’s export led model of growth. In the 1990s 
Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy was growing at a rate that was three times higher than 
the any other EU state, yet from 2000 onwards, this growth became undermined by the 
dot-com crash, registering a significant decline in growth and falling investment 
between 2001-2003. Although it recovered after this period, new forms of economic 
growth sidelined the export-led growth for most of the 2000s. This downturn reveals the 
limitations of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger, in that it was always highly vulnerable to 
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international shocks and, in particular, the performance of the US economy. I argue, 
however, that it is misleading to locate the origins of the property boom, specifically, in 
the institutions and polices that made the export boom possible. 
Section three discusses the (much overlooked) parallel emergence of the 
conditions for the property and banking crisis during the 1980s and 1990s. Ireland’s 
banking and financial sectors transformed since the late 1980s as a result of preparing 
for the Single Market and EMU. This boom could not have occurred without the 
changes to the Irish banking and financial sector following the liberalisation and 
deregulation associated with the re-launched European project in the late 1980s. The 
story of Ireland’s debt-led development, and the institutions that underpinned it since 
the late 1980s, needs to be taken more seriously.  
The experience of Ireland presents an intriguing conclusion. ‘Following the 
rules’ of modernisation and European Integration, as Ireland was widely considered to 
have done, does not necessarily lead to sustainable economic growth. In fact, doing so 
actually threatened sustainable economic growth in Ireland. As Paul Krugman notes, 
Ireland got into its current bind ‘[b]y being just like us, only more so’ (2009). 
 
Section One: The Celtic Tiger: Contesting the link between export and 
debt-led growth 
Was the Irish banking crisis a departure from the export led growth of the 1990s, or an 
unintended outcome of it? Scholarly opinion is divided. Most narratives of the Irish 
property boom and bust begin with the election of the 1997 Fianna Fáil-Progressive 
167 
 
 
Democrat coalition government.66  This is typically cited as the moment where the 
export-led growth of the 1990s began to be undermined by a decade of expansionary, 
short-sighted misgovernment during the 2000s.67  As the argument goes, Irish 
politicians helped generate the bubble through changes in national and investment 
politics. The 1997 coalition government combined the populist ‘growth machine’ 
approach of the centre-right Fianna Fáil party with the liberalising economic policies of 
the conservative-liberal Progressive Democrats (PDs). As early as 1998 this government 
had slashed capital gains tax in half, with the explicit intention of injecting untapped 
capital into the economy. They more than succeeded in this goal and capital flowed into 
property and construction; signalling a newly emerging dynamic in Irish investment 
politics (Ó Riain 2012, 506). 
Irish governments during this period are often accused of actively encouraging, 
rather than restraining credit fuelled property development during this period (Kirby 
2010, 9). Hardiman notes that Irish politics has consistently had a tendency to use 
taxation to garner political support. This continued into the 2000s when the former Irish 
Minister for Finance Charlie McCreevy – now infamous for his ‘when I have it I spend 
it, when I don’t I don’t’ aphorism on fiscal policy –  pursued politically driven 
reductions in income tax, damaging the profile of exchequer returns and contributing to 
inflationary spending (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012, 95).  
In addition, as I noted in chapter one, Fianna Fáil led governments are noted to 
have had close personal as well as financial links between bankers, property developers, 
builders and politicians (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012), 92; see also Byrne 2012). The 
                                                          
66 For overviews, see the following accounts: Honohan and Walsh 2002; Whelan 2013; Lane 2011; 
Ahearne, Schmitz, and von Hagen 2011; Hardiman 2012; Hardiman and Dellepiane 2010; Hardiman 
2010; Honohan and Leddin 2005; see Ó Riain 2014, 36-38 and Kinsella 2012. 
67 This is widely influential assessment. See Honohan 2010; O’Toole 2010; Ross 2010; Byrne 2012; 
Carswell 2012; Cooper 2012; Hardiman 2012; Ó Riain 2012; Ó Riain 2014. 
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accusation, which is ubiquitous in the popular consciousness in Ireland, is that bankers 
and property developers exercised undue influence on Irish politicians (see for example 
O’Toole 2010; Ross 2010; Carswell 2012; Cooper 2012). 
The theoretical explanation that is implied within this narrative (the Irish version 
of the immaturity thesis) is that the property boom of the 2000s represents a 
discontinuity with the export boom of the 1990s, and moreover, it represents the 
overwhelming of the productive, sustainable growth Ireland had worked hard to achieve 
in the 1990s (Ó Riain 2012). In a manner of speaking, there is no contradiction between 
Ireland’s status as the ‘poster child’ for European Integration in the 1990s, and its 
membership of the PIIGS in 2010. Immature patterns of governance hijacked and 
reversed the mature growth of the 1990s. Ireland’s Celtic Tiger was squandered, it was 
sank by ‘stupidity and corruption’ (O’Toole 2010). 
 However, this reading of the Irish crisis has been widely challenged. It is an 
explanation that is grounded in an earlier and still influential literature on the origins of 
the Celtic Tiger export boom. Honohan and Walsh (2002) and others (see Whelan 2010; 
Lane 2011; Ahearne et al. 2011; see Ó Riain 2014, 36-38 and Kinsella 2012 for 
overviews) understand the unprecedented growth of the Celtic Tiger era as a case of 
‘delayed convergence’. Since the late 1950s, the institutions and polices set up as part of 
the ‘great switch’ (as I discuss in section two) should have led to convergence with 
Western Europe, but in the 1960s and 1970s, successive Irish government’s ‘got the 
policies wrong’– they followed fiscal expansion as a response to the oil crisis which 
caused inflation, raised wages thereby damaging competitiveness and discouraging 
productive growth (see Ó Riain 2014, 36).  
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In 1987, when the newly elected Fianna Fáil government finally ‘got the policies 
right’, expansionary fiscal contraction took place (Kinsella 2012; Barry 2003), and 
convergence flowed rapidly, as if it had been water building up behind a dam that had 
just been demolished. As Ó Riain (2014) notes, this is in many respects the standard 
account of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger, and remains a key reference point for accounts of the 
crisis, when after the 2000s, policymakers ‘got the policies wrong’ once again. (36).  
 The ‘delayed convergence’ reading explains economic transformation as having 
been achieved through market liberalisation. This has been strongly and frequently 
contested by a literature that focuses instead on the crucial role played by the state in 
generating Ireland’s convergence. Scholars have correctly pointed out that Ireland’s 
success cannot be reduced simply to the liberalisation of markets (Murphy and Kirby 
2007).  Critical political economists such as O’Hearn (1998; 2001) and others 
(Wickham 1980; Crotty 1987; Mac Laughlin 1994) stress the central role played by the 
state in reshaping the Irish economy. They often argue that Ireland has gone through a 
pattern of ‘dependent export oriented development’ (Kirby 2010, 95) where indigenous 
industry is neglected by the state in favour of attracting FDI through opening up and 
free trade. Irish governments have attempted to attract multinational corporations to 
invest in Ireland by offering low taxes and a ‘hands off’ government attitude towards 
business (O’Hearn 1998). O’Hearn notes that Irish governments have fostered a liberal 
environment for US MNCs to accumulate substantial wealth, but in spite of its high 
profile, these sectors have never created substantial numbers of jobs (O’Hearn 1998, 
165). Moreover, in reshaping the Irish state in order to be as attractive as possible to US 
MNCs, successive Irish governments have pitted economic growth against social 
prosperity (O’Hearn 1998, 165).    
170 
 
 
These approaches also typically shed light on the inequality that has 
accompanied the Celtic Tiger boom, and point out the various ways in which GDP 
growth has been illusory, oftentimes an artefact of corporate accounting and a 
conflation of ‘growth’ with ‘development’ (Kirby 2010, 92). One author within this 
literature recalls how such analysis was received as ‘begrudgery’ during the boom years 
(O’Hearn 1998), and notes that refrains about how such arguments were akin to ‘talking 
down the economy’ became a common accusation during the 2000s. Former Taoiseach 
of Ireland, Bertie Ahern who was very much at the helm during the property boom 
infamously remarked when addressing an Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 
conference in Belfast that:  
sitting on the sidelines, cribbing and moaning is a lost opportunity. I don't know 
how people who engage in that don't commit suicide because frankly the only 
thing that motivates me is being able to actively change something (RTÉ News 
2007). 
 
In the wake of the crisis, this critique of the Celtic Tiger period has led authors 
such as Kirby (2010; 2002; Kirby 2004; Kirby and Murphy 2011; Murphy and Kirby 
2007) to emphasise the continuity between the Celtic Tiger export model and the 
speculative property bubble. As this argument goes, the property bubble should not be 
understood as a departure from the patterns of the 1990s. Free market principles, 
deliberately weak regulation and low levels of taxation and expenditure may have 
underpinned the export-led growth of the 1990s, but these policies and institutions also 
left Ireland particularly vulnerable to financial crisis in 2008 (Ó Riain 2014, 37; Kirby 
and Murphy 2011; Kitchin et al. 2012). Kirby sums up this argument: 
The reliance on stimulating an unsustainable construction boom to replace the 
growth model based on FDI and the role of the very lightly regulated banks in 
facilitating this, was the proximate cause, but the vulnerabilities this has exposed 
in the capacity and resilience of the Irish state derive from the low-tax regime 
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that was seen as the central policy mechanism for attracting foreign investment. 
Behind these lie the role of the state and the ways in which it understood the 
opportunities of globalisation. What has collapsed therefore is Ireland’s 
dependent low-tax model of state led development (Kirby 2010, 9 [italics 
added]). 
 
Kirby’s work on the Celtic Tiger highlights the limitations and contradictions in 
a model of growth that was overly-reliant on FDI; less a ‘Celtic Tiger’ and more a ‘U.S 
Tiger caged in a Celtic Zoo’ (Kirby 2010, 149); as well as illuminating a number of 
social and welfare failures that accompanied the Irish ‘competition state’ (Kirby 2010, 
Kirby and Murphy 2011). Yet, Ó Riain (2004; 2014) criticises Kirby for having no 
positive account of the causes of change in the Celtic Tiger. Although he welcomes 
Kirby’s critique of the cheerleading for the Celtic Tiger, he criticises the overall thrust 
of the argument for failing to take seriously the extensive change that has occurred in 
Ireland, whether or not the character of it should be taken to task (Ó Riain 2004, 9). 
This critical approach is successful in highlighting some of the reasons why export-led 
growth did not continue during the 2000s. Yet, it is less convincing in explaining the 
origins of the debt-led boom that replaced it – often assuming that the demand led 
growth and low tax regime that accompanied the Celtic Tiger, would inevitably lead to 
a housing bubble (which was not straightforwardly the case in either Greece or Portugal 
following similar demand led growth in the 1990s).   
As Kirby himself recognises criticising the dependency theory approach of 
O’Hearn (1998), the notion that multinationals are simply ‘draining capital’ from the 
Irish national economy is difficult to support. In fact, far from a relationship of 
dependence, Ireland has received substantial net economic and financial gains to its 
economy (Kirby 2010, 95). It is clear that dismissing the Celtic Tiger boom as simply 
illusory, or as preamble before the speculative boom is limiting. As I argue in section 
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two, brand new patterns of economic activity emerged across Ireland during this period, 
and as the empirical thrust of Kirby’s (2010) analysis concedes, we still require some 
sort of proximate explanation for the dramatic shift that this model went through circa 
2000. 
These competing perspectives leave us with a puzzle for explaining the link 
between the Celtic Tiger and the banking crisis.68 The existing debate has left us with a 
choice between problematically conflating these two very distinctive patterns of growth, 
and falling back upon the narrow internalist assumptions of the immaturity thesis to 
account for an analytical distinction. As a way out of this puzzle, I argue in section two 
that during the 1990s, the Irish economy did indeed undergo a significant 
transformation – which the challenges of Kirby (2002, 2010) and O’Hearn (1998; 2001) 
downplay by reinterpreting the decline of the Celtic Tiger as bound up in the ‘logics’ of 
its initial, illusory, success. While I go on to argue in section three that Ó Riain and 
others have in turn neglected the impact of European integration on this transformation, 
I first focus on how Ireland managed to succeed in achieving genuine, albeit vulnerable, 
export-led growth that should be understood as distinct from the property boom. This 
distinction is important to make because, as I later argue, it clears the ground for an 
alternative explanation of the origins of Ireland’s property boom. As was the case with 
Greece and Portugal, in doing so, I draw out the key role played by Ireland’s adaptation 
to European integration.  
 
 
 
                                                          
68 See Kirby (2010, 71-217) for a close to exhaustive account of the different perspectives. 
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Section Two: Export led growth: Ireland’s Celtic Tiger - 1987-2001 
A 1980s advertisement by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA)69  aimed to 
attract US businesses to invest in Ireland – ‘we’re the young Europeans’, it ventured 
(New York Times 1984). By 1994, the young Europeans were overtaking the old as 
their ‘Celtic Tiger’ model of export-led growth gained Ireland international acclaim that 
it was quite unaccustomed to. As Kitchin et al. note:  
[p]oliticians, policy makers, economists, academics, practitioners, think-tank 
gurus, and journalists from around the world flocked to Ireland to be inducted in 
the art of best practice in fast-track growth, and former Irish leaders have gone 
on global lecture tours espousing the so-called benefits of the ‘Irish model’ of 
neoliberal economic reform for countries wishing to fast-track modernisation 
(2012, 1302-3).  
 
In this section I trace the rise and decline of Ireland’s export-led pattern of growth 
during the period of 1987-2001. I briefly account for some ‘pre-history’ – tracing the 
institutional innovations of the ‘Great Switch’ in 1959 that marked the beginning of 
Ireland’s attempts to develop export-led strategies of modernisation. I then offer an 
account of the unprecedented growth of the Celtic Tiger era from 1987-2001, when 
Ireland began to experience growth rates and falling unemployment that set it very 
much apart from its Southern European, and at times, its Western European neighbours. 
I subsequently highlight some of the limitations of this pattern of growth, drawing 
particular attention to its vulnerability to changing international economic 
circumstances. Finally, I emphasise the distinction between the Celtic Tiger, and the 
banking crisis that was to follow. 
 
                                                          
69 Renamed the Industrial Development Agency (Ireland), or IDA Ireland, in 1994. 
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The ‘Great Switch’: From economic nationalism to export-led growth  
As late as 1990, Irish historian Joe Lee declared Ireland to be the ‘economic laggard of 
Europe’ (1990). The OECD similarly notes how economists tended to label Ireland as 
the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ throughout the 1980s (OECD 2009). Breznitz notes that even 
as late as 1995, ‘observers considered Ireland’s economic performance one of 
continuous failure’ (Guimard, 1995 quoted in Breznitz 2012, 87). The legacy of 
Ireland’s colonial past had weighed heavily on its fledgling projects of modernisation. 
At effective independence70 in 1922, Ireland found itself with underdeveloped capitalist 
and working classes, little to no industry, and a relatively impoverished population 
(O’Hearn, 1998, 35). Agriculture accounted for almost half of the Irish economy, and 
98 per cent of exports went to Britain. Ireland had little control over its monetary policy 
as the new Irish currency, the punt, was tied to the sterling. Non-agricultural activity in 
the economy was characterised by small shop-owners, small professional elites, 
artisans, and transport and services workers (O’Hearn 1998; Kirby 2010; Crotty 1987; 
Lynn 2010, 64–74).  
By the mid-1950s various projects of economic nationalism aimed at 
modernising and industrialising Ireland had little success, creating political and 
economic crises for the new state. The first Fianna Fáil government of 1932, led by 
Éamon de Valera, instigated economic programmes that promised economic self-
sufficiency (O’Hearn 1998, 36). An extensive regime of protection of infant industrial 
industries was pursued by de Valera, with the average tariff level rising from 9 per cent 
in 1931, to 45 per cent in 1945  (Kirby 2010, 17). Despite initial success, the 
developmental nationalism project was in chaos by the 1950s. As O’Hearn notes, by 
                                                          
70 ‘The Irish Free State’, a self governing ‘Dominion’, was created in 1922 following the ending of the 
War of Independence and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Ireland only officially became an 
independent Republic in 1949. 
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1955 industrial production had fallen by 3 per cent, agricultural production by 7 per cent 
and GNP by 1.3 per cent. Employment fell by almost 10 per cent between 1951 and 
1956, and census results revealed that Ireland’s population had declined by 2.11 per 
cent over the same period (O’ Hearn 1998, 38).71 The Irish state was facing mounting 
pressure to address this economic situation. This led ultimately to the ‘great switch’ of 
1959, the period when Ireland began to actively follow a project of export-led growth, 
facilitated through the successful attraction of FDI, coming primarily from the US. This 
was channelled into high-tech sectors that were new to Ireland, namely in computing, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, metals and engineering (Kirby 2010).  
A young generation of Irish politicians pioneered a radical strategy of 
modernisation during the 1950s and 1960s that favoured export-orientation and the 
promotion of free trade. Éamon de Valera retired as Taoiseach in 1959 and was replaced 
by Seán Lemass. This marked a new era for Ireland’s political economy, which was 
signalled by the publication of the First Programme for Economic Expansion, covering 
the period 1959-63 (Kirby 2010, 19). Lemass and his secretary of the Department of 
Finance, T.K. Whitaker, are largely credited with setting in motion the three elements 
that characterise the liberal export-led model of Irish growth which kicked off the Celtic 
Tiger decades later; the use of grants and tax concessions to encourage the development 
of an export-oriented sector, the attraction of FDI (especially in manufacturing) and the 
dismantling of protection in order to gain greater access to international markets (Kirby 
2010, 20). Ireland unilaterally reduced tariffs by ten per cent on two occasions during 
the 1960s, and also negotiated the Anglo-Irish free trade agreement which came into 
effect in 1966. EEC accession in 1973 provided a five year window for Ireland to 
establish free trade with all EEC member states (Kirby 2010, 20). The Irish state also 
                                                          
71 Fears about the ‘vanishing Irish’ were common, see (O’Brien 1953). 
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offered grants and, crucially, tax concessions to manufacturing and later financial 
services companies – in a number of predecessor arrangements to Ireland’s well-known 
12.5 per cent corporation tax rate. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) became 
a key (semi-state) agency, with similarities to the agencies of East Asian Tigers, and 
played a ‘hunter-gatherer’ role in attracting foreign firms (Kirby 2010, 20; O Hearn 
1998; Ó Riain 2004, 2014). Crucially, the IDA identified electronics as a key sector in 
1974, and focused on attracting investment from the US in that sector, meaning that 
investment in post-1973 Ireland was decidedly ‘modern’ (O’Hearn 1998, 40). 
Kirby notes that initially, this programme was expected to make indigenous 
industry more attractive, and few foresaw the pivotal role that FDI would ultimately 
play (2010, 20). In 1983 there were almost a thousand foreign firms in Ireland and they 
had invested over I£4 billion in the economy (Kirby 2010, 20).72 The shift to US 
investment came during a period of rapid world-wide investment in high-tech sectors 
such as electronics. Ireland’s membership of the EEC, where free imports of 
intermediate goods into Ireland, and re-exports of final products to the rest of Europe 
from there, proved to be a powerful attraction for American-based firms (O’Hearn 1998, 
41).  Yet, this export-oriented strategy, while somewhat successful, did not lead 
anywhere close to the kind of growth levels that would eventually characterise the 
Celtic Tiger. By the 1970s and 1980s ‘Ireland was in kind of a funk’ (O’Hearn 1998, 
55). Initial optimism over EC membership quickly subsided as industrial growth 
appeared to be short term. Also, while some (mostly larger) farmers experienced a rise 
in incomes, in the early decades Ireland’s export-orientation strategy ‘turned into a 
nightmare of emigration and unemployment’ (O Hearn 1998, 55).  
 
                                                          
72 I£ refers to the Irish punt. 
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The Celtic Tiger – 1987-2001 
Few could have predicted the turnaround of the 1990s. The country found itself in a 
position to use the institutions and policies of the Great Switch to take advantage of a 
booming US economy, together with the new opportunities and increased attractiveness 
of Ireland as a destination for FDI due its membership of the recently ‘completed’ 
European Single Market (Cahill and O’Donnell 2010). 
Existing literature tends to split Ireland’s export-led boom into three phases (Ó 
Riain 2014, 2008; Kirby 2010, 32). The first phase begins with ‘1987 and all that’ (Ó 
Riain 2014, 50) the typical start date of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger. The newly elected Fianna 
Fáil government led by the charismatic and divisive Charles J. Haughey (Joyce and 
Murtagh 1983) introduced a number of significant new policies and institutions, 
including Social Partnership, ‘one of the longest historical unbroken series of 
corporatist national social pacts’ (Ó Riain 2014, 177); as well as an ambitious project of 
fiscal consolidation, representing ‘the moment Ireland got its house in order’ (Kinsella 
2012, 233). Ireland succeeded in reducing its public debt levels from 112 per cent of 
GDP in 1986 to 25 per cent in 2007 (Kinsella 2012, 233).  
Yet, as Kirby notes, at first recovery was quite modest with growth averaging at 
about 3.6 per cent of GNP between 1987 and 1993 and by the latter year 294,000 people 
remained unemployed (Kirby 2010, 32). While it is true that Ireland began to exit a long 
history of recession, growing unemployment and structural emigration during this 
period, progress consisted largely of ‘jobless growth’. The radical increases in the 
employment rate and the reversal of emigration did not take place until after 1994 (Ó 
Riain 2014, 53). Overall, the recovery of this first period was a mixed affair, even 
seeing an upturn in unemployment towards the middle of the 1990s – with the 
international recession of 1991 and the departure of computer manufacturing companies 
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in that same year especially. The recovery of these years was certainly welcome, but it 
was difficult to anticipate the growth that was to follow (Ó Riain 2014, 54).       
The second phase of the Celtic Tiger is best represented by the GNP73 growth, 
and the dramatic decline in unemployment, of 1994-2000. In the 1990s, GNP growth 
ran at over 10 per cent per annum and unemployment fell from 15 per cent in 1994 to 4 
per cent in 2000. From 1980 – 2000 Ireland attracted 40 per cent of US electronics FDI 
that went to Europe. Firms were undoubtedly attracted by corporate tax rates of zero to 
12.5 per cent at different time periods, pools of skilled labour, a highly supportive state, 
and increasingly improved technological and innovation capacities (Ó Riain 2014, 52; 
Lynn 2011 67). Even as Ireland lost some manufacturing employment during this 
period, FDI attraction became more sophisticated, and various evidence has suggested 
that labour cost competitiveness was only one factor of many considered by investors 
(and it was to become less and less important as years went on, see Brazys and Regan 
2015). Skilled and educated labour, according to Ó Riain, were crucial to increased 
inward investment during this period– and government policy had gone some way to 
target and encourage education in science, technology and engineering (Ó Riain 2014, 
50; 2004). The population grew and there was very significant return migration from 
about 1996 onwards (Ó Riain 2014, 54). Average incomes rose by 34 per cent between 
1994 and 2001 (Kirby 2010, 32). Remarkably, throughout all of this, wage pressure and 
inflation remained relatively subdued, and government finances continued to be 
consolidated (Ó Riain 2014, 54). As Ó Riain notes, in 1999, 40 per cent of public 
spending went on redeeming securities and loan repayments as government receipts 
increased, with an additional 4 per cent directed to the repayment of interest on national 
                                                          
73 GNP is a better measure than GDP due to the key role of FDI in Ireland’s economy. 
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debt. In other words, Irish governments took advantage of high growth rates to 
overcome their debt crisis during this period (Ó Riain 2014, 55).  
Ó Riain refers to this period as Ireland’s ‘developmentalist phase’ (Ó Riain 
2014, 184-86).  Ireland became the second richest country in the EU (after 
Luxembourg), moving from a position of about 60 per cent of EU per capita income (a 
position it had held since EEC accession in 1973) to 145.4 per cent in 2006 (Kirby 
2010, 32-33). Unlike Greece and Portugal during the 1990s, Irish growth was driven by 
a boom in exports, facilitated largely by US FDI in high-tech sectors (Ó Riain 2014, 
55). Ireland was certainly in the right place at the right time, but the institutional and 
policy legacy of the ‘Great Switch’ made such growth possible during the 1990s. As 
such, its 1990s boom should be set apart from that of the other cases in this study. All 
three countries experienced unprecedented GDP growth during the 1990s, but Ireland 
was the only one that appeared to be doing so via sustainable export-led development.74 
 
The decline of Ireland’s export-led growth 
The massive influence and importance of US FDI for economic growth in Ireland is 
unquestionable. This meant that the profile of Irish growth during the 1990s was 
incredibly vulnerable to fluctuations in the US economy and to changing levels of FDI. 
Denis O’Hearn (1998) has noted that perhaps the most startling thing about Ireland’s 
increased dependence on MNCs is not simply their share of GDP but their domination 
of economic growth. He notes that MNCs were responsible for 45 per cent of GDP 
growth during from 1990-95, and were indirectly responsible for an unknown additional 
amount of growth (O’ Hearn 1998: 72, 73).  
                                                          
74 But naturally, as I show in section three, Ireland’s export-led growth is not the only story to be told 
about this period. 
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Ireland’s vulnerability was made apparent during the third period of the Celtic 
Tiger, 2001-2003, when export growth actually began to decline. This was in large part 
due to Ireland’s particular exposure to those sectors affected by the dot-com crash (see 
figure 4.1). US investment was also negatively affected by 9/11, from an annual average 
of 17.6 per cent between 1995 and 2000 to an average of 4.9 per cent annually between 
2001 and 2006 (Kirby 2008, 16). After a decade of sustained growth, Ireland was losing 
the inflows that had characterised, and arguably defined the economic success of the 
Celtic Tiger era, as figure 4.1 shows.  
 
Figure 4.1 Amount of FDI Inflows (in US Dollars) from the US to Ireland  
Source: UNCTAD 
A 2002 IDA Annual Report reveals also that the year 2001 marked the first time since 
1993 that employment dropped in IDA supported companies, never to come close to 
recovering the same percentage employment (IDA Ireland 2002) (see figure 4.2). In the 
year 2000, employment in IDA supported companies increased from the previous year 
by 11.7 per cent. In 2001 it fell by 3.2 per cent, and again by 3.2 per cent in 2002 and by 
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2.5 per cent in 2003. Percentage change in full time employment averaged at 1 per cent 
from 2001 until 2008. This is contrast to the period from 1994 – 2000, where it 
averaged at 8.2 per cent. 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage change in net employment in IDA supported companies.  
Source: IDA Annual Reports 
 
In addition to falling investment and employment, the value of Ireland’s merchandise 
exports in 2006 was less than it was in 2002 and crucially, for an ‘export-led country’, 
Ireland’s balance of payments moved from a position of balance in 2003 to a deficit of 
3.3 per cent of GDP in 2006 (Kirby 2010, 35; see figure 4.3).  
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
182 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Ireland’s Current account balance (percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
 
Kirby quotes Tansey (2007) – ‘the Celtic Tiger economy met its end in 2001’ (in Kirby 
2010, 35). Export-led growth was to pick up again, and is arguably underpinning 
Ireland’s recovery in 2015 (Brazys and Regan 2015). But at the time, vulnerability to 
falling FDI contributed to a massive shift away from Ireland’s ‘developmentalist phase’, 
and the economy has seen nothing like the Celtic Tiger since 2001.  Yet, even accepting 
all of this, as I now discuss, the limitations of Ireland’s export-led growth should not be 
understood as the same as the causes of its debt-led growth. 
 
A boom without a bubble: towards a new account of Ireland’s debt-led growth 
It was during this period of uncertainty and downturn (2001-2003) that the Irish 
property bubble began to kick off. As I suggested in section one, Kirby and others have 
argued that the origins of the speculative property boom are to be found in the 
weaknesses of the Celtic Tiger export-led model of the 1990s. There are a number of 
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problems with this argument. Firstly, it tends to under-specify the linkages between the 
Celtic Tiger’s institutional set up and the origins of the property bubble. Secondly, in 
conflating the Celtic Tiger and the property boom into a singular, non-interrupted 
trajectory, the genuine promise of the Celtic Tiger that authors such as (Ó Riain 2004; Ó 
Riain 2014) recognise is denied. This is a particular problem, because it misses out on a 
fundamental critique of Ireland’s relationship with European integration. As I argue in 
section three, such analysis overlooks the possibility that there are other, potentially 
discrete causes of Ireland’s debt-led growth. Crucially, certain aspects of Ireland’s 
European integration contributed to the undermining and damaging of a peripheral 
economy that actually had effectively ‘done everything right’. 
The links between the various market and non-market state-led strategies of 
attracting inward investment and credit-fuelled property development are not usually 
clearly defined by critical analysis of Ireland’s crisis (see Kirby 2010, 156-160 
especially). Neoliberalism is often evoked as a ‘black box’ to account for the increasing 
prevalence of market logics across both the Celtic Tiger period and the 2000s (Kirby 
2010, 164). Yet, authors such as Kirby fail to trace, historically the concrete linkages 
between ‘a particular type of market economy…highly dependent on high levels of FDI 
and ever attentive to the needs of these foreign corporations’ (Kirby 2010, 164) and the 
property boom; instead, the linkage is taken for granted.  
In fact, such analysis tends to need to rely on assumptions of the immaturity 
thesis to bridge their critique of the Celtic Tiger with their analysis of the origins of the 
property bubble. Kirby and others tend to over-emphasise the significance of certain 
‘market forms’ of FDI attraction when discussing the Celtic Tiger period. Light touch 
regulation is a clear linkage between both periods and was an important strategy for the 
attraction of the financial services sector, but less so for other sectors such as 
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manufacturing and software. In fact, a strong and reliable regulatory infrastructure has 
been argued to be a central reason why Ireland managed to hang on to its 
pharmaceutical sector in the wake of the EU’s enlargement to the CEECs (Barry 2004, 
844) Similarly, although low corporation tax is more clearly important across sectors, 
the link between Ireland as a ‘low tax regime’ in this respect, and the damaging of 
Ireland’s fiscal profile in the 2000s does not stack up well with the reality that when the 
export-boom was at its height, the tax base was not skewed towards unsustainable 
revenues, and fiscal consolidation was being strongly pursued. 
Additionally, as Brazys and Regan (2015) argue, ‘non-market’ forms of FDI 
attraction were just as important as the well-known ‘market forms’. Of key significance 
is the long standing institutional commitment by public sector agencies to attract inward 
investment from global firms in high-technology sectors (Brazys and Regan 2015, 6). 
The authors emphasise the ‘non-market forms’ of coordination that have been 
instrumental in attracting large global firms to Ireland, including:  
informal networking, hard political bargaining and the active marketing of 
Ireland’s low corporate tax regime, and their willingness to partner in a 
readymade business model (Brazys and Regan 2015, 6).  
 
 Viewing the property boom as caused by the Celtic Tiger belies an important 
distinction that ought to be made between Ireland’s export-led growth and its latter-day 
debt-led growth (see Kinsella 2012, 572). Certainly, Kirby et al. are correct to highlight 
some of the social and economic limitations of the Celtic Tiger model of growth. Yet 
the elision of Ireland’s debt-led and export-led growth does a disservice to some of the 
more positive aspects of the modernisation that was achieved during the 1990s. For Ó 
Riain, the Celtic Tiger growth of the 1990s represented a legitimate transformation in 
Ireland’s economy - Ireland can be viewed as a ‘developmental network state’ and as 
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having contained a genuine promise of a more sustainable, socially progressive 
developmentalist trajectory of modernisation – even if this promise went unfulfilled 
(2004, 2014).  Neglecting this distinction is a problem, because, as mentioned, it serves 
to downplay just how significant a discontinuity the property bubble was in the context 
of Ireland’s recent economic trajectory. 
 In this section I traced Ireland’s transformation from a beleaguered peripheral 
European economy to an international success story (Lynn 2011). In spite of its 
limitations – especially with respect to its vulnerability to the fortunes of the US 
economy, the Celtic Tiger was a symbol of Ireland’s hard won modernisation, a model 
that generated high-tech export oriented growth through liberalisation, economic 
integration, and free and open trade. This section sought to sever the analytical link 
between Ireland’s export-led model of growth and the debt-led property boom, in order 
to clear the ground for an alternative account of the origins of the latter. The third and 
final section provides this alternative account. I argue that Ireland’s adaptation to 
European financial integration contributed greatly to the protracted derailment of a 
peripheral country’s successful (at least temporarily) development of export-oriented 
growth.  
 
Section Three: Rethinking the origins of the Irish banking crisis: 1986-
2008 
While section two discussed the evolution of Ireland’s export-led model of growth and 
its place in the narrative of Ireland’s crisis, this section traces the parallel emergence of 
Ireland’s debt-fuelled property bubble. Although Ó Riain (2014) and others are correct 
to make a distinction between the Celtic Tiger and the property boom, such accounts 
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have nevertheless overlooked the important international and European dimensions of 
Ireland’s banking crisis, many of which predate the expansionary fiscal policies of the 
late 1990s and 2000s.  
Some background to the property boom and banking crisis is first provided, 
before going on to trace the longer-term, neglected origins of the Irish property boom. 
The narrative presented in this chapter provides an alternative reading of the Irish crisis 
as developing alongside the Celtic Tiger rather than because of it, due to Ireland’s 
commitment to participation in the euro and the European Single Market.  
 
The Irish Property boom: historical background 
From about 2003-2008, domestic demand replaced export led demand as the main 
driver of Ireland’s economic growth.75 Aggressive lending by the Irish banking system 
propelled a property boom during this period, which began to overwhelm all other 
sectors of the economy (Lane 2012, 2). Following the international recession of 2001 
and because of Ireland’s particular exposure to the dot-com sector, there were 
expectations that Ireland would return to ‘a more ‘normal’ European growth path (Lane 
2012, 6). Instead, a drastic transformation was occurred.  
 White (2010) notes that capital stock in Ireland soared by 157% in real terms 
between 2000 and 2008, and that housing accounted for almost two-thirds of this (1). 
House prices began to break the link with demand in ways they had not done during the 
1990s, as vacancies in private dwellings and office space increased in tandem with 
construction. Ó Riain notes that 89 per cent of all ghost estates in 2010 were granted 
planning permission in the period from 2002 - 2008 (2014, 87). Houses and offices 
                                                          
75 For overviews, see Ó Riain 2014, 61; Kirby 2010; Lane 2011; Regling and Watson 2010; Cooper 2012; 
Drudy and Collins 2011; European Commission 2012; Whelan 2013; Rae and van den Noord 2006. 
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were being built at a level that maintained and increased vacancy levels (Ó Riain 2014, 
90). A 2006 census, carried out at the height of the boom, found that there were 250,000 
empty houses in the country, an astonishing figure for a country with a population of 
just over four million (Lynn 2011, 65). In 1994, the average residential mortgage had 
been just one-and-half times the average industrial wage, but by 2004 that figure had 
risen to five-and-a-half times the average (Lynn 2011, 65).  By 2009, the IMF was 
reporting that Ireland ‘was perhaps the most overheated of all economies’ (IMF 2009, 5 
quoted in Kirby 2010).  
The property bubble was the proximate cause of Ireland’s banking and fiscal 
crisis (Hardiman 2012; Whelan 2013). Following the global credit crunch and falling 
house prices circa 2008, the banking system collapsed, leading the Dáil (Irish 
Parliament) to pass a blanket bank guarantee, effectively converting private bank debt 
into sovereign debt. In 2007 Ireland’s gross debt to GDP ratio was 25 per cent. By 2012 
that had risen to 120 per cent of GDP (Whelan 2013). The Irish state had taken on a 
contingent liability of €440 billion, a sum so large that it would have bankrupted the 
economy many times over if ever called upon (Cooper 2011, 161).  The notorious bank 
guarantee has resonated through the popular Irish imagination as ‘economic treason’76 
(O’Halloran 2011) and it played a key role in making Ireland’s debt appear 
unsustainable to international markets (Whelan 2013, 1, 18); effectively ensuring the 
arrival of the troika to Dublin in November 2011. 
The property bubble also contributed to a fiscal crisis (Dellepiane and Hardiman 
2012, 91). Over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s, the Irish tax base became 
skewed towards construction related taxes, as governments from 1997 onwards reduced 
                                                          
76 A charge first levelled by Eamon Gilmore, former leader of the Irish Labour Party and Tánaiste (deputy 
Prime Minister) from 2011-2014, at the Fianna Fáil/Green Party coalition government responsible for the 
bill; although the guarantee is not without its defenders, see Donovan and Murphy (2013). 
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income taxes and promoted the inflation of the construction sector in various ways 
(Regling and Watson 2010, 5). Taxes on economic activities related to the construction 
boom; namely stamp duty, capital gains tax (although this was cut in half in 1997) and 
VAT began to dominate the tax base, all of which fell dramatically after the property 
crash, no longer becoming effective sources of revenue (Dellepiane and Hardiman 
2012, 95-96).  This left the exchequer in serious trouble once the property bubble burst 
and those receipts stopped flowing. As Whelan argues (2013, 18) even though bank 
debts contributed hugely to this figure– Ireland’s debt to GDP ratio was likely to be well 
over 80 per cent of GDP by 2013. This was due to the gap between government receipts 
and expenditure, not to mention declining GDP.  
As such, Ireland’s second ‘great switch’ to debt-led growth in the 2000s 
damaged the competitiveness and sound public finances that had characterised the 
export led growth of the Celtic Tiger era. In this section I provide a revisionist historical 
account of the origins of this property bubble. I challenge a settled commonplace 
assumption that the boom originated due to pro-cyclical and expansionary fiscal policy 
in the 2000s, by arguing that such accounts neglect to mention that the conditions for 
the banking crisis were set in Ireland as early as 1986. It was from that year on that 
Ireland began to introduce dramatic new reforms relating to the liberalisation and 
deregulation of banking and finance. This not only expanded banking activity, provided 
access to deep international sources of capital, but also contributed to the emergence of 
new patterns of banking activity.  
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The neglected origins of the Irish banking crisis: Ireland’s adaptation to Europe 
As I mentioned in section one, scholarship on the Irish crisis (Whelan 2013; Lane 2011; 
Ahearne, Schmitz, and von Hagen 2011; Hardiman 2012; Hardiman and Dellepiane 
2010; Hardiman 2010; see Ó Riain 2014, 36-38 and Kinsella 2012 for overviews), 
media coverage (for instance, The Economist 2011; English 2013; The Belfast 
Telegraph 2012; Sheahan 2010) and an ongoing Oireachtas banking inquiry (Regling 
and Watson 2010; Nyberg 2011) tends to situate the origins of the banking crisis in the 
four to five year period from 2003-2008 (Ó Riain 2014, 61).  As the story goes, 
increased, pro-cyclical government spending contributed to overheating, as did rising 
wages across the public and private sectors, and timid, ineffectual regulation failed to 
put the brakes on reckless bank lending. After 2000, euro membership resulted in an 
interest rate shock, adding fuel to an already blazing fire through unprecedented access 
to cheap capital. 
This narrative establishes a clear analytical distinction between the Celtic Tiger 
and the property boom. While this distinction is important and correct, Ó Riain and 
other have nevertheless neglected the longer historical origins of the Irish banking 
crisis. In fact, we can trace the origins of the banking crisis back to the late 1980s, as 
Ireland began to make dramatic reforms to its banking and financial sector. Perhaps due 
to the extensive body of research on the strengths and weaknesses of Ireland’s export 
led growth during the 1990s, comparable attention has not been paid on the parallel 
history of Irish financialisation. This sub-section draws on the work of Sinéad Kelly 
(2014), John Kelly and Mary Everett (2004), as well as the Central Bank of Ireland 
(2013) to fill this gap.  
It is not often remembered that, until the mid-1980s, the Irish banking system 
was one of the most heavily regulated systems in Europe.  During the 1970s and 1980s, 
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Irish governments issued credit controls and many other restrictions which were 
reinforced to varying extents throughout the 1980s.77 Following EEC accession in 1973, 
Irish banks were advised not to increase private-sector credit to non-productive sectors, 
including financial, property companies and property sectors (Ferriter 2012, 465-473). 
This was in part a response to the debt and inflation crisis Ireland found itself in the 
1970s. Governments were concerned that increased levels of private spending and 
borrowing were damaging Ireland’s competitiveness and widening its current account 
deficit. T.K. Whitaker was concerned that ‘for all the new opportunities, ill-judged and 
reckless policies could lead to a return to the dark days that had propelled his original 
foray into Irish economic policy formulation’ (Ferriter 2012, 467). In 1974, credit 
restrictions on banks were reinforced by provisions for special deposits at non-
commercial rates of interests, and banks were required to have a special 50 per cent 
deposit requirement on capital outflows during these years (Central Bank of Ireland 
2013). Stricter guidelines on loans to non-productive lending were enforced in October 
1978 and after briefly being discontinued, these guidelines were re-imposed in 1982.  
In anticipation of Ireland’s signing of the Single European Act these formal 
guidelines were ended in 1984. This began a process of dramatic financial liberalisation, 
driven by Ireland’s adaptation to European Integration. In 1988 there was a major 
relaxation of credit controls, and Ireland began to liberalise and deregulate the entire 
financial sector in accordance with preparation for the completion of the Single Market 
in 1993 (Kelly and Everett 2004, 95-98; see also Central Bank of Ireland 2013). Just 
like Greece and Portugal, Ireland’s participation in the ‘re-launch’ of Europe from the 
1980s onwards signalled considerable changes for the terms and conditions for capital 
movements, domestic banking and stock-market trading. Restrictions on credit-growth 
                                                          
77 See O’Sullivan and Kennedy 2009; Kelly 2014; and also Kelly and Everett 2004, 91 for how little 
attention has been paid to this. 
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and interest-rate rules were progressively dismantled by 1992, capital controls were 
removed, and banks’ reserve requirements were reduced from 10 per cent to 6 per cent 
in 1992, falling further to 2 per cent in 1999 (Kelly 2014, 42). Additionally, as was 
happening across the EU as a result of Single Market reforms, Irish banks expanded 
their operations overseas and widened their deposit bases (Kelly 2014, 43). Irish banks 
such as Anglo, AIB and BoI opened branches in the UK and elsewhere, contributing to 
massive flows of lending from the UK into Ireland (Kelly 2014, 43; Dooley 2014, 945). 
In other words, the seeds of Ireland’s notorious ‘light touch regulation’ and highly 
liberalised banking sector were sown from as early as this period; and crucially, this 
transformation was driven by changes at the EU level. 
In addition to the dismantling of controls, adaptation to European integration 
during this period drove the development of a more competitive banking environment in 
Ireland – which increased the availability of credit and reduced its cost. Deregulation 
and EU policies including, but not limited to, the Single Passport for banking78 enabled 
new entrants to the Irish market. Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), Rabobank, 
Northern rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) (trading as Ulster Bank) and Danske 
Bank (trading as National Irish Bank), were all operating in Ireland by 2003. This 
transformed the landscape of Irish retail banking, creating imperatives for growing 
competition (Kelly 2014, 44). This new competition drove a transformation of banking 
practice, leading to expanding balance sheets ‘regardless of risk’ (Kelly 2014, 44). For 
instance, the introduction by HBOS of a 3.99 per cent mortgage rate in 2001 had 
dramatic knock-on effects (Kelly 2014; see also Ross 2010) as other banks reduced their 
own mortgage rates in line. Banks also began to compete with new innovations, offering 
longer term loans and higher loan-to-value ratios (Kelly 2014, 45). 90 per cent 
                                                          
78 The ‘Single Passport’ is part of the EU’s Second Banking Directive. It allows any bank that is licensed 
to do business in one EU country to do business in another EU country. 
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mortgages were offered by all the major banks by 2005, and First Active, a building 
society acquired by RBS in 2004, pioneered the notorious 100 per cent mortgage soon 
after (Kelly 2014, 45; Cooper 2012, 239). Equity release loans became more common, 
and vetting of customer’s ability to repay became laxer (Kelly 2014, 45).  Domestic and 
these new foreign banks operating in Ireland were now free to compete in terms of the 
interest rates they could charge. All of this had a considerable impact on Ireland’s 
mortgage markets (Kelly and Everett 2004, 97).  
Of particular importance, as Kelly (2014) notes, was the entrance of Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS) into the Irish residential mortgage market in August 1999, trading as 
Ulster Bank, which resulted in a significant reduction in mortgage interest rates (Kelly 
and Everett 2004, 97; Cooper 2012, 239-241). With the increasing presence of foreign 
banks in Ireland, Irish financial institutions faced more pressure to be competitive and 
this promoted the practice of short term lending, and a culture of bonus payments to 
financial managers who could successfully meet or exceed targets through short-term 
lending (Kelly 2014, 37). This promoted the kind of reckless lending practices that were 
to characterise the transformation of Ireland from an export-led model of growth to a 
debt-led model in the 2000s with the property boom.  
Such reckless lending was further propelled by the increasing availability of 
cheap foreign capital following waves of capital market liberalisation in Europe, which 
subsequently exploded following the introduction of the euro.  Irish banks found 
themselves having much greater freedom to set their own liquidity-management and 
interest rate policies since the Single Market (Kelly 2014, 42). Borrowing decisions also 
began to become affected from 1998 onwards when it was announced that Ireland 
would join EMU. Against the background of capital liberalisation and structural change 
in the financial sector, Irish banks were able to respond quickly when demand for credit 
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strengthened (Kelly and Everett 2004, 98).  Even before EMU membership provided 
Irish banks with significant sources of cheap foreign capital, the provisions of the Single 
Market meant that Irish banks were becoming increasingly internationalised. 
In addition to the domestic banking sector that was most clearly implicated in 
fuelling the property bubble (mainly through banks such as Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland and Allied Irish Bank), a brand new transnational banking sector emerged in 
Ireland from the mid 1980s and 1990s onwards. Much as Irish state agencies had 
identified the high-tech sector as an emerging sector that could be attracted to Ireland, 
the financial services industry began to be courted to set up firms in Ireland (Hendrikse 
2013; Ó Riain 2014; Kelly 2014, 42). This was most emblematic in the International 
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) which was established in Dublin’s docklands area in 
the late-1980s. Financial companies such as Citibank, Mellon Investment, Merrill 
Lynch, Chase Manhattan and Deutsche Bank set up in the IFSC, bringing with them 
knowledge of new technologies of financial innovation as well as new and lucrative 
channels of access to international financial markets (Kelly, 2014, 42). Hendrikse writes 
about how the attraction of financial services enterprises was an explicit developmental 
strategy for Ireland, as Ó Riain (2014; 2012, 508) has also noted. The presence of these 
enterprises and the Irish government’s desire to continue to develop the financial 
services sector created incentives for light touch regulation, as well as favourable tax 
incentives to the banking and financial sector – a regime that extended much beyond the 
‘City of London’ style offshore IFSC (Hendrikse 2013). Hendrikse argues that the Irish 
property bubble grew in the shadows of the IFSC:  
as much as the Irish regulator did not police transnational finance in Dublin, it 
equally failed to detect the huge risks built up in its domestic banks. In other 
words, national and transnational financial institutions made use of the same 
institutional setting’ (2013, 191).  
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Accordingly, public bodies that were responsible for the regulation of the banking 
sector became heavily committed to the promotion of increased competition and 
liberalisation (Kelly 2014, 42). This dual role resulted in the timidity and complacence 
that Irish regulatory bodies have been accused of by the former Governor of the Irish 
Central Bank in the course of an ongoing Irish banking inquiry into the causes of the 
crisis (Honohan 2010; Nyberg 2011). The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority 
(IFSRA), established in 2003 had an explicit goal to ‘foster an internationally 
competitive and successful financial services industry’ within the context of its 
regulatory practice (Kelly 2014, 43). There has, unsurprisingly, been clear evidence of 
regulatory capture (McGrath 2010). 
 
Ireland’s debt-led growth as an outcome of European integration 
The above narrative suggests that we cannot understand the property bubble of the 
1990s without accounting for the EC/EU encouraged deregulation and liberalisation of 
the banking sector in Ireland from the late 1980s onwards. Ireland’s participation in the 
EU’s ‘one market, one money’ project since 1986 has had a dramatic transformative 
effect on its economy. While the role of credit in Ireland’s export led boom is disputed 
(Everett and Kelly 2004; Honohan 2006) – the EU reforms discussed above were setting 
the scene for a parallel pattern of growth that was to become fully activated following 
the EMU interest rate shock of the 2000s and the separate decline of the export led 
growth following the dot-com crash 2001-2003. We cannot understand the 
unprecedented property bubble during this period without accounting for the EU 
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that existing explanations that focus only 
on pro-cyclical government policy during the 2000s are incomplete. While this 
undoubtedly contributed to the boom, former Central Bank governor John Hurley is 
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correct when he claimed in the banking inquiry on May 21st 2015 that he didn’t believe 
that ‘regulation could have prevented the crash and said international factors played a 
crucial role’ (Irish Times 2015). Irish governments in the early 2000s may indeed have 
tragically missed an opportunity to put the brakes on this boom. Yet, it is crucial to 
recognise that, in the decade before; European integration had already helped create an 
aggressive banking sector capable of driving debt-led growth.  Irish governments may 
have failed to halt the bubble, but European financial integration helped it to emerge in 
the first place (Dooley 2015b). 
Thus, just like Greece and Portugal, Ireland’s crisis is intimately bound up in its 
adaptation to the project of European Integration. This conclusion makes it possible 
to recognise that European integration can have a distinctly paradoxical impact on a 
small peripheral economy such as Ireland. As I suggested in section two, the Single 
Market and EMU are widely considered to have, at the very least, facilitated Ireland’s 
export led boom during the 1990s, and were certainly a significant factor in increasing 
overall US FDI to Europe from the late 1980s onwards (Cahill and O’Donnell 2010). It 
is reasonable to assume that Ireland would not have emerged as the prominent 
destination for US FDI into Europe without this deepening of European integration. 
Yet, as I have argued in this section; pursuing export led growth via the specific 
blueprint of the Single Market and EMU also led to unintended transformations in the 
Irish economy. The specific reforms, policies and institutions that were involved in 
Ireland’s adaptation to Europe from the late 1980s onwards did far more than simply 
complement its export-led development strategy. They also set the scene for a banking 
crisis so severe that Ireland found itself returning to the periphery of Europe. Ireland 
thus owes a great deal of its success, but also its crisis, to European integration. 
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Conclusion 
In this final case study, I traced Ireland’s remarkable economic trajectory from the ‘sick 
man of Europe’ in its first 50-60 years of independence, to its status as the ‘poster-child’ 
of European Integration in the 1990s, to an apparent full circle return as one of the worst 
hit economies of the European PIIGS in the 2000s. I make two important claims to 
account for this trajectory. First of all, Ireland’s Celtic Tiger boom should be 
analytically separated from the property bubble of the 2000s. Since the 1950s, the Irish 
state, through a variety of institutional and policy innovations, consolidated a model of 
export-led development that allowed Ireland to take advantage of the 1990s US boom 
and the completion of the Single Market between 1994 and 2001.  
This is narrative represents a challenge to the ‘victimisation thesis’. Since the 
late 1950s Ireland managed to negotiate its European integration to generate a high-
tech, export-oriented model of modernisation. Ireland’s relationship with Europe has 
thus never been straightforwardly negative. Nevertheless, as a small, open liberalised 
economy, Ireland was clearly exposed to any potential downturn in the US economy, 
and the Celtic Tiger model suffered a major crisis in the early years of the 2000s. It has 
since shown signs of recovery, but the country is unlikely to see the same levels of 
unprecedented growth that it witnessed during the 1990s any time soon.  
The second important claim that I make is that the origins of a parallel pattern of 
debt-fuelled property speculation have their origins in the capital market liberalisation, 
deregulation and financial integration associated with Ireland’s adaptation to the re-
launched European project since the 1980s. Ireland’s participation in the ‘one market, 
one money’ project was taken for granted, as it was viewed as a vital aspect of the 
Celtic Tiger export led growth. Yet, somewhat ironically, the specific reforms that were 
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introduced as part of this project set the scene for Ireland’s banking crisis. Existing 
accounts that limit their analysis to domestic policy errors in the 2000s have tended to 
overlook this longer history, and in doing so, fail to recognise how new and more 
aggressive lending strategies by banks emerged quite directly as a result of these 
transformations in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
This suggests an intriguing conclusion. In spite of Ireland’s mature, ‘core 
European’ style export-led growth in the 1990s, it was not invulnerable to the 
deleterious effects of ‘following the rules’ of European integration during this period. 
Ireland certainly benefitted in the earlier decades from European Integration, and the 
success of its export led model was almost certainly unthinkable outside of the EC/EU 
and indeed outside of the euro and the Single Market. Yet, financial integration in 
Europe led to unintended consequences in Ireland, catalysing parallel patterns of growth 
from the late 1980s onwards. Just like Greece and Portugal, adhering to a one-size-fits-
all model of integration led to unexpected, and detrimental patterns of divergence in 
Ireland. Contrary to the claims of the ‘immaturity thesis’, Ireland’s difficulties do not 
stem from its ‘getting the policies wrong’ in the 2000s. They stem from its following of 
those EU driven policies deemed to be ‘right’ since the late 1980s. Far from a ‘poster 
child’ for European integration, Ireland tells a cautionary tale (Dooley 2015b). 
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5  
Bad Things Can Happen to ‘Good Pupils’: 
‘Modernisation via Europeanisation’ and the 
Eurozone Crisis 
 
 
But, and forgive me for saying this, Portugal is a good pupil. 
Jacques Delors, 2013. 
 
 
The globalisation of the economy and the development of technology create 
opportunities and capacities to those that are able to adjust and those who have 
the will and creativity to take advantage of them…They give to smaller 
countries like Greece the ability to participate further and more dynamically in 
international markets. 
Costas Simitis, former Prime Minister of Greece, 2000.79  
 
 
[T]he process of transformation that [Ireland] began over four decades ago has 
become a model for the millions of new citizens of the European 
Union…Thanks to Ireland’s economic success, to which you devoted your life, 
we can be confident that economic reform works. 
Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the ECB, 2004. 
 
 
 
In the foregoing three chapters, I traced the diverging trajectories of economic 
development in Greece, Ireland and Portugal in the decades before their respective IMF-
                                                          
79 Quoted in Antoniades (2010, 69-70). 
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ECB-EU bailouts. Having done so, it is now possible to suggest that these countries 
suffered relatively severe levels of crisis not because of their ‘immature’ patterns of 
political and economic governance, nor due to their ‘victimisation’ by their more 
powerful European neighbours. Rather, their respective economies transformed into 
increasingly fragile and precarious patterns of development as a result of their 
adaptation to a particular project of European integration.  
Drawing the three narratives together, it is possible to argue that Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal have been at the centre of the eurozone crisis, because their attempts to 
converge with their Western European neighbours were generative of brand new 
patterns of divergence. The EU has obstinately promoted a single model of development 
across a variety of different European economic trajectories. Projects of convergence 
towards this ‘one size fits all’ model of development have actually been a catalyst of 
divergence for the European periphery. Recognising this leads to the central claim of 
this thesis: it was the periphery’s attempt to ‘follow the rules’ of European Integration, 
rather than their failure to, that explains their current difficulties.    
I outline this rethinking of the crisis in the European periphery over two main 
sections. In the first section, I discuss how processes of Europeanisation have acted as 
catalysts for divergence in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Since the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, European integration had always exerted pressures on its member states, but the 
‘one market, one money’ strategy (Emerson, Gros, and Italianer 1992; Delors 1989) of 
the late 1980s onwards created a specific ‘blueprint’ which created relatively extensive 
and explicit imperatives for change. EU driven reforms, especially those relating to 
banking and finance, were identified as pivotal to the generation of ‘debt-led’ growth in 
each of the cases that were studied. This insight represents an intriguing challenge to 
narratives of peripheral ‘immaturity’, because it emphasises the ways in which 
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putatively ‘mature’ processes of Europeanisation were responsible for the crises in the 
periphery. Projects of convergence did not lead to processes of convergence for Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland. Instead, these very projects were generative of processes of 
divergence. 
In section two I further draw out the ways in which the three case studies 
contribute to understandings of the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis by developing the 
concept of Modernisation via Europeanisation. This is done in two main ways. First, 
European integration may have promoted a specific model of modernisation for all 
(Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010), but in reality, when peripheral countries followed this 
model, it led to the emergence of multiple hybrid trajectories of economic development. 
The multiple case study analysis suggests that there is more than one way to become 
‘debt-led’ just as there is more than one way to negotiate and adapt to Europe.  
Second, I emphasise the agency of the countries of the European periphery in 
positively appropriating aspects of European integration in order to facilitate national 
strategies of modernisation. Greece, Portugal and Ireland did not passively participate in 
a project of European integration that was ‘tailored to core Europe’ simply because it 
was in the interests of the more powerful core for them to do so. Rather, as I have 
shown across the three case studies, the European periphery began to view the success 
of their own modernisation strategies as being tightly bound up in ‘tailoring themselves’ 
to core-Europe. This implies that, contrary to the claims of dominant critical 
perspectives, the periphery was never simply a passive victim. By showing that Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland have had some kind of an active role in their own paths to crisis – 
this argument has the potential to enrich these same critical accounts by opening up 
space to consider new and intriguing questions about what it may be possible for these 
countries to do next (Adler-Nissen 2015). 
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Emphasising the agency of the periphery also leads to a deeper understanding of 
the different paths to crisis followed by Greece, Portugal and Ireland. No single country 
adapted to or negotiated their Europeanisation in the same way. Although Greece 
succeeded in adopting various EU directives relating to banking and finance, no other 
country had quite as poor a record in adapting to EU expectations on pension reform, 
tax collection, public debt or fiscal consolidation. Portugal embraced the same 
principals relating to banking and finance as the other countries, but much earlier, and 
with different consequences for household and firm indebtedness. Ireland’s experience 
of Europeanisation was similarly distinct, creating the conditions for a successful 
export-oriented modernisation strategy and a disastrous bank-fuelled property boom 
almost simultaneously. European integration certainly promoted a ‘one size fits all’ 
project of convergence, but individual peripheral states had a degree of scope and 
agency to negotiate this common external pressure in their own way. This is an 
important part of the explanation for why the three cases followed such dramatically 
different paths to crisis.   
This thesis stresses the need for existing debates on the origins and asymmetry 
of the eurozone crisis to move beyond the limiting assumptions of ‘immaturity’ and 
‘victimisation’. Preoccupied over whether blame should be laid at the feet of the ‘lazy 
PIIGS’ or the German ‘big bad wolf’, existing narratives of asymmetry have been 
unable to adequately account for peripheral agency, or for the very different paths that 
led to crisis.  In this chapter I reflect on the findings of the case studies of Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland to propose a way for these same accounts to move beyond 
unhelpful analyses of blame, stressing instead the centrality of both supranational and 
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national aspirations of convergence80 in the origins of the crisis. This critique should not 
be interpreted as a wholesale rejection of either thesis. The domestic sources of the 
crisis in the periphery, both ‘exceptional’ and ‘non-exceptional’ are central to any 
understanding of the eurozone crisis. Debates surrounding the inequalities and hierarchy 
of the European project matter. The concept of modernisation via Europeanisation has 
the potential to deepen these important debates, already started by narratives of 
immaturity and victimisation, by overcoming some of their more serious limitations. 
 
Section One: the eurozone crisis as a product of Europeanisation 
The notion that the eurozone crisis was caused by the failure of governments in the 
European periphery to introduce ‘painful but necessary’ reforms in the decades leading 
up to their respective bailouts continues to resonate strongly throughout scholarly (e.g. 
Featherstone 2011; Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012; Pereira and Wemans 2012), 
political (European Commission 2010; 2011; 2012), and media debates on the eurozone 
crisis (see Antoniades 2012; Tzogopoulos 2013). It has been noisily reanimated since 
the beginning of 2015 when the Greek electorate first provided left-wing party Syriza 
with a mandate to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the embattled country’s 
agreements with its creditors (Gourgouris 2015).81 Months of breakneck disagreements 
followed over the extent of political and economic reforms Greece should be required to 
impose. Commentators frequently point to Ireland (Kinsella 2012) and to a lesser extent 
Portugal (Richter 2015) at such times, noting how they have exited their bailout 
programmes and returned to growth because they successfully ‘got their houses in 
                                                          
80 This discussion retains the distinction between convergence as a ‘project’ and convergence as a 
‘process’ introduced in the introduction chapter. Throughout this chapter, convergence will be understood 
as a project, not a process, that in no way implies any country is actually on the road to convergence. 
81 Syriza were re-elected on September 20th 2015. 
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order’ (Brazys and Regan 2015). Their assumed repentant maturity is regularly 
contrasted with Greece’s supposed petulance. As Ray Kinsella, former IMF and Central 
Bank of Ireland economist, wrote at the time:  
[t]he tenor of the euro zone’s criticism of the government of Alexis Tsipras has 
shifted from the patronising to the denunciatory, from faux long-suffering 
indulgence with a brash upstart to near visceral condemnation. The message is 
that the grown-ups are “exasperated” and “running out of patience” with Greece’ 
(Kinsella 2015). 
 
If the countries of the European periphery, including Ireland and Portugal, are 
responsible for their own turmoil, then it is the very essence of immaturity for Greece to 
expect the rest of Europe to bend to it. As I argued in the introductory chapter, this 
narrative has underpinned a stubborn policy response to the crisis in the periphery that 
even the IMF has admitted on more than one occasion is ‘unsustainable’ (Nardelli 2015) 
and ‘damaging’ (Elliott, Inman, and Smith 2013). 
The preceding case studies have presented a challenge to this narrative. 
Informed by the assumptions of modernisation theory, narratives of immaturity have not 
fully allowed for the possibility that anything other than immature or ‘exceptional’ 
actions by the periphery could have been generative of divergence. In contrast, I have 
drawn on Comparative Political Economy (CPE) notions of capitalist diversity (Bruff 
and Ebenau 2014; Lane and Wood 2009) to shed light on how actions by the periphery 
that would not typically be considered as ‘immature’ have been absolutely central to 
their various paths to crisis (see Ó Riain 2014, 3–10).  By returning to the analytical 
distinction made between ‘divergence’ and ‘non-convergence’ in chapter one, I draw 
out the key role of Europeanisation as a common catalyst of divergence across all three 
cases. This argument is situated in relation to a brief discussion on key EU level 
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developments in banking and financial integration as part of the ‘one market, one 
money’ re-launched project of integration. I conclude that Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland’s adaptation to this project has been generative of brand new patterns of 
unanticipated, unsustainable economic growth. In other words, the European periphery 
diverged and encountered crisis precisely because they ‘followed the rules’ of European 
integration, not simply because they failed to. 
 
Beyond non-convergence: Europeanisation as a catalyst of divergence 
Drawing on the insights of the Comparative Political Economy literature on ‘capitalist 
diversity’ (Lane and Wood 2009; Bruff and Ebenau 2014; Bruff and Hartmann 2014; 
Bruff and Horn 2012; Bohle and Greskovits 2012 Hancké 2009, 19-22; and see also 
Rosenberg 2006; 2013a; 2013b) chapter one introduced a crucial distinction between a 
theory of divergence and one of ‘non-convergence’. I subsequently drew on this 
distinction to orient the study of changing economic trajectories of Greece, Portugal, 
and Ireland. This made it possible to examine the ‘non-immature’ origins of peripheral 
divergence, and in doing so, highlight the central role of European integration.  
Bringing the analytical framework of Europeanisation studies (especially those 
concerned with the differential character of Europeanisation – e.g. Radaelli 2004, 3; 
Knill 2001; Heritier et al. 2001; Wessels 2003) together with the insights of CPE, I 
questioned whether existing accounts of the eurozone crisis have overlooked important 
sources of transformation by primarily paying attention to ‘obstacles’ to an assumed 
‘quasi-automatic’ process of convergence. Crucially, much existing accounts of the 
eurozone crisis have not yet considered that presumed ‘mature’ political and economic 
developments could have been generative of non-virtuous patterns of divergence. In 
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assuming that ‘immaturity’ begets divergence and ‘maturity’ begets convergence (i.e. 
failure or success in implementing ‘painful but necessary’ reforms respectively) this 
perspective has answered too many questions in advance. Accordingly, the three case 
studies presented here have investigated how these approaches could be enriched by 
considering the ways in which putatively ‘mature’ developments in the European 
periphery could have set the scene for crisis. 
In each of the three cases, I found that the periphery’s adaptation to European 
integration (their Europeanisation) was generative of precarious patterns of divergence. 
The transformations that occurred in the developmental trajectories of the European 
periphery cannot be easily located within existing trajectories – and therefore the 
dramatic transformations of the 1990s and 2000s are not mere ‘persistence’ or 
continuations of existing varieties of capitalism (i.e., non-convergence – failure to 
introduce structural reforms), as is often been claimed. Rather, ‘when Europe hit home’ 
(Börzel and Risse 2002), it led to countries of the European periphery in multiple 
different directions. In no case did the periphery ‘not transform’ or ‘converge’ as a 
result of its Europeanisation. Instead, something much more radical occurred; the 
European periphery went in new and unexpected directions.  
As such, focusing primarily on the structural reforms that the periphery failed to 
implement misses out on an important parallel history. Although this should not be seen 
as denying the role of path dependency, ‘exceptional’ or ‘immature’ patterns of 
divergence entirely, accounting for this parallel history invites existing domestic-level 
analysis to rethink the consequences of their arguments. EU reforms drove a 
transformation of banking and finance across the periphery, catalysing the emergence of 
different patterns of debt-led growth. The upshot of this is that avoiding the eurozone 
206 
 
 
crisis would have required much more than simply encouraging the periphery to 
overcome ‘obstacles to convergence’. 
 
Building ‘the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world’: European 
financial integration and the Single Market for banking 
Each case study has emphasised the key role played by the ‘re-launched’ project of 
European integration since the late 1980s. European integration had placed pressures on 
member states to adapt before this period. But the mid-1980s ‘one market, one money’ 
project – comprising the Single Market and preparations for EMU  (Emerson, Gros, and 
Italianer 1992) - provided Greece, Portugal and Ireland with a relatively explicit and 
extensive ‘blueprint’ for their adaptation to Europe.82 Preparations to join both acted as 
relatively strong imperatives  for reform in the countries of the European periphery 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Featherstone, Kazamias, and Papadimitriou 2001, 462). As 
I have argued in the case study chapters, it was the attempt to adjust to these imperatives 
that acted as an important catalyst of divergence in the European periphery. These 
imperatives constitute a project of convergence which the periphery participated in. But 
it did not lead to the processes of convergence that may have been hoped for. 
Europe was ‘re-launched’ with the Single European Act (SEA) and the first 
Delors Commission’s plan to ‘complete the Single Market’, create the European Union 
(EU) and introduce Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) soon after (Giordano and 
Persaud 1998, 8). ‘One market, one money’ (Emerson, Gros, and Italianer 1992); an 
integrated Single Market that was free from all barriers to the free movement of trade, 
                                                          
82 As such, I argue in the case studies something more concrete than that the periphery was simply 
emulating a dominant ‘vision’ of European modernity (Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013), 
although there is certainly scope for important constructivist or discursive analysis (such as Giurlando 
2012; Adler-Nissen 2015) that would enrich the discussion presented here. 
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capital and labour, and a single currency for that market were seen as the cornerstones 
of a new vision for a European economy that could gain a competitive edge in global 
export markets, and adapt to the perceived challenges of globalisation; namely rival 
economies and internationally mobile capital (see Laffan 1998, 235-6; Wigger 2015; 
Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2010; Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011). Although 
competitiveness agendas have been essential aspects of the European project from the 
outset, they only acquired heightened agenda status with the acceleration of the Single 
Market project following the signing of the Single European Act (Wigger 2015, 119; 
Deeg 2012, 79).  
By the 1980s, economic integration in Europe was considered to have failed to 
reach its potential. Accordingly, the project to ‘complete’ the Single Market by 1992 
was expected to unleash the untapped potential of the Treaty of Rome, better preparing 
Europe for the challenges of globalisation by providing it with a competitive edge in the 
global economy (Dinan 2004, 205; Laffan 1998, 240-1).  The Single Market was 
intended as the beginning of a Grand Strategy of ensuring the competitiveness of the 
EU against the USA and the various rising powers that came to increasingly challenge it 
in the coming decades (Laffan 1998, 241; Cahill and O’Donnell 2010, 20). It was to be 
achieved through a number of reforms intended to stimulate trade, increase competition, 
and promote European-wide economies of scale by dismantling a variety of nontariff 
trade barriers, which included national differences in taxes, regulations, and health and 
safety standards (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, 9; these intentions are seen by many as 
a 'neoliberal turn' in Europe, see Beiling and Jager 2009, 92; Gill 1998; van Alperdoorn 
2002). During the period from 1986-1992, the EU adopted approximately 280 pieces of 
legislation. In many areas, twelve sets of national regulations from the then twelve 
Member States were replaced by one common European law (European Commission 
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2012). Every member state was required to transpose European directives relating to 
everything from harmonisation of manufacturing standards to banking and capital 
market liberalisation. The Single Market was successfully ‘completed’ on the 1st of 
January 1993.83  
 Each case study has emphasised the particular significance of EU developments 
relating to banking and finance in stimulating ‘debt-led’ patterns of growth in the 
European periphery from the late 1980s onwards. Completing the Single Market 
resulted in a dramatic shifting of the landscape of European banking and finance (Deeg 
2012, 79; Abdelal 2007; Bieling 2003, 208). A Single Market for Banking, together 
with European financial integration were viewed by their proponents as the backbone of 
the strategy of transforming Europe into, as it was later put in the Lisbon Agenda, the 
‘most dynamic and competitive knowledge based economy in the world’ (Bieling 2003, 
213). Specific EU directives on the dismantling of barriers, capital standards and 
deposit protection were issued in 1989, 1992 and 1994 (N. B. Murphy 2000). The idea 
was that if European banks could conduct business anywhere in the EU, increased 
economies of scale, competition and capital availability would result in benefits to 
businesses and consumers (Murphy 2000, 2). As the Presidency Conclusions to the 
Lisbon European Council put it: 
[e]fficient and transparent financial markets foster growth and employment by 
better allocation of capital and reducing its cost. They therefore play an essential 
role in fuelling new ideas, supporting entrepreneurial culture and promoting 
access to and use of new technologies. It is essential to exploit the potential of 
the euro to push forward the integration of EU financial markets. Furthermore, 
efficient risk capital markets play a major role in innovative high-growth SMEs 
and the creation of new and sustainable jobs (European Parliament 2000). 
New developments in European banking and finance proceeded in various ways. 
Minimum standards for banking conduct are set out in various EU directives. The 
                                                          
83 Although as some noted upon its 20 year anniversary, in many respects, the Single Market remains 
‘incomplete’ (Egan 2012; de Bois 2014). 
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cornerstone of the EU’s policy at the time was the Second Banking Directive which was 
adopted in 1989 and by 1992 all member states were required to have in place laws and 
regulations consistent with it. Murphy (2000, 3) outlines the basic principles of the 
directive. The first was the highly important principle of mutual recognition. This 
entailed that a host nation must allow any foreign bank to do whatever is permitted in 
that bank’s domestic environment. This implies that foreign banks may initially have 
different powers and capabilities over domestic banks. Mutual recognition, accordingly, 
has the potential to provide foreign banks with a competitive edge over domestic banks, 
driving the adjustment and transformation of the latter if they are to compete with 
foreign entrants (Murphy 2000, 3). Secondly, banking activities were explicitly defined 
by the EU, and all member states were required to address any differences in existing 
practices so that they were in line with the principle of ‘universal banking’ by 1993. 
Concretely this entailed, inter alia, a considerable degree of dismantling of regulations, 
interest rate and capital controls, and the harmonisation of solvency ratios. The third 
principle was the ‘single passport’ for banking in Europe. This authorised any bank 
licensed in an EU country to do business in any other EU nation as well, free from any 
barriers to such action (Murphy 2000, 4). As has been seen in previous chapters, each of 
these principles had dramatic effects on domestic banking across the periphery and 
beyond (see Murphy 2000, Deeg 2012, 79; Bieling 2003, 209; Cockfield 1994; Pérez-
Caldentey and Vernengo 2012, 10, 11). They introduced new competitive pressures, 
new forms of banking activity, and greater inflows of cheaper capital to these countries 
in ways that had never been the case before. 
 Beyond the Single Market, financial integration was pursued clearly and 
extensively during the 1990s and 2000s, both through the Lisbon Agenda and the 
introduction of the euro. Yet, following EMU membership, the hard edge of these EU 
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pressures was absent, and adaptation to Europe through such mechanisms as the Lisbon 
Agenda’s ‘Open Method of Coordination’ attempted to achieve transformation through 
more voluntary or persuasive means (Smith 2012; Vink and Graziano 2007, 10; 
Umbach and Wessels 2008, 63-66). As such, the ‘harder’ pressure of banking reforms 
during the 1990s were identified as relatively more important drivers of transformation 
for each of the case studies. Nevertheless, the 2000s entailed dramatic changes in 
providing the Single Market for Banking with a deep, easily accessible, source of 
capital. Developments such as the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
represented a programmatic and operative platform for financial market integration in 
Europe (Bieling 2003, 211, 212). The headline goal of the Lisbon Agenda was to 
achieve investment in R&D across Europe, and in order to do this, financiers needed to 
be encouraged to invest in more risk-oriented capital in order to finance innovation 
projects (Deeg 2012, 74). Yet, Deeg notes that this development was associated with the 
shareholder value’ ideology in financial markets – which has led to an increased focus 
on short term profitability (Deeg 2012, 75) – so while cheap capital became readily 
available, it did not tend to flow to so-called ‘productive sectors’. As is well known, the 
euro itself led to a deepening of financial market integration and liberalisation 
(Papadimitriou and Wray 2012, 2; Noeth and Sengupta 2012, 466; Bieling 2003, 211). 
With the removal of exchange rate risk, cross-border banking activity became much 
easier and liquidity became more abundant as domestic banks had easier access to 
interbank loans from banks in other euro-area countries. The introduction of the euro 
also brought with it a historic reduction in interest rates, because the ECB effectively 
adopted the Deutschemark interest rate levels, countries such as Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece witnessed their own interest rates fall sharply (Koo 2011, 1; de Grauwe 2013, 6-
7).  
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Specifically in relation to banking and finance, the ‘blueprint’ of the ‘one 
market, one money’ strategy provided the European periphery with very specific 
pressures to adapt from the late 1980s onwards. From the brief historical background 
provided here, we can note that since the 1980s, the European project has become a 
supranational internal market and monetary union that aims to promote policies of 
market efficiencies, capital market liberalisation, competiveness and convergence (van 
Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn 2009). Financial market liberalisation, monetary 
integration and national competitiveness strategies based on ‘knowledge based’ 
innovation and ‘sound finance’ have underpinned the European project since the 1980s 
(see Featherstone 1998, 23-24; Bieling 2003, 207; see also van Apeldoorn, 
Drahokoupil, and Horn 2009). The ‘one market, one money’ project was expected to 
unleash ‘unprecedented potential for accelerated growth and enhanced competitiveness 
across Europe’ (Pellegrin 2001, 1).  Leaving aside its more or less evident failure in 
achieving these aims (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2006; Jessop 2006; Copeland and 
Papadimitriou 2012), it presented a clear vision of the type of modernisation that should 
be aspired to and, more than this, provided concrete mechanisms for member states to 
reshape themselves. It is of great significance that each of the countries considered in 
this study successfully adapted to the various directives discussed above; which is often 
overlooked by focusing on the more readily apparent ways in which the periphery failed 
to introduce other structural reforms. In fact, existing case study literature has 
overlooked and neglected the transformative effects of Europeanisation as a catalyst for 
divergence – precisely because it has been pre-occupied with identifying ‘obstacles’ to 
an assumed trajectory of ‘convergence’. As I discuss in more detail in the following 
section, domestic adaptation to these EU driven reforms helped catalyse patterns of 
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domestic demand and debt-led growth in Greece and Portugal during the 1990s, and 
helped set the scene for a credit-fuelled property boom in Ireland during the 2000s.  
The significance of recognising debt-led growth as an outcome of 
Europeanisation in this way is that it can take a domestic-level approach while telling a 
very different story to that of the ‘immaturity thesis’. By paying attention to the 
consequences of domestic adaptation to European integration, it is possible to overcome 
the internalism of existing domestic-level analyses without resorting to the externalism 
of the victimisation thesis.84 Similarly, by taking on board the insights of the CPE 
literature on capitalist diversity, the case studies have shed light on how supposedly 
‘non-immature’ practices of Europeanisation have been generative of divergence, while 
outlining the role of European developments in banking and finance in particular. 
Attempting to participate in a EU project of convergence contributed to processes of 
divergence in each country. In this way, the three case studies have deflated the central 
premise of the immaturity thesis – because they posit a narrative wherein non-
exceptional processes are recognised as the problem, rather than purely considering the 
‘exceptional’ character of the Greek, Portuguese and Irish crises.  
In this respect, the eurozone crisis has never simply been about the failure of the 
periphery to introduced ‘painful but necessary’ reforms, because many of the reforms 
they successfully adopted were shown to have been responsible for the emergence of 
crisis.  Significantly, the case studies contribute a theory of the origins of the eurozone 
crisis that understands it as an outcome of Europeanisation. In the following section I 
                                                          
84 Europeanisation studies provides a 'second image reversed' analysis that is sensitive to the international 
constituents of domestic development (see Featherstone 2003, 7; Vink and Graziano 2007, 16; Raedelli 
2003, 35). In this respect, it has the potential to avoid the methodological nationalism of some of the 
domestic-level analysis reviewed here, while also challenging externalist accounts in much the same way 
advocated by theories such as uneven and combined development (U&CD); which focus on how 
domestic development always involves international constituents – and how there is no thing as purely 
‘domestic’ development (Rosenberg 2006). 
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expand on this argument, while also drawing out the ways in which it can overcome the 
limitations of narratives of peripheral ‘victimisation’. 
 
Section Two: ‘Modernisation via Europeanisation’: rethinking the 
asymmetry of the eurozone crisis 
In chapter one, I identified two major gaps in existing debates on the crisis in the 
European periphery. First, by relying on assumptions of immaturity or victimisation, 
existing approaches have been inadequate to the task of accounting for the very 
different kinds of the crisis the European periphery has experienced. Highlighting the 
various ways in which peripheral economies failed to introduce ‘painful but necessary’ 
reforms might explain the absence of advanced, export-oriented trajectories of growth in 
the periphery, but it tells us far less about how and why a banking crisis developed in 
Ireland, a prolonged recession in Portugal, and a competitiveness-cum-sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece. Pointing out that Germany has ‘beggared-thy-neighbour’ in the 
European periphery, on its own, explains even less about these distinctive forms of 
divergence.  
The second gap relates to how the agency of the European periphery has been 
represented in existing debates. Perspectives relying on assumptions of immaturity have 
been unable to fully account for the possibility that any actions besides error, 
irresponsibility and other such ‘exceptional’ national and political traits could have been 
generative of divergence. Section one has already outlined the ways in which this has 
caused such perspectives to miss out on identifying how ‘non-exceptional’ processes of 
Europeanisation played a role in peripheral debt crises. Perspectives relying on 
assumptions of victimisation on the other hand have effectively neglected peripheral 
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agency entirely, viewing it as a function of ‘core’ economic domination. They discount 
the possibility that although the periphery may have faced a common, and compelling, 
external pressure – they still had a degree of agency with which to negotiate and adapt 
to European projects of convergence. 
 In this section I outline the ways in which the narratives provided by the three 
case studies address the above limitations. I begin by developing the concept of 
modernisation via Europeanisation in order to illuminate the ways in which Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland began to view the success of their own modernisation strategies as 
being tightly bound up in ‘tailoring themselves’ to core-Europe. This concept stresses 
that the emergence of debt-led growth is not best viewed as a process of victimisation, 
but rather as an instance of the limitations of ‘latecomer economies’ actively aspiring 
towards a ‘one size fits all’ developmental strategy in order to ‘catch up’ with Western 
Europe.  
 Subsequently, I build on the discussion in section one in order to trace the ways 
in which Europeanisation was generative of multiple and discrete patterns of divergence 
across the periphery. Paying attention to peripheral agency can help explain how 
although European integration may have created common imperatives, as Knafo (2010) 
has noted, ‘this does not mean that there is only one way to react to these imperatives’ 
(504). It provided the rules of the game, but did not fully determine how the periphery 
played it (ibid 504). Greece, Portugal and Ireland had the requisite agency to negotiate a 
‘one size fits all’ model of European integration in different ways, and they emphasised 
different aspects of these rules. Moreover, similar pressures led to different outcomes in 
each case – the ‘one size fits all’ model did not have a consistent nor homogenous effect 
on the European periphery. On the contrary, the attempt by these countries to converge 
was, in fact, generative of multiple and different forms of modernisation. Narratives 
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underpinned by assumptions of victimisation tend to downplay this scope for agency, 
and accordingly miss out on an important part of the explanation for the very different 
paths to crisis followed by the European periphery. 
 Re-prioritising the centrality of the asymmetric paths to the eurozone crisis, 
together with the role of peripheral agency contributes an intriguing reinterpretation of 
the origins of the eurozone crisis. The real strengths of core-periphery analysis and other 
critical IPE perspectives have been to emphasise the ways in which the inequalities and 
hierarchies that have been built into the architecture of EMU have unevenly affected 
member states. The argument presented here seeks to deepen these debates by viewing 
them through lenses that leave notions of victimisation and ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
dynamics behind. What is at stake is an understanding of how the European project 
negatively affected the periphery, in a way that takes the agency of the periphery 
seriously, and is also sensitive to complex patterns of asymmetry and unintended 
consequences. 
To this end I argue that the crisis in the periphery is the outcome of a project of 
European integration that has been underpinned by the extensive pursuit –at 
supranational and domestic levels - of convergence. The specific paths to divergence 
across the European periphery were set in motion by aspirations for the periphery to 
‘tailor themselves’ to Western Europe. The experience of Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
suggests that the future of the eurozone may need to interrogate whether such the 
project can proceed based on the promotion of convergence, or whether as Adler-Nissen 
has suggested, a better chance for stability may lie in the development of an ‘ever looser 
union’ (2014, 174-190). 
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Beyond victimisation: modernisation via Europeanisation in the European periphery 
So far, the argument of this thesis appears to have much in common with the claims of 
core-periphery analysis and other critical ‘design flaws’ perspectives. The adverse 
impact of European integration on the European periphery that I posited in section one 
is not something that such approaches would dispute. Furthermore, as I have noted in 
chapter one, many relevant analyses have traced the ways in which Economic and 
Monetary Union has been converted into an area of exploitation of the countries of the 
European periphery by the ‘steam engine’ of the core. Germany and other ‘core’ 
European economies are understood to have uniquely benefitted from the European 
project, forcing the less-competitive economies of the periphery to ‘underdevelopment’ 
and causing the destruction of their ‘productive bases’ (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, 
227). This narrative of ‘victimisation’ has been pioneered by core-periphery analysis 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2010b) and has subsequently dominated 
‘critical’ scholarship on the crisis, having been taken up by post-Keynesian (Bellofiore 
2013; Bellofiore, Garibaldo, and Halevi 2010; Cesaratto and Stirati 2010) neo-
Gramscian (Overbeek 2012; van Apeldoorn 2012) and even by more mainstream 
scholarship (Wolf 2010b; Wolf 2014). It remains an influential and the predominant 
challenge to the immaturity thesis, allowing analysis to supplant moralisations regarding 
the ‘lazy PIIGS’ by shifting blame towards the German big bad wolf.  
 The limits of these narratives have already been substantially outlined in this 
thesis. Country specific balances of trade between Germany and the European periphery 
reveal little empirical evidence for claims that peripheral import dependency is the 
‘structural mirror’ of German export success. Disaggregating capital flows between the 
countries of the European periphery similarly revealed that in no case was Germany the 
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most important lender to Greece, Portugal or Ireland. These empirical limitations 
suggest that the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis cannot be explained by reference to 
German or ‘core’ dominance alone.  
 Milios and Sotiropoulos (2010) have rebuked core-periphery analysis for failing 
‘entirely…to explain the dynamics of the eurozone and of the countries that coexist 
within it’ (227). The Single Market and the euro would never have obtained support 
from Germany if the latter had been merely thinking about ways to ‘beggar they 
neighbour’. This is because it would not have had a vested interest in promoting the 
convergence, improved competitiveness and low debt and inflation policies that were 
cornerstones of the accession process (ibid 235). In fact, the central logic of deepening 
integration since 1986, as exemplified in the Maastricht ‘convergence criteria’, was 
predicated on ‘[g]reater convergence of economic performance’ (Delors 1989, 11 
italics author’s own). European integration since the 1980s has never been deliberately 
driven to generate a fracture between the core and periphery, precisely due to fears 
(especially German fears) about the possibility of such a divide leading to the kind of 
instability that has emerged since 2008. As such, a tighter coordination of economic 
policy-making was deemed necessary for both the Single Market, but especially EMU 
to succeed. The ‘one Market, one Money’ strategy contained a number of mechanisms 
aimed at promoting economic convergence across its member states. In the Delors 
report, it is mentioned that the Single Market was expected to link national economies 
much more closely together and ‘significantly increase the degree of economic 
integration within the community’ (Delors 1989). Greater economic interdependence 
was expected to:  
reduce the room for independent policy manoeuvre and amplify the cross-border 
effects of developments originating in each member country…Community 
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polices [that are] in support of a broadly balanced development [among member 
states] are an indispensable complement to a single market (Delors 1989).  
 
The rolling out of the Single Market coincided with adjustment periods for the so-called 
cohesion countries (see Bakker 1996) along with the provision of significant structural 
funds, many argue, as side payment for the support of the peripheral countries 
(Moravcsik 1991, 25). 
 Of course, the problems facing the Maastricht or ‘convergence’ criteria were 
infamous even before the crisis hit. Debates during the 1990s challenged the economic 
rationale and the efficacy of these criteria for generating convergence, while others 
questioned whether these were the right criteria at all (e.g. de Grauwe 1996a; 1996b; 
Gunther Schnabl 2004; Gros 2000; Holzmann, Hervé, and Demmel 1996). Two decades 
later, the ‘design flaws’ literature on the eurozone crisis echoed these same debates 
(Papadimitriou and Wray 2012,2-3; de Grauwe 2013, 7; Panico and Purificato 2013; 
Scharpf 2011). Depending on the perspective, the Maastricht criteria were toothless and 
unable to fulfil the very necessary function of fiscal discipline (Katsimi and Moutos 
2010, 569), they were a wholly inadequate substitute for a genuine fiscal union 
(Patomäki 2013) or were the mechanisms of a transnational strategy of neoliberalism 
that aimed at promoting the interests of certain sectors of European capital, against the 
interests of European workers and welfare states (Holman 1996). Put simply, very few 
have claimed to be under any illusion that the ‘convergence criteria’ were generating 
convergence. 
Nevertheless, for candidate states during the 1990s, membership of EMU 
entailed, inter alia, the adherence to five convergence criteria. In order to qualify for 
euro membership, all prospective member states needed to meet strict criteria relating to 
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low inflation rates (which must not exceed a certain ratio), government budget deficits 
(must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP), government debt to GDP ratio (must not exceed 
60 per cent), participation in the second European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) 
in order to guarantee exchange rate stability, and finally, governments were required to 
meet limits on long term interest rates on sovereign bonds. Across all member states, a 
number of convergence plans were implemented in order to meet these five criteria. 
As such, and in spite of its clear failures, a central aspect of the ‘one money, one 
market’ project was to narrow the precise divide between ‘core Europe’ and the so-
called ‘cohesion countries’ (Barry 2003; Bradley 2006; Leonardi 2006; Martin and 
Tyler 2006; Tumpel-Gugerell and Mooslechner 2003) in order to transform an 
integrated European economy into the most ‘competitive and dynamic economy in the 
world’. As the critique of core-periphery analysis had made clear, the important point is 
that Germany had little interest in perpetuating a ‘structural’ divide between core and 
periphery. On the contrary, the convergence criteria were a crucial aspect of ensuring 
German participation in EMU. In joining, Germany committed to the abandonment of 
its Bundesbank and the Deutsche Mark (DM), two highly symbolic institutions of 
stability and growth. The argument goes that the only way Germany could have agreed 
to join the euro is if it was modelled very heavily on the DM. As Paul de Grauwe notes, 
‘Germany will want to control the entry into the union, so that only those countries with 
the same preferences join the union’ (de Grauwe 1996a). Candidate member countries 
were supposed to show that they ‘care about low inflation rates in the same way that 
Germany does. This they do, by bringing down their inflation rate to the German level’ 
(de Grauwe 1996a). 
Such ‘self-imposed suffering’ (such as rising unemployment as a result of low 
inflation policies) were supposed to provide added evidence for Germany that countries 
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such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal were ‘serious about fighting inflation. Once the 
proof is given, these countries can be let in safely’ (de Grauwe 1996a). Debates over 
their efficacy, logic and rationale aside, all candidate countries for EMU were expected 
to meet the Maastricht criteria during the 1990s, and these five criteria became key 
mechanisms in the ‘one market, one money’ strategy. It is unlikely that Germany would 
have participated in EMU without such firm commitments to the promotion of 
convergence across member states. For this reason, along with those outlined in chapter 
one, narratives of peripheral ‘victimisation’ are lacking in support.  
And yet, as I have argued so far in this chapter, whatever its intended design 
may have been, there is clearly something about the project of European integration 
since its 1980s relaunch that has been calamitous for peripheral member states. 
Convergence may have been promoted for all, but it has certainly benefitted those it was 
‘tailored to’ over those who found themselves having to adjust to it.  Critiques of the 
victimisation thesis should not entail the shutting down of debates regarding the 
ongoing role of Germany, hierarchies, and inequalities in contributing to the 
contemporary crisis. Rather, I propose a different interpretation of these same factors.  
Chapter one developed an analytical framework that was capable of recognising 
the detrimental impact of European integration on the periphery but that did not rely on 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ assumptions. By drawing on the literature on Europeanisation, I 
proposed that the multiple case studies would explore the consequences of domestic 
adaptation to European integration. As already discussed, bringing this literature into 
dialogue with CPE’s insights of capitalist diversity allowed these case studies to 
illuminate the ways in which supposedly ‘mature’ processes of Europeanisation were 
generative of debt-led growth.   
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 Adopting this framework, the case studies have shown that the periphery did not 
passively participate in a project of European integration that was ‘tailored to core 
Europe’ simply because it was in the interests of the more powerful core for them to do 
so. Rather, they actively and enthusiastically participated because they believed that 
‘tailoring’ themselves to core Europe would lead to their own modernisation. In fact, the 
countries that really stood to gain from membership were the periphery themselves.  
The three case studies have emphasised how, from the late 1980s onwards, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal all began to view their ongoing strategies of modernisation 
in the mirror of the European ‘one-size-fits-all’ project. Existing literature has also 
noted how due to their considerably lower levels and, more importantly, diverse forms 
of economic development than ‘core-Europe’, countries of the European periphery 
tended to view EU membership as a chance to allow external forces to re-shape them as 
modern, mature European economies (Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013; 
Giurlando 2012; Dyson and Featherstone 1996).  
Naturally, the commitment by the EU to significantly increase flows of 
structural funds to the poorer member states and regions of the European Union was 
widely welcomed by Portugal, Ireland and Greece (Laffan and O’Mahony 2008, 14; 
Teixeira 2012, 16).  Similarly, the prospect of remaining outside of the Single Market 
and the euro was largely unthinkable – as a 1961 Irish department of finance 
memorandum anticipating EEC membership put it - ‘[w]e might find ourselves a 
political, as well as an economic, anachronism in the midst of the world’s largest 
political and economic entity’ (see Geary 2013).   
Yet in addition, all three countries were motivated by a shared perception of the 
failures of earlier strategies of development, as well as the opportunity to utilise 
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European integration as a developmental strategy. As I argued in the first section of this 
chapter, the ‘one market one money’ project has helped explicitly define what ‘levels’ 
and ‘forms’ of economic development represent both the ‘accomplishment of modernity 
and the formal confirmation of ‘being’ European’ (Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 
2013, 16) for countries attempting to ‘catch up’. As such, the ‘one market, one money’ 
project created a clear vision and blueprint for the periphery to pursue their own 
modernisation via Europeanisation.  
As I argued in chapter two, emerging agendas of modernisation in 1990s Greece 
were shaped strongly by the economic turbulence of the 1980s. As Greek PM Costas 
Simitis put it in 2005, Greece’s participation in the integration process was the  
‘strongest lever for our exit from a reality of economic and social retardation’ (quoted in 
Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008, 190)  Participation in the Single Market and, 
especially, preparation for joining the euro, allowed the Simitis government (and the 
Mitsotakis government before him) to push for a number of measures aimed at ‘reform’ 
(in spite of many supposed missed opportunities and resilient obstacles (Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou 2008). The modernisation agenda was explicitly framed in relation to 
Europe and, as Featherstone and Papadimitriou note, ‘it had little meaning without 
reference to the need to adapt to the EU’ (2008, 14).  Portugal joined the EC in 1986, 
the same year as the introduction of the Single European Act. As I argued in chapter 
three, the introduction of a series of structural reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s 
were ‘marked by a self conscious escape from the legacy of [the revolutionary] period’ 
(Maxwell 1995, 1). As such, the mitigation of political and economic instability was 
sought through the adoption of, or emulation of certain aspects of the European model 
of modernity. For Ireland, participating in the Single Market and EMU emerged as ‘a 
new zone of consensus’ (Antoniades 2010, 146) which had much to do with Ireland’s 
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export-oriented strategy of modernisation – which would have been unthinkable outside 
of the Single Market and Monetary Union (Ahern 2004). 
The EU tended to be viewed by the periphery as providing tools to overcome the 
problems caused by the instability of recent attempts at modernisation, but also as a 
‘challenge for development’ (Antoniades 2010, 69) wherein Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal could each leave their ‘peripheral’ pasts behind, and converge with their 
Western European neighbours. Deepening European integration represented an 
opportunity for the European periphery to ‘make the journey from autarchy to 
interdependence’ and to embrace international liberalisation and economic growth to 
carry with it ‘the seeds of deep societal change and challenge’ (Laffan and O’Mahony 
2008, 14). As former Prime Minister and President of Portugal Mário Soares put it in a 
1985 interview with Le Monde ‘No if we did not want to miss out on the end-of-the-
century technological revolution, we absolutely had to join Europe. Now is the time!’ 
(Clerc 1985). For Ireland, Europe appeared to ensure that Ireland would have an 
‘industrial rather than a pastoral future’ (Laffan and O’Mahony 2008, 16). As one of the 
epigraphs to this chapter has noted, Costas Simitis, Prime Minister and leader of 
PASOK and its ‘modernizing wing’ from 1996-2004 understood European integration 
as opportunity for countries such as Greece to transform into ‘competitive and dynamic’ 
knowledge based economies (quoted in Antoniades 2010, 72).  Participation in the ‘one 
market, one money’ project entailed that Portugal, Ireland and Greece each attempted to 
adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ development strategy in order to modernise their economies 
and catch up with Western Europe. As Kevin Featherstone recognises, for the periphery, 
modernisation became Europeanisation (Featherstone 2005; 1998, 24). 
Viewing strategies of modernisation as intimately bound up in Europeanisation, 
as the three case studies have done, allows us to move beyond the limits of immaturity 
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and victimisation. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal were at the centre of the eurozone crisis 
because they actively and voluntarily followed the rules of the ‘one market, one money’ 
project in order to modernise. Their participation was never of clear instrumental value 
to core-Europe. Rather, it was the countries of the European periphery that appeared as 
if they had the most to gain.  
Nevertheless, as I have argued, the periphery’s attempt to modernise via an 
attempt to converge with Europe did not lead to economic stability, enhanced 
competiveness and convergence. Instead it led to the generation of multiple and fragile 
hybrid forms of development. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for development 
(Rosenberg 2006), and the attempt by the European periphery to reshape themselves in 
order to adapt to the one promoted by the EU, has had disastrous consequences.  
This argument has the potential to enrich critical approaches to the origins of the 
eurozone crisis. In the first chapter I noted that ‘step-1’ of core-periphery analysis had 
unrealised potential to account for the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis by recognising 
that a beggar-thy-neighbour relationship between core and periphery is not necessary to 
recognise that a model of European integration that was ostensibly tailored to ‘core 
Europe’ was likely to have adverse effects on the European periphery. Yet, the 
narratives provided by the three case studies have gone further than this. They have 
shed light on the ways in which the attempt by the periphery to adapt to a homogenous 
strategy of modernisation was actually generative of multiple and qualitatively different 
patterns of divergence. Core-periphery analysis and other perspectives that claim to 
study the asymmetry or unevenness of the eurozone crisis (e.g. see collected essays in 
Jäger and Springler 2015; Rodrigues and Reis 2012) have been more successful in 
paying attention to the differences between the core and the periphery, but considerably 
less so in accounting for variation amongst the periphery itself. I now return to the 
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discussion in section one, in order to emphasise the ways in which Europeanisation was 
generative of multiple, discrete trajectories of divergence. 
Peripheral Agency and the multiple outcomes of ‘convergence’: accounting for the 
asymmetry of the crisis in the periphery 
Modernisation via Europeanisation resulted in a variety of hybrid trajectories of 
development. By paying attention to the agency of the European periphery it was 
possible to draw out the ways in which a ‘one size fits all’ model of European 
integration was negotiated differently by the different countries. This in turn helps 
explain why Greece, Ireland, and Portugal followed very different paths to crisis. 
Explanations which focus on the passive restructuring of the European periphery 
neglect to pay sufficient attention to the differential impact of external pressures such as 
membership of the euro and single market. As Radaelli and Pasquier (2007) note the 
weight of evidence in EU politics leans towards the notion that external pressures will 
provide different actors with different opportunities and the scope for ‘creative uses of 
Europe’ (39). When Europe ‘hits home’, it has to negotiated and adapted to by domestic 
agents, and the implication of this is that it will have a differential impact (ibid, 39). In 
this section I draw out the important differences between the case studies and emphasise 
the way these differences reflect different levels or forms of agency across the three 
cases. 
As I outlined in chapter two, the modernising reforms of Costas Simitis were 
defined in relation to preparing for the Single Market and EMU. While Greece may 
have been considerably less successful than other countries in tackling structural 
problems relating to pension reform, tax collection and public debt and fiscal 
consolidation (Featherstone 2014, 8; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008), it 
nevertheless succeeded in adopting the various principles relating to banking and 
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finance set out by the Single Market project. In the process, the Greek economy set off 
on a course of transformation from the pre-1974 semi-industrial model to one based 
strongly on domestic consumer demand and import penetration. The transformed Greek 
banking and financial sector has operated as the engine of the national economy from 
the 1990s as it developed rapidly in response to EU reforms. Declining interest rates and 
levels of inflation attracted significant international investment into Greece, and this 
investment tended to flow towards the non-tradable sector, rather than the tradable 
sector (Nicos Christodoulakis 2000, 98) which damaged Greek competitiveness and 
widened its current account deficit. Following EMU membership, this overheating 
continued, severely damaging the country’s competitiveness, widening its current 
account deficit, and consolidating brand new patterns of economic activity.  
However, the impact of European integration on Greece has not been entirely 
consistent. (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Featherstone 2008) and others (see 
various essays in Mitsos and Mossialos 2000; and various essays in Kalyvas, 
Pagoulatos, and Tsoukas 2013) have noted Greece’s poor record in implementing 
reforms relating to pension provision, tax collection and privatisation. Greece’s poor 
reform capacity in this regard contributed to its fiscal and sovereign debt crisis in 2009. 
As such, Greece’s crisis can be understood as stemming from a combination of adopting 
certain EU driven changes, while resisting others. Furthermore, although economic 
growth in Greece became driven by credit fuelled domestic demand, as was the case in 
Ireland and Portugal, Greece ended up with one of the lowest levels of private and 
household debt in the eurozone and, unlike Ireland, Greece was quite clearly not a 
banking crisis (see Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 2009; Pasiouras 2012). Indeed, 
Greece’s poor reform capacity may actually have worked in its favour, as Pagoulatos 
and Triantopoulos (2009) note. Post-EMU accession, reform zeal subsided in Greece. 
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The performance of the Greek banking sector was actually relatively lacking when 
compared with other EU member states. It exhibited relatively conservative credit 
policy stances and a limited integration of the Greek banking system with international 
financial markets. ‘This relative ‘underdevelopment’ including the lack of exposure of 
Greek banks to ‘toxic’ products, proved beneficial during the current financial crisis’ 
(37). As Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos (2009) put it, Greece was actually fortunate, at 
least in this particular respect, not to have belonged to the club of the more ‘developed 
and sophisticated’ European financial systems (51). 
As Chapter Three has shown, Portugal also adapted to the ‘one market, one 
money’ strategy from 1986 onwards after joining the European Community. A number 
of structural reforms were introduced which resulted in the establishment of a newly 
liberalised and privatised banking system. These reforms radically changed patterns of 
economic growth in Portugal during the 1990s – as banks fuelled the inflation of the 
non-tradable sector and generated some of the highest levels of private indebtedness in 
Europe for the country by the end of the 1990s (Royo 2012, 205). This inflated the 
construction sector in Portugal during the 1990s, but not to the same extent as Ireland or 
neighbouring Spain. In fact, in terms of increasing employment, wholesale, retail, 
education, health care and social work saw the largest increases (Reis 2013, 156), and 
construction contracted sharply after 2000. This suggests that phenomena such as 
capital market liberalisation and interest rate shocks do not automatically result in the 
generation of speculative bubbles. As Portugal’s export competitiveness declined in the 
early 2000s, this new pattern of growth witnessed a downturn as over-indebtedness 
dampened consumer demand and as acted as an obstacle to investment (Royo 2012, 
206). Together, the structural reforms and falling international competiveness 
contributed to the transformation of the Portuguese model into an import dependent, 
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consumer driven, ultimately stagnant (particularly from the 2000s onwards) economy 
with a persistent tendency to run current account and public deficits. This experience 
sets Portugal apart from Greece and Ireland. Portugal’s adoption of EU reforms relating 
to banking and finance led to a relatively early pattern of private indebtedness during 
the 1990s. This suggests that, unlike the other cases, Portugal did not experience the 
interest rate shock of EMU with an increase in domestic demand or an acceleration of 
GDP.  Portugal exhausted its domestic demand-led growth at a much earlier stage that 
Ireland and Greece (Lagoa et al. 2014, 66). 
In anticipation of joining the European Single Market and preparing for EMU, 
Ireland began to dismantle its heavily regulated banking sector. With the increasing 
presence of foreign banks in Ireland partially as a result of the EU’s ‘Single Passport’ 
directive, Irish financial institutions faced more pressure to be competitive and this 
promoted the practice of lending funds and ‘a culture of bonus payments to financial 
manages on the basis of short-term success in meeting or exceeding lending targets’ 
(Kelly 2014, 37). Ireland also set itself apart from Greece and Portugal by explicitly 
attracting a transnational financial sector to set up in Dublin’s docklands from the 1980s 
onwards, as part of a broader developmental strategy of FDI attraction (Ó Riain 2012, 
508). Each of these factors promoted the kind of reckless lending practices that were to 
characterise the transformation of Ireland from an export-led model of growth to a debt-
led model in the 2000s with the property boom. The scene was set for the Irish property 
boom in the fifteen years before it began. Ireland may have eagerly participated in the 
Single Market and EMU to promote its export-oriented modernisation strategy, but in 
doing so, unintentionally created the conditions for a property boom and a banking 
crisis. 
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However, as Chapter four has argued, Ireland’s experience of the ‘one market, 
one money’ project was initially highly positive, and especially so during the 1990s. It 
was during this period that Greece and Portugal were beginning to find their economies 
dominated by debt-led domestic demand growth; while in contrast, Ireland was 
experiencing an unprecedented export boom. Ireland’s export-oriented strategy of 
modernisation is also intimately bound up in the country’s experience of European 
integration.  Ireland’s Celtic Tiger was made possible by long standing state-led 
innovations in FDI attraction, but only fully activated once Ireland joined the Single 
Market, thus becoming a uniquely attractive location for inward investment from the 
USA. It was only when this export-oriented growth declined in the early 2000s that 
Ireland found its economy overwhelmed by debt-led activity (Cahill and O’Donnell 
2010). It is reasonable to assume that Ireland would not have emerged as the prominent 
destination for US FDI into Europe without the Single Market and EMU. As such, the 
historical reality of Ireland’s integration has been more complex and contradictory than 
was perhaps realised at the time. Europe was seen (not without warrant) as a necessary 
and indispensible part of Ireland’s modern and vibrant export-led growth, and yet, at the 
same time, Ireland’s eagerness to adapt to the European model created the conditions 
for a severe banking crisis a decade later. 
These differences reflect the different ways in which the ‘one size fits all’ model 
of European integration was negotiated domestically in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
Paying attention to domestic agency in this way is important because it makes it 
possible to explain sources of economic divergence, in a way that approaches 
emphasising passive external restructuring are ill-equipped to recognise. This is a major 
distinction between my argument and those underpinned by assumptions of 
‘victimisation’. The periphery certainly experienced disastrous consequences from its 
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attempt to adapt to the ‘one market, one money’ project. But these consequences played 
out in very different ways and took on very different, not at all consistent, forms. We 
cannot trace the specific sources of divergence, and the multiple paths to crisis followed 
by the European periphery without jettisoning an externalist framework and recognising 
how domestic agency allowed that project to be negotiated in different ways. 
 
Rethinking the ‘design flaws’ of the European project  
The case studies of Greece, Portugal and Ireland have revealed that their respective 
paths to crisis were catalysed by their attempts to adapt to a ‘one size fits all’ project of 
European integration. In an important respect, the findings of this study have much to 
contribute to literature that focuses on the ‘design flaws’ of the European project (e.g. 
de Grauwe 2006a; Papadimitriou and Wray 2012; Lane 2012; de Grauwe 2010; Uhlig 
2002; Scharpf 2011). However, rather than focusing on the ways in which EMU lacked 
the necessary ‘discipline’ to manage economic imbalances or on the ways in which 
monetary union was disastrously incomplete without a fiscal, political or federal union, 
I argue that the real design flaw was the promotion of a project of integration with 
convergence.  
The notion that the European project did not promote convergence efficaciously 
enough resonates throughout numerous (and often otherwise fundamentally 
incompatible) strands of opinion on the eurozone crisis. The publications of critical 
political economists (e.g., Varoufakis and Holland 2011) and the European Commission 
alike (see, for example, the provisions on the promotion of competitiveness in line with 
EU 'best practice' in Greece's latest bailout agreement - European Commission 2015) 
have been united by a shared vision of the importance of deeper and more genuine 
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convergence amongst EU member states in the wake of the crisis (even if their visions 
of how to achieve such convergence differ radically). But the experiences of Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland as it has been traced here suggest a competing interpretation. 
Existing attempts at the promotion of convergence at their most successful have been 
generative of multiple and unanticipated patterns of divergence. This heralds that future 
developments in European integration require a tremendous degree of caution in their 
promotion of convergence. Countries of the European periphery have long understood 
EU membership as a chance to facilitate their re-shaping into modern, mature European 
economies. As I argued in section one of this chapter, since the 1980s relaunch of the 
European project, a Single Market for banking, capital market liberalisation, a European 
level competitiveness agenda, and ‘convergence criteria’, together, have defined, 
concretely, what it means for the European periphery to ‘catch up with Europe’. The 
existence of this project has helped explicitly define what ‘levels’ and ‘forms’ of 
economic development represent both the ‘accomplishment of modernity and the formal 
confirmation of ‘being’ European’ (Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013, 16). As 
such, the ‘one market, one money’ project created a clear vision and blueprint for the 
periphery to pursue their own modernisation via Europeanisation.  
The obstinate promotion of projects of convergence since 1986 has created three 
precarious patterns of divergence for peripheral countries. As such, implementing a ‘one 
size fits all’ model of development across uneven levels and types of economies was 
always unlikely to produce homogeneity of models (Smith 2012).  This is a critique of 
the integration process that goes beyond the claims of the design flaws literature 
regarding the dangers in integrating diverse ‘varieties of capitalism’ into a single 
monetary union (e.g., de Grauwe 2013). Certainly, the existence of very different kinds 
of economies was likely to result in tensions. But what this thesis has argued is that the 
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attempt to mitigate these differences through various measures aimed at convergence 
actually contributed to the emergence of brand new and perilous patterns of divergence. 
This reading of the origins of the eurozone crisis has important consequences for 
how existing political responses to the eurozone crisis should be evaluated. The official 
EU response has been marked by measures designed to correct the immaturities of the 
peripheral states; to drive convergence more extensively and systematically – to prevent 
the periphery from endangering the rest of the eurozone through its ‘failure to 
converge’. Yet, if adaptation to new developments at the level of the EU is understood 
as central to emergence of crisis-prone trajectories of economic development, it 
suggests that a lack of convergence is not the main problem facing the eurozone. In fact, 
quite the opposite is true. The relative severity of the crisis in the periphery can be 
explained by the EU’s commitment to the promotion of a single model of convergence 
across a variety of different European economic trajectories. This ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model of integration promoted patterns of debt-led growth across Portugal and Greece, 
and even contributed to the derailment of Ireland’s development of export-oriented 
growth during from the late 1950s onwards. The crisis in the eurozone is therefore not 
best understood as one of peripheral profligacy, misgovernment or exceptionalism. 
Rather, it is a crisis of a project of European integration that has been underpinned by 
projects aimed at promoting convergence. This has important consequences for even the 
more critical proposed solutions to the crisis. Even if Political Union (Bastasin 2012) or 
a ‘European New Deal’ (see Laciata and Vallintino 2014; Patomäki 2013) are somehow 
pursued, as with any conceivable project of European regional integration, they will 
produce similar tensions unless it is recognised that any project of European integration 
is likely to produce multiple models of development. The challenge is not to heedlessly 
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push for future convergence, but to envision ways in which virtuous patterns of 
divergence can be cultivated within a project of integration. 
 
Conclusion  
Tracing the economic trajectories of Portugal, Ireland and Greece has shown that the 
divergence of peripheral economic models should neither be understood as an 
incomplete modernisation (immaturity thesis) or as a stunted/repressed modernisation 
(victimisation thesis), but as one of many multiple ‘modernisations’ that emerged and 
were transformed via participation in the project of European integration. Since the 
1980s, the European project, tacitly or otherwise, provided a single model of modernity 
for all to follow. In spite of numerous, wide ranging and highly extensive projects of 
convergence, this model of modernity led to the emergence of multiple hybrid models 
of development. In fact, domestic adaptation to this project was generative of 
divergence; adapting to the euro and the Single Market contributed to the declining 
competiveness and financialisation of all three countries. This is at the heart of the 
causes of the eurozone crisis.  
Reinterpreting its origins in this way presents a new challenge to the immaturity 
thesis. It does not matter that Portugal, Ireland and Greece did not follow ‘all the rules’ 
of European integration. The rules that they were compelled to follow led to wholesale, 
and damaging, transformations. Similarly, the argument presented here challenges 
notions of peripheral ‘victimisation’. The periphery actively Europeanised in order to 
further national projects of modernisation. The real design flaw of the European project 
is not that such a process ‘underdeveloped’ the periphery to the benefit of the core, but 
that the periphery were following a blueprint that was to lead to unpredictable patterns 
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of divergence. Greece, Ireland and Portugal, as Alexandre Afonso puts it, were pupils 
that got ‘good grades for learning bad lessons’ (2013). 
The concept of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ can be interpreted as a way 
of enriching domestic level and systemic level approaches in different ways. Although 
narratives of immaturity are disputed, my argument has been developed by paying 
attention to the domestic sources of the periphery’s crisis. The importance of  path 
dependency, ‘immature’ or ‘exceptional’ causes has not been altogether dismissed. 
Rather, I have claimed that these processes cannot tell the full story. By recognising the 
‘non-immature’ sources of the periphery’s crisis, domestic-level approaches can deepen 
their understandings of the crisis in the countries they study. Yet, this does mean that 
these perspectives should move beyond their emphasis of the more readily apparent 
‘pathological’ origins of the crisis, towards a deeper engagement with the systemic, 
European level causes of the crisis which I have identified as pivotal. 
This argument, accordingly, seeks to contribute to critical debates on the role of 
European integration in catalysing the crisis. Core-periphery analysis, design flaws 
perspectives, and other accounts from critical IPE have emphasised the adverse effect of 
EMU and the integration process on peripheral economies. I have sought to deepen the 
arguments of these approaches by emphasising the ways in which the periphery 
positioned themselves into a European hierarchy. This does not necessarily imply that 
the periphery were fully free from patterns of victimisation85, but it does propose an 
analysis that is better able to account for agency, complexity, unintended consequences, 
and asymmetry. 
                                                          
85 Although it does suggest that we re-think what is meant by ‘victimisation’. The periphery clearly lost 
out as members of the re-launched European project. Europe was clearly tailored to a vision of 
development that suited core member states more than the periphery. But notions of dependency do not 
adequately capture the ways in which the periphery was adversely affected by their participation in this 
project, as I have argued throughout this chapter. 
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To sum up, the three case studies, together with this chapter, have implied a 
potentially far-reaching rethinking of the origins of the eurozone crisis in the European 
periphery. Ultimately, the crisis relates to the ways in which Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece navigated their projects of modernisation through the project of European 
integration, and how participation in the latter, shaped those projects for the worse. The 
origins of the very different kinds of crisis in Portugal, Ireland and Greece thus have a 
common catalyst; they are the multiple outcomes of attempts to converge towards a 
‘one size fits all’ model of European development. By taking the history of economic 
divergence seriously in each case, the constitutive role of the EU’s ‘one market, one 
money’ project in the divergence of the European periphery has been established. As 
such, the periphery was not hit relatively hard by the crisis because it failed to converge. 
Rather, it was hit relatively hard because its attempts to converge led, unsurprisingly, to 
unintended consequences.  
As such, following the rules of European modernity, rather than failing to, is 
what accounts for the origins of the crisis in the European periphery. This explains why 
a beleaguered peripheral economy such as Portugal may indeed be, as described in 2013 
by Jacques Delors, the ‘good pupil’ of the eurozone (Delors 2013). Even the most 
studious emulation of European modernity can still produce a fragile, divergent model 
of growth.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I argued that national and supranational projects aimed at fostering the 
economic convergence of the member states of the European Union have, counter-
intuitively, propelled the periphery down divergent paths; paths which ultimately led 
them to their respective crises. The origins of the eurozone crisis were investigated 
across three of the worst-hit countries; Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. By bringing 
literature on Europeanisation studies into dialogue with the insights of capitalist 
diversity, the concept of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ was contributed. This 
made it possible to examine how domestic adaptation to a ‘one size fits all’ model of 
European integration has inadvertently resulted in the generation of fragile trajectories 
of economic development in each country. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, I 
argue that the European periphery got into trouble by ‘following the rules’ of European 
integration, rather than failing or being unable to. 
 This rethinking of the origins of the crisis in the European periphery has 
potentially far reaching consequences for existing academic and political debates. The 
eurozone crisis cannot be fully explained by narratives which stress the ‘immaturity’ of 
the countries of the European periphery. Neither can it be explained by more critical 
narratives which understand the periphery as a victim of German ‘economic 
domination’. Instead, I explain the relative severity of the crisis in the periphery as a 
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product of these countries’ attempt to modernise by tailoring themselves to a ‘one size 
fits all’ model of European development. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on how 
this argument has been developed across the previous chapters, and bring the thesis to a 
close by drawing out the broader significance of my argument for important debates on 
the origins - and future development - of the eurozone crisis. 
 
Development of argument  
I began this thesis by recognising that existing literature on the eurozone crisis has been 
unable to account for its asymmetric impact. The eurozone crisis has had a detrimental 
impact across Europe, but the countries of the European periphery have been affected 
more severely than others (Hardiman and Dellepiane 2010, 473). Moreover, the 
individual countries of the European periphery have followed considerably different 
paths to crisis, making it more difficult than might be expected to speak of the eurozone 
crisis as a single phenomenon. If there have been multiple paths to the eurozone crisis, it 
follows that any policy response will need to take this asymmetry into account. Yet, 
existing debates have tended to downplay, or explain away this asymmetry. 
Chapter one uncovered a previously overlooked tendency, common to both 
mainstream and more critical accounts of the eurozone crisis, to fall back upon and 
reproduce one of two problematic narratives on the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis. 
These were labelled the immaturity and victimisation theses. The ‘immaturity thesis’ 
accounts for the relative severity of the crisis in the ‘PIIGS’ by stressing the central 
roles of fiscal profligacy, corruption, and pathological patterns of national and political 
culture. Had the periphery introduced ‘painful but necessary’ structural reforms in the 
decades before the crisis, the sovereign debt crisis could perhaps have been avoided.  
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Such assumptions continue to generate reams of commentary on Greece, but José M. 
Magone’s analysis of Portugal exemplifies this argument as well anything else: 
[t]here is a social psychological explanation for … [the low productivity of the 
Portuguese economy]…related to the lack of transformation of the values of 
Portuguese society, which tend to go counter with a competitive ethos and 
emphasize a lack of ambition in pushing through major objectives (2004, 223). 
 
The second perspective challenges the immaturity thesis by re-interpreting the eurozone 
as a region characterised by a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ hierarchy between the economic 
growth of the core, which leads to precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery. 
Germany’s economic strategy is centred on low domestic demand, export-led growth 
and a firm commitment to ordoliberal values. Germany has reputedly used the euro to 
advance this strategy at the direct expense of the European periphery. Proponents of this 
approach have seemingly been vindicated, time and again, by Germany’s intransigent 
response to the crisis. It makes perfect sense that Germany should be so inflexible in its 
negotiations with Greece; it has directly profited from the very unfairness that Syriza 
and others want so desperately to change (Dooley 2015a). In fact, without a narrative of 
victimisation, Germany’s response seems difficult to comprehend (as Matthijs 2015 
notes).86 
I have argued that each of these underlying theories of asymmetry have acted as 
obstacles to our understandings of the asymmetry of the eurozone crisis, primarily due 
to their problematic conceptions of peripheral agency, and their inability to account for 
the very different kinds of crisis experienced by countries such as Greece, Portugal and 
                                                          
86 And yet, of course, this thesis strongly challenges the claims of core-periphery analysis. This has 
significance for scholars working on Germany and the eurozone crisis, and could contribute to debates on 
German hegemony (Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Bulmer 2014; Paterson 2011). Future research that 
jettisons ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ assumptions could potentially ask intriguing new questions about 
Germany’s relationship with Europe and the periphery, as forthcoming work by Adler-Nissen (2015) also 
demonstrates. 
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Ireland. Perspectives underpinned by assumptions of peripheral ‘immaturity’ were often 
unable to take the international dimensions of the crisis seriously. Moreover, by sharing 
meta-theoretical assumptions with modernisation theory, they have propagated analysis 
that is insensitive to the ways in which development is pursued and achieved in 
different ways across societies (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002, 93, 95; Eisenstadt 2000; 
Rosenberg 2006) – thereby merely offering explanations as to why the periphery failed 
to generate export-oriented patterns of growth, rather than accounting for the three 
dramatically different forms of divergence that emerged. On the other hand, core-
periphery analysis was found to have overstated the ‘structural role’ of the periphery for 
Germany in its generation of trade surpluses and as a destination for capital outflows. 
The empirical case for a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ relationship between Germany and the 
periphery was exposed as seriously limited. Moreover, while the immaturity thesis 
conflates a ‘failure to converge’ with an explanation of divergence (Hancké 2009) 
narratives of victimisation account for all divergence as a passive function of German 
economic domination. And while the immaturity thesis provides no conception of the 
periphery as capable of acting maturely; core-periphery analysis provides little 
conception of peripheral agency at all. In order to adequately understand the asymmetry 
of the eurozone crisis, I claimed that we need to move beyond the limiting ‘immaturity’ 
vs. ‘victimisation’ debate. 
To this end, I proposed an analytical framework which combined 
Europeanisation studies focus on the ‘domestic adaptation to European regional 
integration’ (Vink and Graziano 2007) with Comparative Political Economy’s (CPE) 
focus on capitalist diversity and its distinction between divergence and ‘non-
convergence’. While Europeanisation and CPE have both long been sensitive to the 
differential impact of Europeanisation, each literature has tended to account for this 
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difference with reference to the ‘persistence’ of national diversity. In other words, 
asymmetry is explained as continuity with the past, and in a theoretically meaningful 
sense, a lack of transformation in the face of the pressures of European integration. 
Taking cue from core-periphery analysis’s recognition that the institutions and policies 
of EMU have ‘taken cognisance of conditions primarily in core countries rather than 
assigning equal weight to all’ (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, 3, 5), I proposed an analytical 
framework that would investigate whether or not Europeanisation has been generative 
of divergence in the European periphery. Combining these two literatures proved very 
productive, as it made it possible to study the ways in which domestic adaptation to 
European integration could have lead to divergence – the fundamental transformation of 
existing domestic structures – and to the emergence of radically new hybrid domestic 
structures and patterns of growth.  
This approach allowed me to build on the respective strengths of the immaturity 
and victimisation theses, while overcoming some of their limitations. Domestic level 
analysis of the crisis is vital, as is an awareness of deep patterns of inequality and 
hierarchy between EU member-states that core-periphery analysis and others recognise. 
The approach I propose makes it possible to examine these important aspects, while 
also bringing the agency of the periphery, and the asymmetry of the crisis, front and 
centre. 
I then proceeded to trace the evolving economic trajectories of Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland in the decades leading up to the eurozone crisis, while being sensitive to the 
possibility that domestic adaptation to European integration could have contributed to 
that evolution. Three new narratives of the crisis in the European periphery were 
accordingly contributed. Across each case, the attempt to achieve national goals of 
modernisation through adaptation to a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration 
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was emphasised. The Europeanisation of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, in this respect, 
was revealed to have acted as a catalyst for the emergence of multiple patterns of 
precarious, non-competitive debt-led growth. 
Beginning with the supposed epicentre of the eurozone crisis, chapter two 
investigated the case of the Greece. Much existing literature tends to emphasise the 
‘exceptional’ character of the Greek crisis, setting it apart from not just Western Europe, 
but also at times, from its fellow peripheral states. Jason Manolopoulos has perhaps 
been less equivocal than many when outlining a nevertheless familiar sentiment - 
‘Greece is not a Western country’ (Manolopoulos 2011, 61). In contrast, this thesis has 
emphasised how the crisis in Greece is better understood as having both ‘exceptional’ 
and ‘non-exceptional’ roots. While it would be misguided to downplay Greece’s poor 
record in reforming, inter alia, its public sector, welfare system, tax collection and 
pension provision, it was argued that these putatively ‘immature’ processes only tell 
part of the story.  Recognising that Greece’s current difficulties have a fiscal and a 
competitiveness component, it was argued that we can best trace the origins of the latter 
by studying the impact of Europeanisation during the 1990s. As a result of 
implementing reforms relating to liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, a 
rejuvenated banking sector became the engine of a new type of Greek economy from 
the 1990s onwards (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 2009). Following the introduction of 
the euro, this new ‘debt-led’ trajectory was accelerated, inflating the non-tradable 
sector, import penetration, and significantly widening its current account deficit. As 
such, Greece’s problems - somewhat incongruously – were caused just as much by the 
EU driven reforms it succeeded in introducing, as by those it failed to. This suggests 
that, although the fiscal and debt crisis may have been greatly mitigated, there is little 
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guarantee that the introduction of ‘painful but necessary reforms’ from the 1980s 
onwards would have ensured the good economic health of Greece today.  
The thesis next turned to the ‘difficult story’ of Portugal (Krugman 2011). The 
narrative begins in the 1980s, when responding to severe political and economic 
stability in the aftermath of the 1974 Carnation Revolution, centre-right governments 
led by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) introduced a number of important ‘structural 
reforms’. These reforms were facilitated by the EC/EU, and contributed to the 
development of a new institutional structure that allowed the expansion of the economic 
growth in the non-tradable sector, fuelled by a newly invigorated banking sector. 
During the 1990s, Portugal accumulated some of the highest levels of private debt in 
Europe, creating a situation of household and enterprise over-indebtedness by the turn 
of the century. Combined with falling international competitiveness resulting from the 
rise of East Asia and the EU’s Central and Eastern enlargements, this private over-
indebtedness contributed to a decade long recession beginning in the early 2000s. 
Existing approaches have attempted to explain this recession as the result of state 
failures to improve the productivity of the Portuguese economy during the ‘good times’. 
In contrast, this thesis has argued that Portugal’s difficulties were a direct result of the 
pattern of debt led domestic demand’ growth (Lagoa et al. 2014) that emerged as a 
result of the ‘structural reforms’ of the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, like Greece, 
the Europeanisation of Portugal’s economic trajectory during the 1990s catalysed a 
divergent and fragile trajectory of growth. Implementing the reforms necessary to take 
part in the Single Market and EMU helped transform Portugal’s economy into one that 
was increasingly inward looking and debt-driven; and fated to burn out rapidly. 
The final case study departed Southern Europe for the North Atlantic. It traced 
the decline of Ireland’s export-led ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom of the 1990s, and the emergence 
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of credit-fuelled property boom in the 2000s. An analytical distinction was made 
between the Celtic Tiger and the banking crisis, in contrast with much Irish IPE 
literature that understands both as two sides of a neoliberal coin (Kirby 2010). 
Nevertheless, it criticised those perspectives that mostly understand the former as 
having been hijacked, squandered and supplanted by immature political and economic 
governance from the late 1990s onwards. The Irish crisis was not, as the late Brian 
Lenihan, former Minster for Finance put it in a memorable interview, caused when ‘we 
all partied’ during the 2000s (RTÉ 2010).  
Instead, chapter four charted the parallel history of how Ireland’s adaptation to 
the Single Market and EMU facilitated the emergence of a highly liberalised and 
increasingly aggressive banking sector, a process beginning as early as the late 1980s. 
Until the mid 1980s, the Irish banking system was among the most heavily regulated in 
Europe. New developments in European integration changed all of this. EU driven 
reforms in banking and finance helped develop Ireland’s notorious system of ‘light 
touch regulation’, and the various reforms required by the 1989 Second Banking 
Directive allowed for the entrance of foreign banks, such as Royal Bank of Scotland and 
others, into the domestic market. These EU driven changes dramatically transformed the 
mortgage lending landscape as mortgage interest rates were reduced, and domestic 
banks began to respond to increasing competition by increasingly promoting short term 
lending with little regard to risk.  The scene was already set for Ireland’s disastrous 
property boom in the decade before waves of capital market liberalisation fully 
activated it following EMU membership. 
 Ireland’s crisis is particularly interesting as a former ‘poster child’ for European 
integration (a moniker that has recently been re-applied to the country in honour of its 
commitment to recovery via austerity (Dooley 2015b). While the Celtic Tiger boom 
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may almost certainly have been unthinkable (Ahern 2004) without a strong commitment 
to European integration, the very same commitment also contributed to Ireland’s 
banking crisis a decade later. The Irish case suggests that the consolidation of 
sustainable, putatively mature trajectories of export-led growth were little defence 
against the emergence of EU facilitated, precarious patterns of debt-led growth. 
 These three case studies were finally drawn together to develop the concept of 
‘modernisation via Europeanisation’. Two important implications of this concept were 
drawn out. First, it was possible to conclude that Greece, Ireland and Portugal have been 
at the centre of the eurozone crisis, precisely because their attempts to converge with 
core-Europe were generative of new patterns of precarious divergence. ‘Bad things can 
happen to good pupils’ – in each case, the countries of the European periphery got into 
trouble by following the rules of European integration, not simply by failing to. This has 
implications for narratives of immaturity, because in each case studied, political and 
economic processes that were, on face value, ‘mature’, propelled the periphery towards 
crisis. While this does not dismiss that ‘immature’ processes also played a role, it does 
imply that domestic level analysis could deepen its understanding of the crisis by 
recognising that ‘non-convergence’ is far from the whole story. 
Second, the agency of Greece, Portugal and Ireland was emphasised in actively 
pursuing their own convergence with a ‘one size fits all’ model of European integration 
in order to facilitate national strategies of modernisation. These countries were not 
passive victims of core-Europe. Rather, they actively ‘tailored themselves’ to Europe 
because they believed it would set them off on a particular trajectory of development. 
Of course, the attempt to converge was far more unpredictable than anticipated, and 
propelled the periphery in multiple, yet similarly perilous, directions. This means that 
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the promotion of convergence among member states – long central to the development 
of the European project – has been fatally misguided.   
Recognising the analytical significance of agency in Greece, Portugal, and 
Ireland made it possible to gain a deeper understanding of the multiple paths to crisis 
followed by each country. Tailoring themselves to a ‘one size fits all’ model of 
European integration had disastrous consequences for all three peripheral countries. The 
‘one market, one money’ project of convergence faced all three as a common external 
pressure to restructure their economies. Yet, contra to narratives of victimisation, I 
showed how in each of the three case studies domestic negotiation of Europeanisation 
mattered. Europeanisation was interpreted, negotiated, and adapted to in different forms 
and at different levels in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. This implies that the common 
pressure of Europeanisation, mediated through Greek, Portuguese, and Irish domestic 
agency, resulted in anything but common patterns of divergence. 
 A deeper understanding of Greece’s crisis will recognise the importance of 
adapting to EU directives relating to banking and finance in catalysing a 
competitiveness crisis, but also highlight the damaging effects of Greece electing not to 
emphasise structural reforms relating to its public sector, its revenue system, and EU 
budget rules. In Portugal, a trajectory of domestic demand and debt driven growth 
emerged as household indebtedness grew at a much faster rate during the 1990s than in 
any of the other cases. Portuguese firms similarly favoured credit over equity financing, 
leading to a recession in the early 2000s as a result of relatively severe overleveraging. 
Ireland experienced particularly contradictory effects of Europeanisation, as the Irish 
state and development institutions developed a long term export-oriented modernisation 
strategy through their embrace of EU driven institutional change. Yet these very same 
processes set the scene for Ireland’s banking crisis a decade later.  
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This argument has the potential to strengthen critical approaches to the eurozone 
crisis that have, so far, relied on narratives of victimisation. Inequalities and hierarchies 
within the European project matter. But these cannot be explained simply through a 
core-periphery dynamic, or on the other hand, solely by pointing out the skewed 
architecture of EMU. Rather, I have established the periphery’s complicity in their own 
positioning within a European hierarchy, through their aspirations to become both 
‘modern’ and ‘European’.87 This should not suggest that the periphery was completely 
free from ‘victimisation’ – it is clear that the European project was tailored to, and 
worked in the favour of countries other than the periphery. What it does suggest is that 
the production of hierarchy, and its outcomes, is far more complex than core-periphery 
analysis posits.88 
  
Significance 
The argument of this thesis has clear significance for scholars working on the origins of 
the eurozone crisis. Above all it has stressed the need for existing literature to take the 
asymmetry of the eurozone crisis more seriously, and to move beyond the problematic 
and limiting paradigm of ‘immaturity’ vs. ‘victimisation’. Neither approach was capable 
of adequately accounting for the many different paths to crisis taken by the countries of 
the European periphery. Nor were they capable of developing a conception of peripheral 
agency where ostensibly ‘mature’ actions counted in any theoretically meaningful way.  
                                                          
87 Adler-Nissen’s forthcoming work on the discursive production of hierarchies within Europe develops a 
similar line of argument (2015).  
88 Future research could certainly build on the argument of this thesis to develop a systemic-level account 
of inequality and hierarchy within the contemporary European project. Indeed, doing so would deepen the 
critical edge of existing critical IPE approaches that have so far relied on narratives of victimisation. 
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The significance of ‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ for narratives of 
immaturity and victimisation can be interpreted as follows. First, while overcoming the 
important limitations of each narrative, I do not suggest that Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland are fully absolved from responsibility for their own crises. Second, neither do I 
propose that the absence of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ dynamics between core and 
periphery should shut down important debates about inequality and hierarchy within the 
EU and the eurozone, or regarding Germany’s possibly (re-)emergent role as a 
hegemon, reluctant or otherwise (Bulmer and Paterson 2013).  
 Rather, in overcoming some of their limitations, my argument aims to enrich 
these existing debates in two main ways. First, although I have stressed the hitherto 
overlooked ‘non-exceptional’ catalysts of divergence in Greece, Portugal and Ireland, to 
ignore parallel ‘exceptional’ catalysts of divergence would be to simply invert the 
problem. For instance, it would be misleading to ignore the role of ‘poor reform 
capacity’ in driving Greece’s fiscal crisis, just as it would be equally limiting to 
downplay the role of Europeanisation in driving its competitiveness crisis. The 
argument presented can potentially act as a complement to domestic-level approaches 
by inviting them to broaden their analytical scope to consider more than simply the 
readily apparent ‘exceptional’ causes of peripheral crises. Such an approach can offer a 
deeper understanding of the crises in Greece, Portugal and Ireland that a straightforward 
rejection of the ‘immaturity thesis’ would miss out on.89 
 Second, although I have challenged narratives of victimisation, the concept of 
modernisation via Europeanisation speaks to important debates surrounding the role of 
Germany, the design flaws of the EU, and the production of hierarchies within Europe. 
                                                          
89 In other words, as already argued, I tackle the immaturity thesis ‘on its own turf’, rather than resorting 
to the externalism of core-periphery analysis and other perspectives.  
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‘Beggar-thy-neighbour’ dynamics between core and periphery have been theoretically 
and empirically challenged, but this does not mean that Germany has not still, perhaps 
uniquely, benefitted from the institutional character of the euro. As I made clear in 
chapter one, the European project has certainly been tailored to a specific, one-size-fits-
all model of development in mind. We do not need beggar-thy-neighbour assumptions 
to recognise that this model may reflect the interests and work to the benefit of certain 
member states while disadvantaging others.   
Indeed, as outlined in Chapter one, my argument draws on ‘step one’ of core-
periphery analysis, and as such, can be argued to contribute to debates about ‘German 
Europe’ and ‘Modell Deutschland’ (e.g., Jessop 2014; Beck 2013a Bulmer 2014; 
Cesaratto and Stirati 2010; Dullien and Guérot 2012; Dustmann et al. 2014). My 
argument has the potential to deepen these existing debates and hierarchy in Europe by 
inviting critical scholars to jettison empirically limited assumptions of ‘dependency’. 
While I argue that the periphery were not passively reshaped, but actively aspired 
towards ‘European style modernity, it is nevertheless vital to remember that the 
countries of Western Europe have long been synonymous with being both ‘modern’ and 
‘European’. The countries of the European periphery were thus situated at the bottom of 
a foundational inequality, because they were seeking to confirm their ‘Europeanness’ 
and modernity by reforming and converging with or towards a model of development 
that has been defined by ‘core’ Europe. The burden of adjustment and convergence was 
thus on these peripheral states and not the core (an inequality well-articulated in this 
way by Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki 2013).   As such, the concept of 
‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ has the potential to enhance existing debates on 
hierarchy, the role of Germany, and the unequal position of the periphery in a more 
249 
 
 
dynamic way is better able to recognise diversity, unintended consequences, and in a 
way that does not forfeit the agency of the periphery in the process. 
If the eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of Greece nor Germany, the argument 
presented here could be brought fruitfully in relation to literature on the ‘design flaws’ 
of the eurozone. In various ways, these approaches emphasise that the eurozone crisis 
was an institutional one, stressing that we need to understand the crisis in the periphery 
in that context. The argument presented here invites ‘design flaws’ perspectives to 
interrogate the notions of asymmetry that underpin their own arguments. While these 
approaches focus on how EMU lacked the requisite discipline or how it did not promote 
a ‘genuine’ union involving banking, fiscal and perhaps federal union, I have argued 
that the real institutional flaw in the European project was not that it lacked enough 
convergence. It is that the very promotion of convergence has generated multiple and 
unexpected patterns of divergence. Hence the distinction made in the introduction 
between convergence as a process and convergence as a project. National and 
supranational projects of convergence were prophesised to create pressures towards a 
process of convergence of the periphery with the core (Hall 2014). I argue instead that 
these very projects of convergence set in motion real processes of divergence.  
  This argument also speaks to contemporary debates on the policy response to the 
eurozone crisis. The ongoing official response to the crisis in the periphery has centred 
on the correction of peripheral ‘immaturity’. The ‘PIIGS’ got into difficulty because of 
their failure to modernise in the decades before the crisis, risking their own stability and 
the very survival of the eurozone. If this diagnosis is accepted, it is easy to sympathise 
with the scathing and exasperated analysis of Francesco Giavazzi; without economic 
and social reforms such as those prescribed by the troika, Greece will remain a 
relatively poor country. So if the Greeks chose poverty, ‘let them have their way’ 
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(Giavazzi 2015). By illuminating the central and adverse role of Europeanisation in 
catalysing non-productive, debt-led patterns of growth across three peripheral countries, 
this thesis adds to the already long list of reasons why such a response is gravely 
misguided. Addressing only the ‘exceptional’ origins of the crisis fails to tackle the 
‘non-exceptional’ causes. And if Greece, Portugal and Ireland’s crises were, to an 
important extent, an outcome of a flawed project of convergence, obliviously attempting 
to impose that same project is unlikely to ensure that all will be well for the eurozone. 
This argument also echoes the invitation first extended by Bache, Bulmer and 
Gunay (2011) which calls for Europeanisation studies and International (or, in this case, 
Comparative) Political Economy to engage more closely with one another (see also 
Featherstone 2008). The authors note that Europeanisation literature has portrayed itself 
as an analytical framework or as a valuable ‘attention-directing device’ rather than a 
theory in its own right. This framing has led to the neglect of meta-theoretical reflection 
(although see recent important exceptions from Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; 
Graziano and Vink 2007). This insight echoes the points made in this thesis – in that it 
has tended to smuggle in unilinear conceptions of development into its debates 
regarding divergence and convergence. By shedding light on how Europeanisation has 
been generative of brand new trajectories of economic divergence, rather than simply 
leaving ‘non-convergence’ behind, it has shown the real potential of Europeanisation 
studies to inform Comparative Political Economy theories of capitalist diversity.  
Moreover, the ‘second image reversed’ framework of Europeanisation has much to add 
to IPE approaches on the eurozone crisis that have tended to conflate ‘externalism’ with 
a theory of the international (see Keohane 2009; Rosenberg 2006; Bruff 2010). Bache, 
Bulmer and Gunay note that Europeanisation literature has ‘not yet caught up with the 
Eurozone crisis’; however, to place it within the limitations of a conventional 
251 
 
 
understanding ‘would be a very incomplete account’ (2011, 18). This thesis suggests 
that it may be just as important for IPE and CPE literature on the eurozone crisis to 
catch up with the study of Europeanisaton, and to once and for all leave behind 
moribund debates on modernisation vs. dependency theory. The concept of 
‘modernisation via Europeanisation’ clearly shows the potential of an interdisciplinary 
dialogue between these two literatures to do just that. 
Similarly, this thesis speaks to ongoing debates within IPE and CPE regarding 
capitalist diversity. As I argued in chapter one, scholars working within critical political 
economy (Bruff and Ebenau 2014), Varieties of Capitalism (Hall 2012) and Uneven and 
Combined Development (Sandbeck and Schneider 2013) have all attempted to 
understand to eurozone crisis by bringing their respective sensitivity to the diversity of 
economic development to existing debates. Similarly, Bruff (2010) notes the need for 
IPE to reconcile the role of the ‘international’ in accounting for distinctive national 
trajectories of development. Yet, the persistence of narratives of immaturity and 
victimisation in existing accounts suggests that the modernisation vs. dependency 
theory debate hasn’t fully gone away, at least for analysis of the eurozone crisis.  While 
debates on capitalist diversity suggest intriguing alternatives to this debate, Bruff and 
Ebenau (2014, 4) recognise that, as of yet, there has been a general lack of reflection 
within debates on capitalist diversity on the implications of the eurozone crisis for their 
respective frameworks. Although it remains for future research to investigate more 
fully, the concept of modernisation via Europeanisation, together with the case studies 
of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, provide a useful starting point for deeper reflection on 
issues of diversity and the role of the international in contemporary IPE. There is 
potential for the empirical contributions offered here to enrich these kinds of debates on 
252 
 
 
the eurozone crisis, but potentially, to also enrich theoretical debates on capitalist 
diversity within IPE more generally.  
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